Data Appendix for Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform

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SECTION ONE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RULES

I follow five rules in constructing the land reform data series. First, I employ the primary sources that provide the most fine-grained data and are the most transparent. Second, when needed, I use the most common, high-quality secondary source data series with the greatest coverage over time. Third, I minimize the number of sources used to construct any data series, ideally employing only one source per series, on the reasonable assumption that the methods used to measure the variable in question are likely to be constant over time within a single source. Fourth, when I had to use more than one source for any country series, I ascertain that the values in the two data series match for overlapping years; this leads me to infer that both sources are employing similar methods or drawing on the same primary source. Fifth, I use the most updated data available from each source, thus making it less likely that I will record a preliminary estimate.
SECTION TWO: CONSTRUCTING GEOGRAPHICAL ENDOWMENTS, REGION DUMMIES, AND REVISED INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS MEASURES

1. Geographical Endowments

I follow Easterly (2007) and control for geographical endowments as the log(%Land Suitable for Wheat to %Land Suitable for Sugar Cane). Because there are some countries where the land suitable for either/both of these crops is zero, I compute the ratio as: log((1+% land suitable for wheat)/(1+% land suitable for sugar)). Unlike Easterly, I use the arable land suitable for these crops within 100 miles of the country’s largest city to address the possibility that country averages mask a considerable degree of heterogeneity and may be biased by areas that are not populated. In order to calculate the arable land suitable for each crop, I use data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) GAEZ (2002) dataset. The FAO computes, based on measures of soil characteristics, such as moisture, temperature, chemical composition, depth, texture, and organic matter, a suitability index for a large number of crops. That suitability index (SI) is scaled from 0 (completely unsuitable for that crop) to 100 (the highest possible yield for that crop under rain-fed conditions). This is done crop by crop, by parcel, on a global scale. Each of these parcels roughly corresponds to 36 mile by 36 mile squares. I then used the parcel SIs to compute, via triangulation, the average SI for each crop 100 miles in radius from the largest city.


2. Region Dummies

I divide the countries in Latin America into four different regions for the creation of region dummies. This classification is based on both geographical proximity and demarcation by area specialists who have contributed to an understanding of distinct cultural and historical legacies in the region. The four regions are as follows:

1. Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama.
2. Caribbean: Cuba, Dominican Republic.
3. Andes: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela.
4. Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay.

3. Revised Institutional Constraints Measures

Two alternative institutional constraints measures are discussed in the manuscript. The first is a measure of Veto Points (POLCONIII), taken from Henisz (2002) with data updated to 2007, that I modify to take into consideration the role of the military as a potential de facto veto player. In constructing this modified Veto Points measure, it is important to recognize that militaries may act as veto players under democracy as well as dictatorship. I turn to Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013), who provide a coding of all cases of democratic regimes in Latin America since
1900 where "military leaders or the military as an institution are able to veto important policies in...areas not related to the armed forces." They code major and partial violations of civilian control on the part of the military for each government administration. I treat both of these as indicating the presence of an independent military that serves as a veto player. I also code the military as a veto player in all instances where these authors coded a regime as being autocratic. Finally, I code the fractionalization of the military (relative to the executive’s preferences) as one-half. This indicates that at least half of the military supports the executive when it has veto player status. A regime is unlikely to stand with majority opposition from a politically involved and powerful military. This is a rather weak assumption; Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), for instance, assume that the military is completely aligned with the ruling elite.

I construct the modified Veto Points measure, called POLCONIII_MIL, using the formula below and building from the rules for the construction of POLCONIII. Data for l1, l2, legralower, legfraupper, aligne_l1, and aligne_l2 are taken from Henisz (2002) with data updated to 2007. Data on the military as a veto player (mil_veto) are generated as detailed above.

\[
POLCONIII_{MIL} = 0 \text{ if } l1==0 \& mil_veto==0 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (2/3)*(1/2) \text{ if } l1==0 \& mil_veto==1 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (legralower)*(2/3) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==0 \& mil_veto==0 \& aligne_l1==1 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (1-legralower)*(2/3) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==0 \& mil_veto==0 \& aligne_l1==0 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (2/3)*(1/2)+(legralower*(2/15)) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==0 \& mil_veto==1 \& aligne_l1==1 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (2/3)*(1/2)+((1-legralower)*(2/15)) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==0 \& mil_veto==1 \& aligne_l1==0 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = ((legralower+legfraupper)/2)*(4/5) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==1 \& mil_veto==0 \& aligne_l1==1 \& aligne_l2==1 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = ((legralower+(1-legfraupper))/2)*(4/5) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==1 \& mil_veto==0 \& aligne_l1==1 \& aligne_l2==0 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (((1-legralower)+legfraupper)/2)*(4/5) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==1 \& mil_veto==0 \& aligne_l1==0 \& aligne_l2==1 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (1-(legralower+legfraupper)/2)*(4/5) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==1 \& mil_veto==0 \& aligne_l1==0 \& aligne_l2==0 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (2/3)*(1/2)+((legralower+legfraupper)/2)*(2/15) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==1 \& mil_veto==1 \& aligne_l1==1 \& aligne_l2==1 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (2/3)*(1/2)+((1-legralower)+legfraupper)/2)*(2/15) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==1 \& mil_veto==1 \& aligne_l1==1 \& aligne_l2==0 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (2/3)*(1/2)+((1-legralower)+legfraupper)/2)*(2/15) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==1 \& mil_veto==1 \& aligne_l1==0 \& aligne_l2==1 \\
POLCONIII_{MIL} = (2/3)*(1/2)+((1-legralower+legfraupper)/2)*(2/15) \text{ if } l1==1 \& l2==1 \& mil_veto==1 \& aligne_l1==0 \& aligne_l2==0 \\
\]
The second alternative institutional constraints measure is POLCONV from Henisz (2000), with data updated to 2007. This measure accounts for the judiciary as another independent branch of government (alongside the executive, lower, and upper legislative chambers) that has veto power over policy change. POLCONV also accounts for independent sub-federal entities as a veto player when they impose substantive constraints on national fiscal policy. Like POLCONIII, this measure takes into account the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit various veto points. Further details can be found in Henisz (2000).
SECTION THREE: CONSTRUCTING ELITE SPLITS FOR LATIN AMERICA

I measure Elite Split according to whether there is a coalitional split between political and landed elites. The political elite is composed of key military players and civilian politicians, and is headed by an elected executive under democracy and a dictator or junta under autocracy. While there may be conflicts and machinations even within the political elite, what they share is the power and organizational capacity to run the government. Landed elites are those economic elites that own land as a "livelihood,...as financial security (e.g. as a hedge against inflation), as a transfer of wealth across the generations, and as a resource for consumption purposes (e.g. country estates held by urban elites for leisure purposes)" (Ellis 1992, 196). Chapter 2 provides a detailed definition of political and landed elites. When political elites are landed elites, are appointed by landed elites, or their rule is fundamentally materially supported by landed elites, I code Elite Split as a “0.” The ruling political elite in this case should be therefore actively avoiding alliances or significant material support from landed groups. Elite Split is otherwise coded as a “1.” When there are very short-lived interim leaders, I do not code these as an elite split unless they have a clear mandate and orientation (e.g., Alarcón in Ecuador).

I code coalitional splits between landed and political elites using a host of country-level primary and secondary sources.

Country Specific Sources

This subsection lists country specific sources for the Elite Split variable, and notes coding decisions and additional information as relevant.

Argentina

Early data are taken from Teichman (2002, fn. 7): "From 1910-1940, 40% of all cabinet appointments went to members of the Rural Society, the organization of large landowners. And for much of the volatile period from 1955-70, particularly under Aramburu, Frondizi, and Guido, big landed, commercial, and industrial interests dominated the significant majority of government posts."

The remainder of the data are taken from Ardanaz et al. (2013) and Molinelli et al. (1999). Large landowners remained in Ortiz’s cabinet beyond 1940 until his death in 1942. His Vice President, Ramón Castillo, assumed the presidency and ruled until a coup in 1943. Several short-lived military leaders ruled with narrow coalitions until Perón became president in 1946. Perón relied on industrialists for support until he was ousted in a 1955 coup (Ardanaz et al. 2013), though landed elites and the Rural Society remained powerful in Congress (McGuire 1997, 70-71).

The military leaders Levingston (1970-1971) and Lanusse (1971-1973) remained allied with large agricultural interests, consistent with a string of previous military rulers in the 1960s (Ardanaz et al. 2013, Teichman 2002). This changed for a brief period under Juan and Isabel Perón from 1973-1976, and then returned under the subsequent string of military rulers from Videla to Bignone (Ardanaz et al. 2013). Beginning with Alfonsin in late 1983 and until the Kirchners, a series of
civilians leaders from the UCR and Peronist Party have split with landed elites (Ardanaz et al. 2013).

Sources:

Bolivia

Landed and political elites were fused in the early 1930s. The Chaco War led to challenges to the hacienda system. A series of more radical military officers (Toro and Busch of the "Chaco generation") ruled the country from 1936-39, enacting a labor code and adopting a constitution that stipulated that land ownership was dependent upon landowners' fulfillment of their social responsibilities (Thiesenhusen 1995, 55).

In 1939, however, senior officers recaptured power, returning traditional political parties and repressing dissent. Oligarchic parties gained a stronger grip on national political power in 1946, ruling amidst strikes and land invasions as the Society of Bolivian Landowners (SRB) won backing for the protection of private property. This ended in 1952 as the MNR seized power through a revolution by capturing key armories in La Paz and distributing weapons to civilians.

From the 1952 revolution until 1979, peasants were a cornerstone of all political coalitions that ruled Bolivia (Klein 1992). This was not broken until Luis García Meza Tejada seized office in 1980, and even then the link with landowners was tenuous.

Siles Zuazo's rule after the return to democracy was built on a coalition of labor leaders, new peasant leaders, various parties of the left, and a group of MIR radical intellectuals (Klein 2011, 239). This gave way to the centrist rule of the MNR in 1985 under Paz Estenssoro. Subsequently elected presidents incorporated landed elite groups such as the increasingly important Santa Cruz elites into their coalitions until Morales and his MAS party was elected in 2005 (Klein 2011).

Sources:

Brazil
Vargas put an end to landowner hegemony. Landowners nonetheless remained politically powerful, and Vargas enlisted them along with the urban middle class and the proletariat to support his regime (Gordon 2001, 143).

Landed elites were able to maintain their power following the 1946 constitution (Ondetti 2008, 11). The first major split came with the election of Goulart in 1961 (Ondetti 2008, 12). Goulart was ousted by the military. The military restricted its coalition's size. Military officers and technocrats were preferred over partisan interests or representatives of economic elites such as landowners. Médici divided his government into military, economic, and political spheres, appointing a chief in each area and cementing the military-technocratic alliance (Skidmore 1988, 108). All actors outside the regime, including landowners, had to work through these chief administrators. The head of economic affairs, Delfim Netto, was a middle-class urbanite (Skidmore 1988, 108). This continued until 1985. As Skidmore (1988, 109) writes, the core of decision-making within Brazil after 1964 was within the officer corps.

The elite split persisted under Sarney until the conservative Collor was elected (Ondetti 2008, 14). Cardoso incorporated conservatives, including landed elite interests, in his coalition (Ondetti 2008, 15). The subsequent PT government under Lula da Silva split from landed elites.

Sources:


Chile

Carlos Ibáñez del Campo won power in 1927 in a sham election boycotted by the traditional parties, and largely steered his own course. Juan Esteban Montero ruled in 1932, having been elected with the support of Radicals, Liberals, and Conservatives. Alessandri became president in 1932 with support from the Radicals, which despite rhetoric supporting workers nonetheless followed its latifundista and capitalist leadership that frequently allied with traditional elites (Petras 1969, 121). Indeed, they joined Alessandri's oligarchic cabinet. The following president, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, was a large landowner (Petras 1969, 121). Juan Antonio Ríos Morales incorporated Socialists in his cabinet, who upheld the hacienda system (Petras 1969, 125). González Videla was elected as a Radical and incorporated Communists in his cabinet along with middle-class Radicals and Liberal members of the oligarchy (Petras 1969, 128). In 1947, however, Videla banned the Communists and turned to the Right for support (Petras 1969, 129-31).

His successor, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1952-58), ran a radically anti-status quo campaign, and gained support of the Agrarian Labor Party and of rural workers and tenant farmers against
landowners (Petras 1969, 165-67). The political coalition of Frei excluded landowners (Petras 1969, 205), as did Allende's coalition. Pinochet, by contrast, was supported by landowners. His democratic successors of the Concertación excluded landowners from their cabinets.

Sources:

Colombia

Liberals and Conservatives from prior to the 1930s up until La Violencia had strong landowner membership (Zamosc 1986). This is true even during López Pumarejo's (1934-38) rule during the "Liberal Hegemony" when he implemented the "Revolución en Marcha" (see also LeGrand 1986). López Pumarejo was the son of one of Colombia's largest coffee merchants, and he himself pursued this profession (Safford 1995, 124). Nonetheless, coffee was produced in various ways, and López Pumarejo chose Alejandro López, a vocal critic of latifundia, as director of the Coffee Federation in 1935 (Safford 1995, 135). López Pumarejo attempted to gain the support of the masses in proposing Law 200 of 1936 (Tai 1974, 170-71). The law was never effectively implemented.

Both parties openly supported the military's seizure of power in 1953. But after Rojas Pinilla sought to increase his power and evidenced a turn toward populist policies, he was overthrown. General Paris Gordillo and a junta of four other generals took power. Paris appointed prominent members of both the Liberal and Conservative parties as cabinet ministers.

Furthermore, landowners from both parties were empowered in government under the National Front (Albertus and Kaplan 2013, Zamosc 1986). Lleras Restrepo (1966-70), however, attempted to increase land redistribution relative to previous National Front administrations. He was supported by an alliance of some sectors of the bourgeoisie, and also attempted to broaden his popular base of support (Zamosc 1986, 47-51). Zamosc (1989, 114-15) argues that this was in part to undercut the rise of populism in cities and to support the expansion of industry by gaining the political support of peasants, and perhaps even to build a rural base of electoral support for a future presidential bid after the end of the National Front. To forward these interests, he promoted peasant organization via ANUC and tried to establish a direct corporatist link between the peasantry and the state (Zamosc 1986). His efforts were thwarted by the resistance of large landowners from both parties (Dugas 2000, 91). Landowners within his successor Pastrana's administration, by contrast, were decisive in squelching reform attempts (Zamosc 1989, 115).

López Michelsen (1974-78) had been more radical for a time, splitting from the Liberal Party to join the Revolutionary Liberal Movement (MRL), but rejoined the mainstream in the mid-1960s (Zamosc 1986, 39).
Significant land reform was tabled after the dissolution of the National Front and the Chicoral Pact, a formal agreement between large landowners and politicians to halt further attempts at reform (Albertus and Kaplan 2013).

Sources:

Costa Rica

From 1919-1948, the (National) Republican Party held office. In its early years, the party was led by the coffee oligarchy (Seligson 1987, 164). But with the election of Calderón in 1940, the party radically altered its ideology and took on a populist orientation. Calderón even formed an alliance with the communists in 1943. Calderón's allies won until Figueres overthrew the government in a coup in 1948 (Seligson 1987, 165). Meanwhile, opposition to Calderón and his communist coalition coalesced around the National Unification Party headed by Blanco, who took office from 1949-53 (Seligson 1987, 165).

In 1951, Figueres formed the PLN to contest the presidency. The PLN formed a rural base of support (Lapp 2004, 45) and began the push for land reform. Figueres won in 1953. In the ensuing years, the main challenge to the PLN was a loose a coalition of the traditional oligarchy, unions, and Calderón supporters. This coalition only displaced the PLN when united, but unification was frequently short-lived given the divergent goals of the groups that comprised the opposition – first the National Unification Party and then the Social Christian Unity Party (Seligson 1987, 168).

The Social Christian Unity Party, again in power in the 1990s and early 2000s, draws its support primarily from larger rural landowners and conservative urban voters (Dendinger 2009, 66-67).

Cuba

Machado (1925-1932) steadfastly allied with landed interests, and was supported by the US. While Grau's radical nationalist legislation was seen by some as a threat to the wealthy landowners that controlled Cuba's economy, the radical left was in fact the most militantly opposed to his rule. The Communist Party denounced him as a "reactionary leader of the 'bourgeois-landlord government.'" (Hirschfeld 2011, 181). Batista withdrew the army's support from Grau amidst popular unrest and installed Mendieta, who was supported by the US (Staten 2005, 62).

Laredo Brú had the support of conservative Republicans and Nationalists, as well as Batista's support (Domínguez 1978, 99). Starting in the 1930s, social and economic groups did not simply use the political parties as mechanisms to express their differences. Large sugar interests, for instance, used the Sugar Stabilization Institute to influence policies in their favor (Domínguez 1978, 95). No president until the revolution dared to undercut their access to the government (Domínguez 1978, 95). The intent of the regulatory system was to identify all organized social interests, including landed interests, and give them stable access to power (Domínguez 1978, 98). The only group excluded was the poor, including squatters (Domínguez 1978, 98).

Beginning in the mid-1930s, as Domínguez (1978, 98) writes, "So long as it did not challenge the basic structure of the system, competition for political office could be relatively free from political cleavages linked to social and economic interests. Politicians did not run on platforms to expel private groups from government bureaucracies but sought support from anywhere." The military in the mid-1930s provided protection for sugar plantation owners outside of Havana (Staten 2005, 63). While electoral choices, particularly from 1940-52, were fairly independent from choices made by organized social and economic groups, government policy was heavily influenced by pressure groups.

Batista in 1940 called for a constitutional assembly that passed a socially progressive constitution. He was then elected with support from the Communists (since they had little chance of being elected themselves), the US, and nearly all social classes (Rouquié 1987, 176). From 1940-44, Batista had the confidence of wealthy elites (Staten 2005, 65). These elites also had a presence in the national legislature and Senate and could block unfavorable legislation.

The following two presidents, Grau and Soccarás, came from the Auténtico Party. They had a leftist, progressive orientation and had the support of radical student groups (Hirschfeld 2011, 185). Nonetheless, as Domínguez (1978) notes, they also had the support of other social groups. Their administrations were corrupt and focused on gaining control over the gambling sector (Hirschfeld 2011, 190).
Batista launched a coup prior to the 1952 elections and aligned himself with large landowners, cultivating ties with sugar plantation owners and others (Domínguez 1978).

Castro and his rebel army that seized power in 1959 was deeply split from landed elites (Álvarez 2004, Valdés Paz 1997). Castro largely destroyed private landowners, and large landowners have never since been incorporated into the political elite.

Sources:

Dominican Republic

Trujillo came to power in 1930 from the National Guard, and formed a narrow coalition with support from the military (Turits 2003). Trujillo did not include landlords and "sought to consolidate his regime by securing popular acceptance in the countryside" (Turits 2003, 81). Following Trujillo's overthrow, several short-lived military and elected leaders targeted landed elites, including those landed elites who were Trujillo's cronies (Stanfield 1989). The exception was the military triumvirate headed by Donald Reid Cabral that overthrew Bosch and his successors (Stanfield 1989). Reid's coup was supported by conservatives (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 130).

When Balaguer came into office in 1966, he took several of Bosch's leftist supporters into his cabinet (Woods 2005, 241), but also brought in landed interests. His National Development Commission was headed by a prominent representative of the landed elite (Stanfield 1989, 308). Nonetheless, his regime narrowed in 1970 and 1974 as he winnowed away opponents and consolidated power in a personalist regime that favored foreign interests (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 150-56).

Balaguer was defeated in a 1978 election by Antonio Gúzman, a wealthy landowner from the PRD. Although Gúzman wanted to nominate another wealthy landowner (Majluta) as his successor, a split within his party led to the nomination of, Salvador Jorge Blanco, who was supported largely by the middle and lower classes, including the rural poor (Wiarda and Kryzanek 1983, 545).

Blanco was ultimately hamstrung by having to accept IMF-imposed austerity in the wake of the debt crisis. He also faced political divisions within his own coalition (Betances 2007, 144). The subsequent elections were again won by Balaguer, who ruled again from 1986-96, this time in a more liberal fashion and a wider coalition that included conservative elements such as landed elites.
The period 1996-2008 was dominated mostly by Leonel Fernández from the centrist Dominican Liberation Party. There was no split with landed elites under Fernández, and although land reform continued at a low level, there was no strong emphasis on redistribution. The one exception to Fernández's rule was the period 2000-2004 under Hipólito Mejía, who had been the Minister of Agriculture under Guzmán and had focused on promoting agri-business in addition to rural development.

Sources:

Ecuador

The Liberals and Conservatives represented contending elite factions and dominated politics beginning in the 19th century (Conaghan 1995, 439). They remained influential into the 1970s. Velasco Ibarra was the exception to largely elite-dominated politics in the 1930s-1940s. Nonetheless, even his early success was due to close ties with traditional elites (Conaghan 1995, 446). The formation of new parties only began in force in the 1950s (Conaghan 1995, 441).

Galo Plaza was US-educated, owned a large cattle ranch near Quito, and ruled in a technocratic fashion from 1948-52. He was replaced by Velasco Ibarra's now more populist and personal rule.

Ponce Enríquez was a former Conservative Party (PCE) member until founding the Social Christian Party in 1951. He represented highland landowners during his presidency (Ameringer 1992, 273), and was from a leading landholding family in the Sierra (Conaghan 1995, 441).

The election of Velasco Ibarra in 1960 brought promises of agrarian reform, but little action was taken after the commission he appointed to study agrarian problems encountered concerted opposition from landholding interests (Redclift 1978, 23). The powerful large landowners associations (Cámaras de Agricultura) strongly opposed the redistribution of private land, instead favoring the colonization of state-owned property or frontier areas (Haney and Haney 1987, 12). The subsequent president, Carlos Julio Arosemena promised to enact an agrarian reform by executive decree, but was overthrown in a coup in 1963 that brought to power a narrow military coalition that ruled until 1966.
Yerovi was interim president for most of 1966 until Arosemena was elected late that year. In late 1966, Otto Arosemena was elected. Although he had served as the populist Velasco's vice president, he incorporated Liberals and Conservatives in his cabinet.

In 1968, Velasco Ibarra became president for the fifth time, as a populist. President Velasco Ibarra was again ousted by the military in 1972. General Rodríguez Lara and a narrow military coalition seized power. They were replaced by another narrow military faction led by Poveda until democracy was reintroduced in 1979.

Roldós was from Popular Democracy, allied with the popularly-based Concentration of Popular Forces for the 1978 elections (Ameringer 1992, 278). His running mate was Hurtado from Popular Democracy (Ameringer 1992, 278).

Febres (1984-88) was supported by the conservative Social Christian Party (PSC) (Ameringer 1992, 280). He was replaced by Borja from the socialist Democratic Left party (Ameringer 1992, 274). Durán won in the 1992 elections after he split from the PSC to form the more right-leaning Republican Union Party. Bucaram took his place but was shortly impeached and replaced by Alarcón, who did not have a strong ideological affiliation (Ameringer 1992). Mahuad was from the center-left and Noboa from Popular Democracy, though he was placed in power via a coup.

Correa was elected on a populist platform and came to office in 2007.

Sources:

El Salvador

"Between 1913 and 1927, interlocking family clans with large landholdings dominated the Salvadorean polity" (Almeida 2008, 37). This included figures such as Quiñónez, Regalado, Escalón, and the Meléndez brothers. There was a brief period of liberalization with Romero Bosque from 1927-30. Romero, who had links to the coffee industry, won in the 1927 elections as the only candidate and introduced political reforms. He was backed by the Partido Nacional Democrático, dominated by wealthy families including landed elites.
Arturo Araujo was elected President in 1931. Araujo was a wealthy landholder, and though he cultivated support of the campesino vote during the campaign, he turned his back on land reform after being elected (Wilson 1969). This provoked a campaign of rural protest and violence in 1931.

Following the 1932 crackdown, the state reconfigured itself in a manner that restricted sustained social movements for the next 30 years (Almeida 2008, 35-36). "In the aftermath of the 1932 events, an informal pact emerged in which the military assumed political control and managed the state while agro-export elites focused on economic production" (Almeida 2008, 60). Landed elites nonetheless played a critical role in the military's support coalition. Mason (1986, 503), writes that as of the 1970s, "The Salvadorean state, still controlled by coalitions of the landed oligarchy and the military, has lacked the institutional capacity (and, perhaps, the political will)" to introduce reforms that split up landholdings or otherwise benefit peasants.

A struggle then emerged in the 1970s between the traditional landed oligarchy and their military allies on the one hand, and reformist elements led by the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and some progressive members of the military on the other (Mason 1986, 505). The main faction of the military made it clear in the 1972 and 1977 elections that the PDC would not win in the electoral arena. A breakaway military faction then staged a coup in 1979 that instated a junta of civilian politicians and military officers that excluded traditional landed elites (Mason 1986, 505). After some instability in the junta, PDC leader José Napoleon Duarte became the nominal head. Landed elites were still excluded from the junta.

In 1982, the Salvadoran political parties decided that it was time to move on from the rule of the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, or JRG, and decided to install Dr. Álvaro Magaña as head of state. Soon after, both political parties met at Magaña's farm in Apaneca and decided that under Magaña's provisional government, both parties would share in the ministerial posts.

The 1984 and 1985 elections were largely a repeat of the 1982 elections between the Christian Democrats and conservative business elites. McElhinny (2006, 55) writes, “The March 1984 presidential election of the center-right government of Napoleon Duarte…dealt a decisive blow to the FMLN strategy of promoting popular insurrection and fended off complete political control by the extreme right under Roberto D’Aubuisson. Despite irregularities that severely challenged the legitimacy of the result, Duarte’s victory reflected the majority preference for peaceful social change that severely conditioned the political-military strategies of the FMLN.”

The subsequent four elections were won by candidates from the Nationalist Republican Alliance, with ties to landowners (Lindvall-Larson 2000). Presidents from this party ruled from 1989-2009, when FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes was elected.

Sources:
Guatemala

General Jorge Ubico seized power in 1931. Ubico took several steps to lessen his dependence upon and the strength of landed elites, such as rotating appointed governors and abolishing debt peonage, cancelling peasant debts to landlords (Berger 1992, 26-30). Waning support from the US along with increasing popular pressure domestically led Ubico to resign in 1944. Dissident military officers and armed students and workers pressed successfully for elections (Thiesenhusen 1995, 74), which were won by Juan José Arévalo. Arévalo, ruling absent landed elites in his coalition, convoked a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution in 1945.

Arbenz followed Arévalo and campaigned in part on land reform, supported by peasant organizations. He was elected in 1951. A US-backed coup in 1954 toppled Arbenz and brought Colonel Castillo Armas to power. Castillo Armas had strong backing and even material help from powerful members of Guatemala's Catholic Church (Steigenga 2001, 68-69), as well as substantial support from the CIA. While the UFCO also supported him, however, "its role in the intervention has been overstated" (Karabell 1999, 107). The intervention was not a result of UFCO's anti-Arbenz campaign; indeed, the US was simultaneously bringing an antitrust suit against the company (Karabell 1999, 107). More important were the local groups that plotted against Arbenz as well as the CIA (Karabell 1999, 107). Indeed, "[t]he elite planters, industrialists, and businessmen who had supported the coup also found themselves locked out of a direct role in Armas' authoritarian government. They were pleased to see the status quo restored to the countryside, but they were not happy that the upstart colonel wielded so much power" (Karabell 1999, 134-35).

When Armas was ousted in a coup, his military rival Ydígoras Fuentes took power. Landowners had supported Ydígoras Fuentes in his campaign against Arbenz in 1950, which he lost (Karabell 1999, 100). Ydígoras had also befriended some of the German nationals that had been expropriated by Ubico during WWII, even returning some of their lands (Friedman 2003, 187). Included in his support group of several military factions were wealthy landowners such as the powerful Roberto Alejo Arzu.

The subsequent president after Ydígoras was overthrown in a coup was Peralta Azurdia. Peralta Azurdia included the right-wing Democratic Institutional Party in his coalition (Ameringer 1992).

Méndez Montenegro was elected in 1966 as a candidate of the Revolutionary Party, which was a progressive political movement built around the democratic reforms of Arévalo (Ameringer 1992, 344), including land reform. When in office, he was forced to concentrate on satisfying
powerful traditional elements (Buckman 2012, 192). His successor was Carlos Arana had the right-wing Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) in his coalition. Laugerud also had this powerful right-wing group in his coalition. In 1978 Lucas García came to power in a fraudulent election and empowered right-wing death squads to wipe out peasant and other labor leaders (Buckman 2012, 192).

The relationship between Ríos Montt and landowners was good in the wake of the March 1982 coup (Handy 1984). Ríos Montt had the backing of rightwing landowners and industrialists (CACIF and UNAGRO) (Schirmer 1998, 149). Ríos Montt did, however, shift and adopt a USAID land reform program and threatened to expropriate land. Mejía Victores, his successor, continued the coalition with landowners and suppressed peasant groups.

Upon democratization in 1986, the Christian Democratic Party under Cerezo took power. This party had close ties with the coffee oligarchy and the MLN in the 1950s (Schirmer 1998, 187). It split in the 1960s, and one line supported a developmentalist policy including agrarian reform. Cerezo, however, realized that the party had to come to an agreement with the military if it was to govern. The mainstream party then tacked right, seeking connections with the military and commercial elites and causing a drop in support by the popular sectors (Schirmer 1998, 188).

The subsequent president, Serrano Elías, brought the Solidarity Action Movement (MAS) to power. The MAS was a party of the right and sprung from Serrano's days in the Ríos Montt government. It was a personal vehicle for Serrano and did not seriously engage social and economic issues (Ameringer 1992, 345).

After Serrano's failed auto-coup, Léon Carpio was sworn in as president. Léon had joined the MLN, served under Arana, had been a legal advisor to the Guatemala Association of Sugar Producers, and was involved in Mejía's coup against Ríos Montt.

A peace agreement was signed under president Arzú in 1996, who was from the moderately conservative National Advancement Party (PAN) (Ameringer 1992, 343-44). Portillo was in office from 2000-2004 under the Guatemalan Republican Front, a party that had supported Ríos Montt's candidacy in the 1990 elections. It then joined with the right-wing Democratic Institutional Party in an alliance. Berger, a wealthy landowner, was elected in 2004 from the conservative Grand National Alliance. His successor was Colom from the center-left National Unity of Hope.

Sources:


**Honduras**

From 1930-1956 (and as far back as the early 1900s), the Liberal Party and National Party dominated Honduran politics. As Ameringer (1992, 373) states, “[p]rominent rural landowners dominated both of these loosely organized, nonideological parties.” This continued through Carías (1933-48) to Gálvez (1949-1954), who was a former United Fruit Company lawyer. Following a contentious 1954 election, a longtime friend of Carías named Lozano Díaz seized power and dissolved Congress (Ameringer 1992, 374).

A military coup deposed Lozano Díaz in 1956 and set elections for 1957. The military junta was narrow in scope, not composed of landed elites. Euraque (1996, 67) lists the key actors: “The top conspirators included Colonel Héctor Caraccioli, head of the air force; Major Roberto Gálvez Barnes, minister of development; and General Roque J. Rodríguez, director of the military academy in Tegucigalpa. These officers then organized a military government with General Rodríguez as its apparent leader, primarily because of his seniority.” This was a watershed even in Honduran politics. As Merrill (1995, xxvii) notes, “For the first time, the armed forces acted as an institution rather than as the instrument of a political party or of an individual leader. For decades to come, the military would act as the final arbiter of Honduran politics.” This was bolstered by a new constitution in 1957 that effectively gave the armed forces autonomy from the executive.

Villeda Morales was elected president on the Liberal Party ticket in 1957. He ran as a moderate reformist, proposing pro-poor policies (Ameringer 1992, 374). His political opponents in the PN and MNR, including landed elites, were divided. Villeda Morales governed without landed elites, but he respected the military's autonomy.

The 1963 election campaign seemed to favor Liberal Party head Modesto Rodas Alvarado, who promised further reforms (Ameringer 1992, 374). Rodas was "the charismatic and fiery former president of the Constitutional Assembly, who promised to large campaign crowds that he would reduce the power of the military" (Bowman 1999). Just prior to the elections, the military launched a coup and López Arellano took power, with support from large landowners (Anderson 1988, 131).

López Arellano stepped down in 1971 and was replaced with a bipartisan National Unity Pact that had a wide coalition (Ameringer 1992, 374). López Arellano, with new political allies, overthrew the government again at the end of 1972. He was supported by labor unions, peasant groups, and progressive businessmen (Ameringer 1992, 374). He was ousted by a group of
young dissident military officers in 1975, and replaced by Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro. Melgar headed the new Superior Council of the Armed Forces, which was formed mainly of lieutenant colonels (Schulz 1994, 44).

Melgar's support waned and he was replaced in 1978 by Policarpo Paz García. Military conservatives regained control and aligned with the PNH for support, which was still populated in part by large landowners (Ameringer 1992, 374). National Party politicians directed many government ministries.

Democracy returned in 1982 with the election of Suazo Córdova. He campaigned as a progressive and then allied himself with military chief Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, who wielded power as a strongman until an internal military coup in 1984 (Ameringer 1992, 375). He then attacked democratic institutions against opposition from both major parties. Azcona took office in 1986, but faced factionalized support and formed a governing coalition of both the PLH and PNH (Ameringer 1992, 376). The conservative Callejas then took office in 1990 with broad support from the PNH and the business community (Ameringer 1992, 376).

The subsequent Liberal presidents were split from landowners and opposed by many elites. PNH candidate Ricardo Maduro took the presidency in 2002, and was succeeded by Manuel Zalaya, a Liberal businessman (Lindvall-Larson 2000).


Mexico

There were three main factions that jockeyed for power during the Mexican Revolution after Porfirio Diaz relinquished power (see, e.g., Albertus and Menaldo 2012). The first faction consisted of small farmers from central Mexico that had lost their land during the Porfiriato. Meanwhile, the development of mining, railroads and manufacturing under Diaz generated a powerful fledgling labor movement. Finally, because Diaz had favored an elite group of industrialists and bankers, a contingent of merchants, mine owners, and ranchers from Mexico’s northern states, represented by Alvaro Obregón, opposed the monopoly rights granted to Mexico
City’s new powerbrokers.

According to the Mexican historian Daniel Cosío Villegas, during the revolution these groups had "totally swept away not only the political regime of Porfirio Diaz but all of the Porfirian society, that is, the social classes. ...Landowners, urban, and especially agricultural, were almost entirely replaced by new ones" (quoted in Tai 1974, 91).

In the wake of the revolution, Mexico cycled through a series of leaders that alienated one or more of these factions and consequently failed to consolidate power. But in 1924, Plutarco Calles rose to power as Obregón’s handpicked successor through a stolen election that was orchestrated by Mexico’s most important (national) labor organization (CROM), landless peasants, and the military’s senior officers. Calles fastidiously courted these three constituencies, incorporating them in his government. This strategy paid off: Calles proceeded to handpick several puppets as successors and ruled behind the scenes for ten years.

Before voluntarily exiting power, Calles was able to fashion a corporatist arrangement that helped him make credible promises to the new beneficiaries of his policies over the previously favored landed and industrial elites (see Haber et al. 2003). The pillar of this corporatist arrangement was the founding of the PRI by Calles in 1929. Calles invited influential generals, regional elites, nascent industrialists, peasant organizers, and labor bosses to join his new political party. The peasantry was foundational to the regime throughout this period (Albertus et al. 2013). The PRI soon monopolized Mexican politics, and continued to do so for 71 years. The PRI reassigned property rights and funneled patronage to the rank-and-file (Huntington 1968, 318-22).

By 1997, the PRI lost the lower house, and it lost the presidency in free and fair elections in 2000 to the PAN candidate, Vicente Fox. The PAN gained much of its support from disaffected economic elites, including large agribusiness owners, that were targeted by the PRI in the wake of the 1982 financial crisis. Fox and the PAN therefore were supported at the top levels by remaining northern landowners. This remained true when Calderón won the presidency under the PAN in 2006.

Sources:

Nicaragua
Nicaragua's political scene since independence was dominated by infighting between Conservatives – aristocratic landowners, cattle ranchers, and large merchants – and the relatively weaker Liberals, composed of smaller (but not small) landowners and artisans. The persistence of this cleavage along with its geographical dimension, with Conservatives based in Granada and Liberals in León, prevented the development of a strongly unified elite (Thiesenhusen 1995).

The pact of Espino Negro brought fighting Liberals and Conservatives to a negotiated agreement in the late 1920s. The pact protected landowners (Thiesenhusen 1995). Sacasa was elected in 1932, and with support from Liberals and Conservatives signed a pact with the rebel leader Sandino that ended his rebellion in exchange for amnesty and land grants for his supporters (Thiesenhusen 1995). Somoza forced Sacasa from office in a coup in 1936. Somoza appropriated much of the land granted to Sandino and his supporters from Sacasa. Somoza's father, Anastasio Somoza Reyes, was at this time a capitalist coffee grower (Williams 1994, 224). Over the next 20 years until his assassination in 1956, Somoza ruled by repression. Landlords that had been frightened by Sandino and peasant organization during the 1930s vested their faith in Somoza to undermine rural unionization and set labor laws favorable to them (Thiesenhusen 1995, 122).

Upon the elder Somoza's assassination, his sons Luis and Anastasio Somoza Debayle took over. They continued to have the support of many landowners (Thiesenhusen 1995). The FSLN, founded in the 1960s and stemming from the anti-Somoza student movements, overthrew the Somozas in 1979. The FSLN had strong support from peasants and excluded large landowners from their coalition (Thiesenhusen 1995, Kaimowitz 1989). This endured across their tenure in power. The Sandinistas lost power to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in 1990, who allied with landowners that had lost out under the Sandinistas (Everingham 2001, Thiesenhusen 1995, Stanfield 1995). The next two presidents had been opposed to the Sandinistas, running in the Constitutionalist Liberal Party, which has Liberal Party roots. The second of these, Enrique Bolaños, had his family cotton farm seized by the Sandinistas in the 1980s.

Daniel Ortega, leader of the FSLN, returned to power via elections in 2007, and again his coalition was largely split from landed elites.

Sources:

Panama
Panama's early Liberal Party was comprised of three different groups: i) Caribbean immigrants and people of mixed African origin living in the arrabal; ii) lower and middle echelon merchants in port cities; and iii) interior landowners, ranchers, and rural landholders of Hispanic descent (Aguirre 2010, 214).

Beginning in the 1920s a socially progressive, reformist (though racist) political group known as Acción Communal was formed around Arnulfo and Harmodio Arias. The party's name changed from the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) to the Panamenista party and was the main antagonist of the upper class for decades before Torrijos came to power (Di Tella 2005, 67). The Liberal Party and PNR alternated in power several times between the 1920s and 1951.

Remón Cantera was elected in 1952. In power until 1955, he was supported by a host of parties, some of which counted landed elites in their ranks: the Renewal Party, the Liberal Party (del Matadero), the National Revolutionary Party, the Authentic Revolutionary Party, the Popular Union Party, and the Patriotic Youth Front. These fused to form the National Patriotic Coalition, which had an ill-defined ideology. Remón Cantera's successors, Ricardo Arias (1955-56) and Ernesto de la Guardia (1956-60), counted landed elites within their ruling coalitions. De la Guardia was "a conservative businessman and a member of the oligarchy" (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).

In the 1960 election, there were three candidates. All of them, including the winner Chiari of the Liberal Party, were wealthy oligarchs (Harris 1970, 179-89). By the mid-1960s, Meditz and Hanratty (1987) write, "the oligarchy was still tenuously in charge of Panama's political system. Members of the middle class, consisting largely of teachers and government workers, occasionally gained political prominence. Aspiring to upper-class stations, they failed to unite with the lower classes to displace the oligarchy. Students were the most vocal element of the middle class and the group most disposed to speak for the inarticulate poor; as graduates, however, they were generally co-opted by the system." The Liberals retained the presidency in 1964 when Marco Aurelio Robles won the election. Robles had served as minister of the presidency in Chiari's cabinet.

A clear break from landed elites occurred when Lieutenant Colonel Omar Torrijos and Major Boris Martínez launched a military coup in 1968 to overthrow Arnulfo Arias, who had been in office less than two weeks. Torrijos became head of the National Guard and the de facto leader of Panama. The Torrijos regime excluded traditional landed elites from its coalition, instead favoring military insiders. Torrijos then reached out to incorporate peasants as a base of support rather than capitalist agro-business (Gandásegui 1985, 216).

After Torrijos' death in 1981, he was succeeded immediately as National Guard commander by the chief of staff, Colonel Florencio Flores Aguilar, a Torrijos loyalist. Flores was forced into retirement in 1982 and replaced by his chief of staff, General Rubén Darío Paredes, who considered himself to be Torrijos's rightful successor (Torrijos had been grooming Paredes for political office since 1975) (Meditz and Hanratty 1987). Paredes was then succeeded by Manuel Noriega, a career military man. Landed elites remained excluded from the top echelon of power.
On the 1989 elections, Furlong (1993, 20) writes, "As their candidates, the new coalition [ADO- C] selected Guillermo Endara, who was associated with the original Arnulfo Arias party...to run for president, along with vice-presidential candidates Ricardo Arias Calderón (of the PDC) and Guillermo Ford (of the MOLIRENA). The Noriega government...chose Carlos Duque to run as candidate for the...PRD, the official government party. When the elections were finally held in May 1989, not only was Duque defeated, but the anti-Noriega forces had won by a margin of more than 2-1. In frustration, Noriega cancelled the results of the election and destroyed all the official ballots." Noriega was shortly thereafter overthrown by a US invasion of Panama.

Endara became president in the wake of the US invasion until 1994. Endara's successor was from Torrijos' PRD. Peeler (1998, 91) writes, "[F]ree elections in 1994 brought to the presidency Ernesto Pérez Balladares, head of the old Torrijos-Noriega Party." The subsequent presidents from 1999-2009 were also from the Panamenista and PRD parties, largely split from landed elites.

Sources:

Paraguay

From the early 1900s until 1930, large landowners resisted reform via the ruling Liberal Party. The status quo largely persisted despite popular pressure for redistribution from peasants who fought and were injured in the Chaco war with Bolivia, only to be sent back to work on latifundios. In 1936, however, Colonel Rafael Franco seized power in 1936 as the head of the Revolutionary Febrerista Party (PRF) composed of soldiers, veterans, peasants, and students (Lewis 2006). Large landowners were excluded from the party.

The Liberals overthrew Franco after 18 months in office, and in 1939 chose General Estiggaribia as president after a brief interlude with the consensus civilian leader Félix Paiva in office. Estiggaribia died in a plane crash in 1940, however, and was succeeded by General Morínigo as an interim leader. Morinigo was a career military man. He quickly solidified his power and eliminated rivals, cancelling upcoming elections. The Liberals in Morinigo's cabinet resigned less than a month after he came to power. Morinigo banned political parties and ruled with a
narrow military coalition until 1948, though he did bring Febrerista and Colorado party members into his cabinet in 1946.

A brief civil war in 1947 resulted in years of political turmoil. Between 1947 and 1953, Paraguay rotated through 18 different presidents. Alfredo Stroessner seized power in 1954 via a military coup. Stroessner had a narrow cabinet composed primarily of military figures with few regional interests or coherent substantive economic interests (Lewis 1980, 115). They were selected on the basis of loyalty. Stroessner subordinated the Colorado Party under the supervision of the army, and made sure that no single organization became dominant over others (Galván 2012, 86). This included landowners. Stroessner used a paternalistic, populist strategy with respect to peasants (Hetherington 2009). Sonntag (2001, 136) writes that the Colorado Party "was little more than the political organization of different factions of the armed forces, whose interests happened to coincide with those of the landowners and the small commercial bourgeoisie." This continued with General Rodríguez, Stroessner's successor, and beyond (Sonntag 2001, 136-37). As a result, populist rural policies continued to a large degree despite the economic power of large landowners (Hetherington 2009).


Sources:

Peru

Lieutenant-colonel Sánchez Cerro overthrew the dictatorship of Augusto Leguía in 1930, and was subsequently elected in 1931. He quickly allied himself with elite interests, including the powerful agro-export industry on the northern coast (Bertram 1991, 412). A constituent assembly named the decorated military man Óscar Benavides president in 1933 when Sánchez Cerro was assassinated. Benavides' cabinets were dominated by traditional elites with landed and other economic interests (Bertram 1991, 418). Benavides called elections in 1936 but then annulled the unfavorable results. Instead, he dissolved the national assembly and appointed an all-military cabinet with strong backing from traditional elites.

Manuel Prado was elected president in 1939 after Benavides' term in a restricted electoral field in which APRA remained banned. He was the president of one of Peru's largest banks and had substantial holdings in other financial insurance institutions (Masterson 1991, 67). The oligarchic Prado family also had a strong resource base in coastal export agriculture (McClintock 1981, 67).
This made him a natural ally of the large agribusinesses that fueled the export sector, particularly the sugar enterprises on the northern coast. Indeed, his vice president was the wealthy hacendado Rafael Larco.

President Bustamante came to power in 1945 through democratic elections, leaning heavily on Prado's constituency, the newly legalized support of APRA, and elements of the growing urban middle class and organized labor (Bertram 1991, 425). Upon coming to office, Bustamante's first cabinet nonetheless excluded APRA (Masterson 1991, 93), as well as established elites such as large landowners (Bertram 1991, 426). APRA's influence grew over time within the national congress and within Bustamante's cabinet: its legislative majority brought down Bustamante's first cabinet and won posts in the newly formed cabinet. APRA's harassment of political opponents and alleged support of the assassination of the La Prensa director led to another cabinet change in which apristas were ousted and the hard-line General Manuel Odría was brought in. Odría bolstered the state's repressive apparatus.

An economic and parliamentary crisis led to the regime’s overthrow in 1948 by General Manuel Odría. Odría’s coup was financed by key business circles and strongly supported by Peru’s oligarchic “forty families” (McClintock 1981, 68-69), which counted the largest landowners in the country among their ranks. The democratic successor to Odría’s rule was again Manuel Prado. His cabinet and Congress were populated with landed elites. Pedro Beltrán, a landowner and the president of the powerful landed elite dominated National Agrarian Society (SNA), was named as the agrarian reform commission chair. Prado elevated Beltrán to the post of prime minister in 1959.

The hectic and indeterminate elections of 1962, which raised the prospect of putting Odría back in office, were cancelled in a coup and rescheduled for the following year. The head of the junta that seized power, General Ricardo Pérez Godoy, was a military man that brought in a strictly military junta and originally called for elections, come what may, and then displayed a desire to remain in office longer. Landed elites were not directly in the political coalition. The prospect of Godoy extending his stay led to another coup in which his original co-conspirator, General Lindley López, overthrew him.

Fernando Belaúnde was democratically elected as president in the 1963 elections that followed quickly after Lindley’s coup. Belaúnde came from an urban family and co-founded the National Democratic Front with Bustamante. He then formed AP and was in office from 1963-68. His political coalition was mostly but not entirely split from landed elites, although the latter were able to stifle the most serious land reform attempts through Congress.

In October 1968, General Juan Velasco Alvarado seized power from Belaúnde with the help of a military coalition of middle-class officers that did not mix in with the exclusive social circles of the landed elite (Albertus 2013). Velasco's coup began the Docenio, a period of autocratic rule that lasted until 1980. With the tacit support of many insiders, then Prime Minister General Morales Bermúdez pushed the ailing Velasco out of office in 1975 (McClintock 1983). Morales at first kept many key Velasco advisers such as Rodríguez, Fernández Maldonado, Gallegos, and Graham (Albertus 2013). Many of these advisers, however, left government as Morales introduced policy changes. Despite these later changes, the support coalition still did not overlap
substantially with landed elites (Kruijt 1994). The new Minister of Agriculture after Gallegos, General Luis Arbulú Ibáñez (July 1976-July 1979), was a longtime military man.

Belaúnde’s second term (1980-85) and Alan García's first term (1985-90) lacked an elite split. The elite groups that remained at the end of military rule played an important role in the transition back to democracy (Conaghan and Malloy 1994), and were therefore important to these governments. This remained true under Fujimori, who was elected in 1990, as well as under Fujimori’s successors through Alan García’s rule from 2006-2011.

Sources:

Uruguay

Landowners were strongest within the National Party (Blancos) in early 20th century Uruguay. They were not, however, entirely absent from the Colorado Party. In fact, "parts of the coastal landowners supported the nation-building, modernization, and secularization project of Batlle and the Colorado Party" (Huber and Stephens 2012). Landowners split during Batlle's second term (1911-15), most supporting the Blancos but some supporting the Colorados. Until 1929, the strength of the National Party in government along with the strength of conservative factions within the Colorado party "prevented the implementation of any reforms that would have affected landed interests in a significant way" (Huber and Stephens 1995, 201).

Intra-party factionalism eroded this, and the more cosmopolitan faction of the Colorados held the presidency at the outset of the 1930s to the exclusion of most landed elites. The Federación Rural formed in 1929 to pressure against reforms that threatened rural interests (Huber and Stephens 1995, 201). In 1933, under Terra's presidency, a faction of conservative Colorados allied with a faction of Blancos (the Herrerista group) with close ties to landowners to exclude other factions from executive power. This alliance ended in 1942, and the more urban and cosmopolitan faction of the Colorados regained the executive until early 1959.

From 1959-early 1967, the National Party (Blancos) controlled the executive, and landowners wielded power within the ruling coalitions. The conservative wing of the Colorados, which
included some large landowners, then captured the presidency from 1967-73 (Cavarozzi 2001, 51-52). Bordaberry implemented an auto-coup by involving the military in 1973, but was pushed out in 1976. The military then ruled with the support of some Colorados (the Pachequists) and some Blancos (Aguerrondo's Herrerists) (Hudson and Meditz 1992). The return to democracy following the Naval Club Pact saw the Colorado Party again predominantly capturing the presidency with the exception of 1990-1995 (National Party rule). This gave way to Frente Amplio victories beginning in 2005, in which landowners played little role.

Sources:

**Venezuela**

The military strongman Juan Vicente Gómez seized power in Venezuela in 1908 and ruled until 1935. Gómez was a large cattle rancher and was allied with landed elites, particularly those from his favored home state of Táchira. Power remained with the same set of military elite (the "Gomecistas") after Gómez's death in 1935 (Powell 1964, 35). This was true under Generals Eleazer López Contreras and Isaías Medina Angarita. Both were allied with wealthy military elites and business elites in export agriculture.

A split began to develop within the ruling elite in 1943. President Medina had encouraged military professionalization and permitted opposition political parties and their increasingly volatile protests to function legally during his rule. This caused a rift within the political party that Medina created in 1943, the Partido Democratico de Venezuela. When the more hard line former president López announced his candidacy for the 1945 election and made clear his opposition to the trend toward change, he was immediately backed by much of the conservative elite, splitting Medina’s support. Medina was overthrown in 1945 by a group of younger officers that feared a López victory in upcoming elections.

The successful October 1945 coup conspirators subsequently formed a seven-member ruling junta named the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, which was staffed by four civilians from the nascent political party Acción Democrática (Rómulo Betancourt, Gonzalo Barrios, Luis Beltrán Prieto, and Raúl Leoni), an independent civilian (Edmundo Fernández), and two military officers from the self-fashioned Union Patriótica Militar, or UPM (Carlos Delgado Chalbaud and Mario
Vargas). AD leader Rómulo Betancourt presided over the junta. Many of the AD civilians were former student leaders from the Generation of ’28, and counted a doctor, political organizer, teacher's union leader, formerly exiled politician, and a lawyer. None were from oligarchic families. Landowners loathed AD from the start given that its party platform called for the dissolution of large landholdings (Myers 2004, 15).

Secret, direct elections in December 1947 consolidated AD's political power. Rómulo Gallegos, AD's presidential candidate, won the election with 74% of the vote. A military faction led by Pérez Jiménez and Delgado Chalbaud then paired with opposition political leaders to overthrow the AD government in November 1948. Supported by the old landed elite, the new junta severely cracked down on AD (Albertus 2013). Pérez Jiménez consolidated power after Delgado Chalbaud was assassinated in 1950 and dominated the political scene until 1958.

Admiral Larrazábal organized a set of military elite to overthrow Pérez Jiménez in 1958. Larrazábal announced elections four days after coming to office. The December 1958 elections resulted in a victory for AD's Betancourt. Betancourt included COPEI and URD representatives in his cabinet in adherence to the Punto Fijo pact, though URD quit within two years (Neuhouser 1992, 124). COPEI was founded in 1946 as a Christian Democratic party and adversary to AD's leftist and anti-clerical tendencies (Crisp et al. 2003, 275). It was a traditionally conservative party founded by Rafael Caldera that originally represented Catholics, the middle-class right in rural areas, and landed elites (Crisp et al. 2003, 283-84; Lynch 1993, 97), with particularly strong support in the Andes.

AD again won the presidency in 1964 under Raúl Leoni. This time, COPEI chose not to accept ministerial posts in his government (Neuhouser 1992, 194). Splits within AD then enabled COPEI's Rafael Caldera to capture the presidency in 1968. Caldera chose to govern without a coalition cabinet, which helped to consolidate political competition between AD and COPEI in Venezuela (Crisp 2000, fn 4 p. 236). His first cabinet members contained COPEI, independents, and businessmen (Crisp 2000, 31). The presidency then rotated between AD and COPEI for the next 20 years until Caldera split from COPEI and won office again in 1994 with the support of an amalgamation of smaller parties, though his positions were still representative of COPEI constituents (Coppedge 2000, 114).

Venezuela’s political system changed dramatically in the 1990s. The charismatic Hugo Chávez was elected president in 1998, promising to end the long-term domination of Venezuela’s entrenched political parties that had presided over an extended economic decline. Chávez built much of his electoral support from poor voters (e.g. Canache 2004, Handlin 2013, Roberts 2003). A former lieutenant colonel, Chávez also empowered the military by enhancing their resources and domestic role and by appointing officers to his cabinet (Trinkunas 2004). By contrast, Chávez largely excluded traditional elites from his political coalition (Handlin 2013, Zúquete 2008). Chávez remained in office until his death in 2013.

Sources:


SECTION FOUR: CONSTRUCTING LAND REFORM VARIABLES

This section contains information on the three main land reform variables: Land Redistribution, Land Negotiation, and Land Colonization. I begin by defining each of these variables. I then list the sources I used to code these variables by country.

Definitions

A. Land Redistribution: Land redistribution is measured as the area of private landholdings expropriated in a given year for the purposes of redistribution. I only code land reform as expropriation and redistribution if compensation is below market value, such that large landowners do not simply receive full payment for their property that they can then invest in other sectors of the economy. In most cases during the period of study, land was expropriated at much less than market value or wholesale confiscated.

B. Land Negotiation: A second major type of land reform is the acquisition of land from the private sector with fair compensation for subsequent redistribution to those with less land or no land at all. The main difference between "land negotiation" of this form and land expropriation and land redistribution resides in the level of compensation received by affected landowners. Whereas land redistribution entails land acquisition at rates below market value, "negotiated" land transfers are those in which landowners are compensated at a value equal or greater to that which they would receive through sale in the private market or otherwise voluntarily sell their property to the state. Because market value may be difficult to assess when land is seized, the way in which land is transferred aids in coding land negotiation. Land negotiation can occur through willing sales by landowners to the state or the creation of laws that require individuals to first offer their property to the state before putting it on the private market. Land negotiation may also occur through compulsory sales with market-value compensation as determined by courts.

C. Land Colonization: In contrast to land redistribution and land negotiation, in which land is transferred from some private individuals to others, land colonization programs distribute state-owned land. The important distinguishing feature of land colonization is therefore the origin of the land that is distributed. When colonization schemes that involve the settlement of rural migrants are implemented on private land obtained either through forcible expropriation at below-market rates or through fully compensated negotiated transfers, I code these cases as land colonization, the state must play a role in the distribution of land. The state's role may either be direct or indirect. Direct land colonization involves the opening up of specific tracts of land for colonization that are then granted as settlers occupy them. In some cases, land colonization involves an active state role in clearing virgin land, relocating settlers, and providing support for agricultural production. The state may also take an indirect role in colonization by simply legalizing certain forms of settlement and then providing administrative infrastructure to recognize land occupation. In contrast to these forms of state involvement in colonization, "spontaneous" settlement or squatting on unoccupied land is indicative of the absence of effective state policy for colonization. Because these are not sanctioned or catalyzed by the state, they are not coded as land colonization.
Country Specific Sources

This subsection lists country specific sources for the land reform data, and notes coding decisions and additional information where relevant.

Argentina

Sources:

Bolivia

Sources:
Brazil

The raw data on all land reform projects since the early 1900s from INCRA (2012) depart somewhat from recent official figures released by INCRA and various presidents. There are two main reasons this is the case. First, INCRA typically releases aggregate figures based on the dates they begin land reform projects. By contrast, I use the dates that land was actually obtained by the government. In some cases, INCRA initiated land reform projects prior to actually legally obtaining the land that it will use, and therefore this is just the beginning of legal proceedings. In other cases, INCRA initiates projects on land that was incorporated into INCRA many years prior but that was previously unused for various reasons. In those cases, we want to know when land was seized rather than when it was settled. Second, INCRA includes in official publications under "purchased land" that land which simply recognizes previously existing ownership. This is true in many native land claims and quilombos, which extend over a substantial portion of Brazil's national territory. These properties were rarely (though occasionally) transferred via expropriation or purchase, but instead formal ownership is extended over lands that were previously de facto occupied by native groups and former runaway slaves.

Sources:


**Chile**

*Sources:*


**Colombia**

*Sources:*


Incoder. 2009. Archivo de INCORA. Database.


Colonized lands (and statistics) in this case are based on the distribution of both state land and purchased land. Furthermore, land that was given to squatters was a mix of private and state land. However, more squatters were given private land than state land (Rowles 1985, 503-504). There were also donated lands and lands titled to existing owners (Barahona Riera 1980, 275).

As a result, I use the squatter figures as a basis for calculating yearly expropriation figures, using expropriation statistics from Villareal (1992, 44), subject to the caveat that expropriations after 1969 are considered purchases given how compensation was structured as detailed in Seligson (1984, 31).

Sources:
Cuba

Sources:

Dominican Republic

Land captured through Law 282 of 1972 (terrenos baldíos) is not counted in the land redistribution figures, since these are principally abandoned properties. When owners claim them but are not using them for production, they are paid 10% of the value in cash and the rest in bonds redeemable within 10 years (Walter and Bidó 2000, 28). Land received by the IAD through donations (primarily from Gulf and Western and the CEA) are not counted in the land redistribution figures. State-owned land recuperated through Laws 283/292, which was abandoned or in some cases occupied by private individuals who were either expelled or given a portion of the land, are not counted in the land redistribution figures. Land negotiation is calculated as those properties acquired by the state through negotiated purchases from private owners. Colonization is coded as including recuperated state lands, donations, and baldíos, all of which were subsequently used for colonization projects (on the use of recuperated state lands, see Article 2 of Rule 2555 that regulates the application of Law 292).

Sources:
Fernández, Félix. 2007. 50 años de vida sindical. Santo Domingo: Grupo León Jimenes.
Ecuador

IERAC/INDA break down the land reform data by type of intervention: 1) negotiations, expropriations, and reversions; 2) parceling of haciendas of the Asistencia Social (state-owned land formerly owned by the church); 3) liquidation of forms of precarismo, which includes trabajo precario, huasipungos, arrimazgos, the enlargement of arrimazgos through purchase in Loja, and the parceling of haciendas by private initiative in Loja. There are also separate data on colonization. I code as land redistribution the first category and all but the enlargement of arrimazgos through purchase and the parceling of haciendas by private initiative in Loja for the third category. The parceling of haciendas of the Asistencia Social is coded along with the distribution of state-owned land via colonization. The enlargement of arrimazgos through purchase is coded as land negotiation. There may have been a small number of negotiations coded along with redistribution, but data do not allow them to be distinguished.

Sources:


IERAC-INDA. 2011. "Información IERAC-INDA." Quito: INDA.


El Salvador

Sources:


**Guatemala**

*Sources:*


**Honduras**

Not all of the yearly data from INA distinguish between expropriation, negotiation, and afectation of national land. Furthermore, some years report land adjudicated, while other years report the amount of land affected. Later figures (e.g. from the INA in 1986) suggest that the discrepancy between adjudications and afectation is not large. CEPAL (2001, 94) indicates that 16% of the land redistributed during the reform was private property. However, Stringer (1989, 363) writes that 15% of the land distributed was "good quality, private, agricultural lands." It is not clear if this includes banana company land obtained by the state in the wake of Hurricane Fifi in 1974.

**Sources:**
Calculating colonized land in the Mexican case is somewhat difficult prior to 1990, because colonized lands came from both public and vacant or state-owned land (terrenos baldíos). Some land colonization was incorporated into the land reform program by the land reform agency (SRA) in the form of new population centers, the formalization of colonies into ejidos or population centers, or the incorporation of colonists into existing ejidos or communities. Some of the land that was colonized, however, came from underutilized private property or properties that violated landholding ceilings. And some new population centers were created on existing ejido land or adjacent private land as village populations grew. Other colonization efforts took place outside of the SRA, such as the occupation of vacant or unused national land. 

Because it took roughly 10 years for land reform petitions to be met, I estimate colonization through colonies in two ways. First, I take data from the agricultural censuses every 10 years on land in colonies. I linearly interpolate these data and divide by 20 to get an estimate of the yearly amount of land incorporated into colonies. I divide by 20 because according to Sanderson (1984), it takes roughly 10 years for a community to gain official state recognition from the time of petition. At the same time, it takes time for the community to grow to reach a size where it would submit such an application. Second, I calculate colonization in the form of colonies directly from grant-level data held by RAN. 

For the occupation of national lands, which according to the 1923 Law of Unoccupied Land applied to vacant land not claimed by the state for the purposes of colonization, I linearly interpolate the data and divide by 12 (given 2 years required to work the land and an additional 10 years personally holding the land) to get an estimate of the yearly amount of national land passed to individuals in this way. 

These two estimates yield similar figures for the period: 12,178,640 ha for the first figure that estimates colonization based on data from agricultural censuses, and 11,620,092 ha for the second figure based on the creation and expansion of new population centers. Because the yearly data for the latter figure cluster later in the series after formal processing has occurred, attributing colonization to years long after it occurred, I use the first series. Beginning in 1990, the SRA reports official yearly land colonization data. 

Sources: 


**Nicaragua**

Sources:


Panama

Sources:

Paraguay

Sources:


Peru

Sources:


Uruguay

Sources:


Venezuela

Sources:
SECTION FIVE: CONSTRUCTING ELITE SPLITS OUTSIDE LATIN AMERICA

I measure Elite Split according to whether there is a coalitional split between political and landed elites. See Section Three above for a complete definition and coding details. As in Latin America, I code coalitional splits between landed and political elites for the rest of the world using a host of country-level primary and secondary sources. This subsection lists country specific sources for the Elite Split variable, and notes coding decisions and related information.

NORTH AMERICA

Canada

From 1900 to 1925, western growers possessed “considerable political power” in the federal government (Fowke 1946, 244-5), largely due to their critical role in Canadian westward expansion. The Borden government (1912-19) was built upon the support of these growers, and the enactment of the Canada Grain Act of 1912 and Agricultural Instruction Act of 1913 marked the high point of their political influence (Fowke 1946, 246). In the mid-1930s, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture emerged as an umbrella organization for agricultural interests. Though the Federation exercised less influence over policy than did its counterparts in Britain and the United States (Skogstad 2005, 196), it remained “one of the most powerful [interest groups] in Ottawa” (Skogstad 2005, 196), enabling “farmers [to] exercise political influence wildly disproportionate to their numbers” (Wilson 1990, 135). Indeed, the CFA developed a close, cordial and trusting relationship with officials in the department of agriculture in the 1940s (Skogstad 2005, 53, 195) and was instrumental in the enactment of state assistance for agriculture in the 1960s (Skogstad 2005, 196). The political influence of agricultural interests merely increased in the 1970s with the emergence of new commodity and farm groups, which – despite their organizational fragmentation on many policy matters – acted in concert to secure farm income supports (Skogstad 2008, 513). As a rule, Ottawa could be expected to be responsive to the dominant producers in central Canada given an electoral imperative to capture rural voters, especially in Ontario (Skogstad 1978, 36). By 1990, Wilson went so far as to assert that “The most striking finding which comes from the analysis of the food policy process is the dominance of farmers almost to the point of exclusion of other food system members” (1990, 135). There is thus no elite split coded in Canada.

United States

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) became the dominant agricultural interest group, and political elites in Congress and US Department of Agriculture worked in lock-step with the organization (Wilson 2005, 168). As Wilson notes (2005, 168), “policy was controlled by a network of Congressional committees composed of rural legislators, the Department of Agriculture and farm interest groups, particularly the AFBF, that helped create the program the Department administered.” In the 1930s and early 1940s, the AFBF was closely involved in the development of New Deal farm policies. Indeed, AFBF President Edward O’Neal “secured a privileged position in dealings with the Roosevelt administration” (Sheingate 2001, 109-110), and would later “confidently report to the Farm Bureau rank and file that Roosevelt had followed the farmers’ demand” (Sheingate 2001, 109-110). Beginning in the mid-1940s, the AFBF’s ties to policymakers weakened with the emergence of a new farmers’ association, the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) (Sheingate 2001, 118). However, as a whole, the agricultural lobby retained its influence; policy proposals vacillated between free market ideas (favored by the AFBF) and government controls (favored by the NFU), but “no fundamental changes in farm policy were achieved for fifty years after the Second World War” (Wilson 2005, 170). Beginning in 1996, a new “farm bloc” reminiscent of the inter-war period reemerged, and US Secretaries of Agriculture were expected not to question farm subsidies (Wilson 2005, 182-183). For instance, Bush II’s Agriculture Secretary, Ann Veneman, had expressed considerable concerns about subsidies, but changed her thinking once in office. Indeed, Veneman refused to take a critical position of a 2002 farm bill that would once more place subsidies on a permanent legislative footing, despite the exhortations of the bill’s opponents (Wilson 2005, 182-183).


WESTERN EUROPE

Austria

In the early 1900s there were two main parties representing the interests of the people: on the one hand, Social Democrats mostly representing workers; on the other hand, Christian Democrats representing the Roman Catholic peasants and the conservative classes, the latter consisting largely of army officers, landowners, and big businesses. The two great mass parties, the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials, were indeed chiefly German in membership, but they had official “programs designed to appeal to class rather than to national interests” (Jelavich, 1977: 145). The urban middle classes, hostile to both workers and peasants, became German Nationalists. But German nationalism was not limited to the middle classes. Many workers and peasants felt themselves to be Germans and responded to the national appeal” (Murray, 2014: 118-119). After 1918, which marked the end of the Habsburg Empire, the German Austrian Parliament still featured Christian Socials, Social Democrats and members representing German-national and liberal parties (Jelavich, 1977). The law abolishing nobility of 1919 and titles was never repealed, even during the period of Austro-fascism (1934–1938). Following the Anschluss to Nazi Germany (1938–1945), this law remained on the books, although it was not enforced, allowing Austrian nobles to use titles freely again. Unlike the nobility in Bohemia (Czechoslovakia), Poland, Russia, or the former Prussian territories, the Austrian nobility never had its lands and riches confiscated. Social measures were introduced by the republican government in order to create more equality amongst the citizens and finance public projects, which put a strain on the traditional land-holding gentry and aristocracy, resulting in the forced sale of many palaces and lands due to the expense of their upkeep. However, there was no measure by the government specifically to target large landowners or nobility; indeed, governments incorporated or allied with them.

Belgium

There was no elite split in early-twentieth-century Belgium, since both landed elites and tenant farmers were incorporated into every ruling coalition. The Borenbond – or Farmers’ League – “was able to forge Christian solidarity among landowners and tenants, instill faith in the leading role of the upper classes and set out family, religion and property as the sacrosanct foundations of society” (Witte et al 2000, 93). Moreover, the Borenbond was incorporated into the Catholic Party (CP), which was in turn included in every ruling coalition through 1940: CP-Socialist-Liberal (1919-21, 1926-27, 1935-30), CP-Socialist (1925-26, 1939), CP-Liberal (1921-25, 1927, 1935m 1939) and one Catholic Party minority government in 1925 that lasted one week (Fitzmaurice 1983, 145). With the end of World War II, the allied government briefly reinstated Pierlot’s Catholic-Party-led government (Witte et al 2000, 170). However, a brief split occurred in 1945 and 1946 when the Catholics voluntarily left coalition governments under van Acker and Huysman over the ‘royal question’ – namely, whether King Leopold would continue to rule as king. A second split occurred when the Catholics were excluded from a Liberal-Socialist government under van Acker from 1954 to 1958 (Witte et al 2000, 190). Since then, Catholics have been represented in every government coalition. In fact, since 1958, Belgian politics has been characterized by consociation, in which solutions to political problems have incorporated the interests of the three different pillars (i.e., Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism) (Witte et al 2000, 2674). With the virtual institutionalization of executive power-sharing in 1970, Lipjhart went so far as to claim that “Belgium is not just a complete example of consociational democracy: it is the most perfect, most convincing, and most impressive example of consociation” (1980, 8).


Denmark

Originally supported by peasants, the Liberal Party that governed Denmark through 1912 had “gradually come to represent the interests of the large landowners” (Andelson 2000, 186). Thus, there was no elite split in early twentieth-century Denmark. A brief split occurred from 1913 to 1914, when a Radical Party government came to power with parliamentary support from the Social Democrats (Miller 1986, 60). Constitutional reform in 1915 created a system of representation in which virtually every party shared executive power and negotiated on major policy reform (Miller 1986, 95; Miller 1991, 26). Moreover, corporatist structures effectively devolved policy implementation to interests groups: as Halpin and Jordan note (2012, 163), agricultural corporatism was characterized by a remarkable degree of self-governance. Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, “it was no simple job to draw the line between the state and agricultural interest groups. The latter were to large extent formed by the former” (Halpin and Jordan 2012, 163). This is echoed by Christofferson et al (2014, 145-50),
who argue that minority government, corporatism, and a tradition of consensual decision-making have created de facto consociationalism in Denmark.


**Finland**

There was no elite split in Finland from independence in 1917 to 2009. Cabinets under conservative president Svinhufvud (1917-18) and liberal president Stahlberg (1919-25) incorporated members of the conservative National Coalition Party and center Agrarian Union (Alapuro 1976, 57; Tornudd 1969, 59). Importantly, the National Coalition Party drew support in part from large landowners (Alapuro 1976, 57), and the Agrarian Union was a rural-class party and thus incorporated both smallholders and large landowners (Arter 1999, 160). Thus, the right-wing Agrarian Union-led government’s “decision to adopt the Lex Kallio Law in 1924 was a truly radical solution since it weighed the compensation to former landlords against aspirations to political and social stability” (Jorgenson 2006, 88). Under the right-wing Agrarian Lauri Kristian Relander (1926-30), the Agarian League veered to the right, becoming in practice a center-right party (Siaroff 1999, 112). Moreover, prominent Agrarians such as Svinhufvud (1931-37) and Mannerheim (1945-46) actively supported the anti-communist Lapua movement of the 1930s, a movement that “was ultimately supported mainly by the larger farmers” (Siaroff 1999, 119). Cabinets in the 1940s and 1950s included members of the National Coalition Party and Agrarian Union, and under Kekonnen (1957-80), Agrarians predominated (Tornudd 1969, 60; Koikkalainen 2010, 90).

Though Finnish presidents were Social Democrats after 1982, every cabinet included members of the Centre Party (i.e., the name of the Agrarian Union/League after 1965), and several included members of the Conservative Party (Arter 1999, 236). In fact, the Holkieri (1987-89,
1990) and Aho (1991-94) cabinets were Conservative- and Centre-Party-led cabinets, respectively (Arter 1999, 236). This “government-by-consensus” trend persisted through 2009. For instance, from 1995 to 2003 “Social Democratic Chair Paavo Lipponen led a so-called rainbow coalition consisting of his party, the Left-wing alliance, the Swedish People's Party, and the National Coalition Party” (Lavery 2006, 159). This was followed by successive Centre-Party led governments under Center-member Vanhanen (2003-07, 2007-10) (Lavery 2006, 159).


Germany

East and West Germany are coded together under the “Germany” label. East and West Germany nonetheless become two separate countries from 1949 until 1989; West Germany is coded as Germany for this period. At the turn of the century in Germany, “the pattern of landholding was characterized by many tiny holdings, small medium holdings (286-1430 acres) and the dominant position of huge estates” (Eddie, 1967: 304). "In Eastern Germany where a handful of Prussian Junkers owned over 40% of the available land, vast grain-producing estates predominated and hindered the development of strong and independent peasantry" (Werner, 1959: 530). Before the Third Reich, the Junkers were very well organized – “the Junkers of Pomerania, the ‘crack regiment,’ founded the Landbund on a platform of reconciliation between town and country. It aimed to embrace all the farm dwellers, farm laborers, peasants and craftsmen, not forgetting landlords […] In any case the Landbund succeeded in uniting the majority of German farmers under the guidance of Junkers” (Brandt, 1935). "Through the professional organization of farmers, the Landbund not only enjoyed a monopoly of representation in agrarian affairs but also injected itself into the various economic deals which were made with industry” (Brandt, 1935). The emergence of National Socialism was closely related to the power of the landed elites: "Two elements forged the connection between landed elite and populist radicalism: an unusually large
and politically influential primary sector which favoured large estates, and a remarkable degree of rural cohesion, especially in the Prussian east" (Baranowski, 1996: 211). Nonetheless, "[T]he Junkers were neither politically nor socially entirely at ease in the Third Reich. Though on the surface the Nazi displayed a scrupulous regard for title deeds, and Federtype resettlement plans rarely got beyond the drawing-board, many Junkers were uncomfortably aware that their heightened affluence masked a decline in status, in that they were gradually becoming administrators rather than owners of their estates" (Grunberger, 1971: 154).

In the summer of 1945, all people owning more than 100 hectares in East Germany were dispossessed. Their land was given to workers living in rural areas, small farmers, and expellees" (Ther, 1966: 790). In East Germany, "by 1958 the agricultural sector still consisted primarily of the 750,000 privately owned farms that comprised 70 percent of all arable land; only 6,000 Agricultural Cooperatives (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften--LPGs) had been formed" (http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5058.html). By December 1959, there was no more independent agriculture altogether in East Germany. The German farmer was given three choices: enter the LPGs, go to jail, or flee to the West" (Naimak 1995: 166). In contrast to East Germany, where land owners were expropriated, their lands having been nationalized, bourgeois interests were still represented in West Germany: "[T]he Christian Democratic parties, at the head of a bourgeois party coalition, proved most capable of operating within the parameters set by the occupation powers (including militant anti-communism)” (Graf, 1984: 170). "What was distinctive about the prevailing ideology of the CDU State can thus be summed up in the formula, clerical anti-communism” (Graf, 1984: 174). There are hints to indicate that landowners (albeit, with more capitalized enterprises) persisted with influence. For example, Graf (1984) makes a distinction between the anticomunism of the bourgeoisie and the anticomunism of the wage-dependent classes, who have different reasons for supporting anticommunism: "Yet anti-communism – meaning here anti-socialism, anti-reformism, indeed anti-democratisation – amounts to an acceptance of the ground rules laid down by the most conservative interests in society, enacting political competition/conflict on their terms and hence ultimately working to the advantage of the Right” (Graf, 1984: 204).

Sources:

France

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, agricultural interests “operated as instruments of political competition and maintained a strong presence in national politics” (Sheingate 2001, 67). On issues like tariffs, republican leaders and agricultural interests – particularly the “club of distinguished landowners” known as the Société des agriculteurs (Tracy 1989, 71) – forged a powerful marriage of iron and wheat (Sheingate 2001, 67). This symbiosis between the political elite and agricultural interests continued with the formation of the Confédération nationale de associations agricole – a merger of the conservative Société des agriculteurs and republican Société nationale d'encouragement à l'agriculture (Sheingate 2001, 93). In the 1920s, commodity-based interest groups became effective partners with the government in the regulation of their respective markets (Sheingate 2001, 80), and in 1924, the French government created a new corporatist organization, the Chambres d’agriculteurs, to formally represent the agricultural lobby (Sheingate 2001, 93). This incorporation of commodity groups and agricultural interests into government through formal corporatist institutions continued until 1936, when the election of a socialist coalition “radically reconfigured national politics” and subsequent policies effectively “took a first step toward complete control of production” (Sheingate 2001, 98).

This split persisted through 1945, when Socialist Minister of Agriculture Tanguy-Pierre sought to “reinforce socialist dominance within the network of farm organizations” through state promotion of the peasant-dominated Confédération générale d'agriculture organization (Sheingate 2001, 163). The split ended in 1947, however, with the appointment of Christian Democrat Pierre Pfimlin to the Ministry in 1947. Pfimlin withdrew state support of the CGA and instead recognized the conservative Federation nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles as the single most important farm organization in France (Sheingate 2001, 164). Indeed, “in less than ten years, the prewar agricultural elite regained its prominence and fashioned an organizationally dominant farm union in France” (Sheingate 2001, 164). A second elite split occurred when the conservatives were excluded from the Socialist and Radical cabinets from 1957 to 1965 and the FNSEA broke off all relations with government (Keeler 1987, 47-8).
The split ended when, in the aftermath of the 1965 election, de Gaulle appointed Edgar Faure to the Ministry of Agriculture with the explicit aim of soothing tensions with the FNSEA (Sheingate 2001, 170-1). From that point forward, the FNSEA enjoyed a corporatist relationship with the state that was “unmatched in either intimacy or originality” as well as “exclusive or privileged access to the decisionmaking centers of the state” (Keeler 1987, 31, 110).


Ireland

The landlords present in Ireland are descendants of the Protestant Ascendancy, which were the descendants of British colonists who had settled in the country in the wake of its conquest by England and colonization in the Plantations of Ireland (1531-1691). This group dominated Ireland politically, economically, and socially. They represented a minority of great landowners. The Land Acts were a series of measures to deal with the question of peasant proprietorship of land in Ireland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Five such acts were introduced by the government of the United Kingdom between 1870 and 1909. "The Land Acts in Ireland reflect the outcome of a political struggle, a struggle between landlords and tenants, between tenants and their creditors, and between Irish Parliamentary representatives and English political parties” (Guinnane and Miller, 1997: 608). “Landlordism, in its effects and record, was to tenants and others the symbol and expression of social injustice resting upon foreign rule” (Davitt, 1904: 120). Nonetheless, early post-independence governments incorporated landowners; indeed, the ruling Cumann na nGaedheal party allied with and even included large landowners despite the latter being squeezed by a changing economy (Cronin 2001, 211). Nonetheless, Irish estates had taken a hit during the independence struggle as well as with the Land Acts. By the 1920s, there were virtually no great, longstanding Irish estates left (Cannadine, 1990: 105-106). Furthermore, "[i]n the period 1923-1932 some 452,000 acres were distributed to some 24,000 families" (Tuathaigh, 1982: 177). By the 1930s, large landed estates had been broken up in Ireland (Dooley 2001, 134). Between 1923 and the late 1930s, the Land Commission had acquired vast sums of land from large landowners, which “was tantamount to ruin” where such landowners were concerned (Dooley 2001, 134). Subsequent governments did not actively attempt to exclude estate owners given their decline; by 1940 the landed elite had been effectively eliminated.


Italy

The government of United Italy served primarily the interests of the ascendant industrialists and the aristocratic landowners (Schmidt 1938, 15). Landed elite dominance was particularly acute in the south, where absentee landlords “[held] the peasantry in economic and political subjection” (Schmidt 1938, 28; Meissner 2006, 40). For instance, Giolotti, who headed multiple governments from 1900 to 1920, used patronage directed to local landlords to produce electoral majorities in rural southern constituencies (De Grand 1982, 11). The fascist government (1930-43) similarly incorporated the Italian landed elite. As Shemidt notes (1938, 159), “enriched peasants, middle-class landowners and small enterprisers….streamed to the ranks of fascism.” Immediately following the war, a brief split occurred under the communist Bonomi government (1944-45). Importantly, Minister of Agriculture Fausto Gullo was himself a communist, and subsequently, he issued a series of decrees that mandated reform of tenant contracts as well as the seizure of uncultivated land (Ginsborg 1990, 60). However, from 1946 to 1947, the communists were purged from the de Gasperi government, and Antonio Segni, a wealthy landowner, was appointed to the Ministry of Agriculture (Ginsborg 1990, 122).

From 1948 to 1953 factions within the Christian Democratic Party pressed the de Gasperi government to split with the southern landowners. As Ginsborg notes (1990, 129-31), an industrialist faction of the DC, led by Angelo Costa, “had no intention of allowing the southern magnates’ pig-headedness to jeopardize the social and political stability needed for industrial reconstruction.” This elite split within the DC ended when after the DC’s electoral losses in the 1953 elections. The DC was forced to govern by way of minority government that relied on the small center and right-wing parties (1990, 145), and the DC developed a “privileged relationship” with agricultural interests groups, such as the Confagricoltura and Coldiretti (Morlino 1998, 215). This relationship between the governing DC and agricultural interests continued through the present-day. As Constantelos notes (2001, 129-30), agricultural interests groups “continue to have considerable influence…they continue to be disproportionately important for their size.”


**Netherlands**

The establishment of special commissions in 1913 to resolve disputes over school funding and the franchise established a “politics of accommodation” in which representatives of virtually every social sector were incorporated into government decision-making (Lijphart 1977, 111). All seven political parties – including the landowner-supported Liberal Party (Koning 1994, 67, 70) – gained membership in the commissions, and, importantly, “the recommendations of the commissions were adopted virtually without change” (Lijphart 1977, 110). With the advent of universal suffrage in 1917, a politics of negotiation among the leaders of the four main blocs – Catholic, Calvinist, Socialist and Liberal – became institutionalized within the “summit organizations” (Lijphart 1977, 112). Daalder similarly argues that after 1917, a balance between the four political blocs produced “centrist and de-politicized policy-making processes” (1979). The “politics of accommodation” is further strengthened in 1950 with the establishment of the Social and Economic Council, a peak organization comprised of representatives from labor unions, employers’ associations, and every major political party (Lijphart 1977, 113-14).


Norway

In Norway, an elite split occurred whenever the emerging Labor party excluded the parties of the right from government. This is because the Conservatives and Agrarian / Center Party represented the interests of the large landowners: Indeed, “the Bp’s [i.e., Bondepartiet, or Agrarian Party] social base primarily embraced larger landowners” (Allern 1997, 23), and the Conservatives ultimately came to be known as a party of landowners and the middle class (Solheim 2001, 929). Elite splits thus occurred from 1946 to 1964, 1971, 1973 to 1981, 1987 to 1989, 1991 to 1996, 2000 to 2001, and from 2005 to 2009 (Arter 1999, 205; Aalberg 2014, 177). Each of these periods reflects Labor Party majority governments. By contrast, parties of the right were too small to comprise single-party majority governments and thus tended to govern as coalitions. Importantly, except for a two-year Conservative minority government from 1981 to 1983, the Center Party was included in every non-Labor Party government (Arter 1999, 205).

Portugal

The landed elite had presided over Portugal’s political institutions for at least two centuries, and their influence persisted across regime changes in 1910 and 1932 (Pires de Almeida 2007, 63). Indeed, Wiarda and Mott (2001, 113) note that “A group of elite families was able to maintain its power up through the Salazar regime [i.e., 1933-66],” and Bermeo argues that the latifundarios were among the most important allies of the post-Republican regime (1986, 15). An elite split occurred with the revolution of April 25, 1974, when the elites of the former regime were replaced a new political elite with ties to either the Movement of the Armed Forces or the communists (Pires de Almeida 2007, 66). Military officers effectively controlled the three provisional governments that followed the revolution (Bermeo 1986, 38). In 1977, Antonio Barreto, a politician endorsed by Portugal’s major landowners’ association (the CAP), was appointed to the Ministry of Agriculture, and subsequently, formerly expropriated land is gradually returned to its former owners (Bermeo 1986, 197-203). In 1984, the creation of the Permanent Council for Social Concertation was created, effectively ensuring that the interests of large landowners are incorporated into the policymaking process. In fact, the political influence of the Confederacao de Agricultores Portugueses (CAP) after 1984 “led to allegations of the colonization of the Ministry of Agriculture by the association, permitting peddling and trafficking to take place” (Magone 2014, 120).


**Spain**

In early 20th-century Spain, both bourgeois landowners and latifundia owners “had close ties with professionals, the administration, and even the military and emerging industrialists” (Linz 1981, 374). From 1923 to 1929, the Rivera dictatorship relied on the financial and landowning elite for support (Linz, Jerez and Corzo 2002, 59). A split occurred in 1931 when a center-left coalition of Progressives, Radicals and Socialists overthrew the monarchy and established a new republic (Malefikas 1970, 163-65). As Linz notes (1981, 382), “the republic proclaimed in 1931 represented a radical discontinuity on the conservative right, in that few of the notables of the political parties of the restoration returned to Parliament. In their place a new generation of politicians appeared.” The Franco government (1940-75) was comprised primarily of military officers as well as large landowners and individuals connected to the Primo de Rivera regime (Linz 1981, 387). Indeed, the military junta was described as committed to “the unchanging Spain of the big landowners and of the monarchy” (Gallo 1973, 27). There was no elite split after the exit of the Franco dictatorship, since the interests of medium- and large-landowners were incorporated into democratic administrations through the corporatist-type organizations established by the Franco regime (e.g., the Agricultural Association-Young Farmers).


Sweden

Swedish governments were dominated by the monarchy and landed nobility in from 1900 to 1905 (Kupchan 2010, 119; Rustow 1955, 6), so there was no elite split. After 1905, when the cabinet was no longer appointed by the king, an elite split occurred whenever the Conservative Party – and after 1921, the Agrarian / Centre Party – was excluded from government. The Conservative Party had emerged from a split within the former Country Party and represented the interests of large landowners (Widfeldt 2001, 2). Similarly, the Agrarian / Centre Party after 1921 emerged as “the unchallenged and dominant farmers’ party” and incorporated both smallholders and large landowners (Torben 1980, 309-10). A first elite split occurred under Staaf (1912-13), who headed a Liberal-Party government that dissolved in the wake of farmers’ protests largely orchestrated by the Conservatives. The Staaf government was succeeded by a Conservative-majority government under Lindman (1907-11) (Lewin 1988, 69). Additional elite splits occurred under Nils Eden (1918-19), Hjalmer Branting (1922-23), Rickard Sandler (1925, 1926-28) and Carl Gustaf Ekman (1930-31), who each led Socialist-led governments that excluded Conservative Party members (Rustow 1955, 82-84, 92, 95-97, 101). A stable Socialist-Agrarian coalition emerged under Per Albin Hansson from 1933 to 1945, so there was no elite split during this period (Rustow 1955, 104; Widfeldt 2001, 5). Yet another split occurred when Erlander’s first Social-Democratic government excluded every political party (Arter 1999, 207). The Centre Party was included in Erlander’s second government (1951-57) before once more being excluded from 1957 to 1969 (Arter 1999, 207). Additional splits occurred during the Social-Democratic majority governments of Palme (1983-85), Carlsson (1986-90), Carlsson (1994-95) and Persson (1996-2005) (Arter 1999, 207).

Switzerland

There was no elite split in Switzerland after 1900. Competition between the Liberals and Conservatives – who incorporated the interests of the landed elite – in the late 19th century resulted in the co-optation of the latter by the former (Kriesi and Treschel 2008, 77). Specifically, the Conservatives were guaranteed a seat on the Federal Council – Switzerland’s highest executive body – and then gained a second seat in 1919 (Kriesi and Treschel 2008, 77). The inclusion of all political parties in executive decision-making is an enduring theme: by 1959, the four main political parties – Liberals, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and the Swiss People’s Party – each held seats on the Federal Council, and from 1959 to 2008, the composition of the Council remained identical (Katzenstein 1984, 124; Kriesi and Treschel 2008, 76). In other words, there was no elite split because the permanent sharing of executive power between Switzerland’s four main political parties facilitated the representation of virtually every sector of society.

United Kingdom

The aristocracy in Britain was historically tied very closely to landholding. Early aristocrats were military officers who the King rewarded with land and noble titles in exchange for their participation in warmaking. Over the centuries they formed strict hierarchies. Primogeniture allowed the accumulation of land and the perpetuation of power without fractionalizing estates.
Furthermore, land was a source of revenue for aristocrats since tenants who lived on their land paid rents.

Cannadine (1990, 37) describes landowner power on the eve of the 20th century: "[A]s the last quarter of the nineteenth century opened, Britain remained essentially a patrician polity. The electorate was restricted to one-third of all adult males, the vote was firmly attached to property, and the great territorial magnates still wielded significant influence in many county and borough constituencies. And as the supreme embodiment of institutionalized aristocratic power and hereditary political privilege, the House of Lords retained the unchallenged right to veto virtually all legislation initiated in the Commons.” The majority of MPs at this time came from the landowning elite (Cannadine, 1990: 153). Indeed, landowners in some ways were becoming more politically powerful at the end of the 20th century than they had been in the middle, when the Conservatives – the most loyal defenders of the landed elite – were wracked by internal divisions (Ziblatt 2015).

The extension of the franchise in 1884-85 and the emasculation of the House of Lords in 1910-11 reduced the power of landowners, yet they remained politically prominent in both the Conservative and Liberal parties such that there was not an elite split at the outset of the 20th century in the UK. Consider the Conservatives: "Between 1898 and 1935, less than one-quarter of Conservative MPs came from landed backgrounds, yet in Tory cabinets, the proportion of landed ministers was never below one third, and in the earlier period was well over one-half" (Cannadine, 1990: 213). "And even as late as the 1930s, Henry Channon claimed that 'it is the aristocracy that rules England, although no one seems to believe it. Of course, with cousinhoods in the cabinet, as with cousinhoods in the Commons, the long-term trend was inexorably downhill: but the period of inter-war Conservative dominance did ensure that the patricians remained numerically more important in the executive than in either branch of the legislature" (Cannadine, 1990: 206). And again from Cannadine (1990, 234): “The grandees and gentry may have been in decline as the governing class, but between the 1880s and the 1930s, the Salisburys, the Devonshires, and the Churchills were more prominent in British politics than their forebears had been for several generations.” This success was in part due to organizations such as the Primrose League that enabled landowners to win middle- and working-class support. Ziblatt (2015, 189) explains: “In the context of the British Conservative Party, given the size and make-up of the electorate, election appeals on socioeconomic issues were a losing proposition. The Primrose League, as a cross-class organization, however, built around sociability and entertainment, provided a powerful vehicle to draw attention to and make appeals with non-class issues, such as Empire, defense of religion, and monarchy.”

By the time of WWII, British landowners were a fragmenting class. Many began to get out of land and into urban business (Cannadine 1990, 136). Others shifted to country government rather than national government, and were quite successful in doing so (Cannadine 1990, 162-63). Wealth, power, and status became more weakly correlated with landowning.

Consequently, post-WWII governments formed a different relationship with landowners. The most powerful landowners by this time were involved in commercial agriculture, and had capitalized their enterprises. Declining domestic pre-war agricultural production along with the German blockade of food imports in the early WWII years led postwar governments of all
political stripes to ally with landowners in agricultural intensification (McCormick 1991, 70). The agricultural lobby became a juggernaut that had immense influence directly in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (McCormick 1991). This was only strengthened by price support with the European Community’s Common Agricultural Policy after 1970 (McCormick 1991). As a result, there is no elite split in the UK post-WWII.


CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Albania

In the early 1900s, political and landed elites were a monolithic entity in Albania, much of the land being concentrated in the hands of a few people. For example, Cungu and Swinnen (1998) argue that after 1912 (year of the independence from the Ottoman Empire), only five families owned most of the arable land and 36.7 percent of all agricultural land (including forests and pastures) in the coastal plain and hilly region of the country. Communism in the aftermath of WWII brought a clear split as landowners were excluded from the ruling coalition. An Agrarian Reform Law set to destroy landowners quickly followed in 1945, which redistributed over 170,000 hectares of land from large land owners to 70,000 families, both to those that had previously been landless and to those with fewer than 5 hectares of land (Stanfield et al. 1992).[...] Large and medium landowners were entitled to retain only 5 hectares of arable land (Cungu and Swinnen 1998). Landed elites gradually lost power until they disappeared completely with the reform in 1976, which represented the year that marked the total abolition of private farming and nationalization of all land: "In this way by 1976 all land had been nationalized [...] 76 percent of the agricultural land was cultivated by the APCs, 21 percent by the SFs and only 3 percent was privately owned" (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003: 5). Land remained in the hand of the state during the communist period until the early 1990s. Various reforms occurred in the early 1990, but successive governments sought to prevent a
reconstitution of the former landed elite. It was not until 1995 that the sale of agricultural land was even permitted (under Law no. 7983).


Belarus

Belarus had strictly state ownership of land through June 1993, when the Law on Land Ownership allowed for private ownership of household plots of up to 1 hectare (Lerman, Csaki and Feder 2004, 70). However, despite a clear-cut ceiling on private land ownership, the large, corporate farms (mostly collective agricultural enterprises) that evolved from Soviet-era collective and state farms remained intact and were largely viewed as a “backbone of agriculture” (Lerman, Csaki and Feder 2004, 70). These large farms continue to have strong political links with regional and national authorities (Lerman, Csaki and Feder 2004, 70). Given the persistence of large, corporate farms—as well as the ongoing political influence of those farms—there was no elite split in Belarus after 1991. Relatedly, a private landed elite was destroyed in Belarus under communism; agricultural land remains state-owned, and private ownership of agricultural land remains prohibited (Hartvigsen 2014, 338).


Bosnia Herzegovina
There was no elite split in Bosnia Herzegovina after independence in 1992. The farm structure in Bosnia after 1991 was dominated by small and highly fragmented family farms (Hartvigsen 2013, 35; Williams 2013, 145). Upon transition, roughly 96 percent of land was already privately owned, and while most landholdings were small, fragmented farms, there remained a few large, state and former collective farms – often the successors of the SOEs (Hartvigsen 2013, 35). Restitution policies largely favored workers in these large farms. As Thomas notes (2006, 230), “third parties that in good faith obtained property subject to restitution are protected against restitution in land. Also, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, enterprises established before a specific date, along with the land and buildings necessary for their present and future operation, are not subject to restitution in kind.” There has been virtually no land reform in Bosnia Herzegovina since the collapse of Yugoslav socialism (Hartvigsen 2014, 335; Thomas 2006, 231; Giovarelli and Bledsoe 2001, 25). There has thus been no reconstitution of a former landed elite.


**Bulgaria**

In Bulgaria, like in many Eastern European cases, the power of the landed elites and traditional aristocracies was still formidable in the early 20th century (Richards and Waibel, 2014: 111). Indeed, King Ferdinand I and his family were wealthy, landed nobility with extensive landholdings. An elite split arose, however, immediately after WWI with the rise of Stamboliski, a political outsider from the Agrarian Union, which was a peasant movement. Stamboliski led the Bulgarian Agricultural Union (BANU) to a 1919 electoral win with 31% of the vote. BANU shunned the communists and instead formed a coalition with the democrats. "[I]n the early 1920s…the radical Agrarians, under the leadership of Stamboliski, replaced the small and corrupt landowning elite. Stamboliski, in fact began the formation of a peasant-based society in which the co-operative associations were to be given a far more significant role than anywhere else" (Jorgensen 2006: 75). This split persisted into WWII. After 1946, the elite split continued under communist rule. There was central planning as agricultural land was consolidated under the campaign for collectivization, which meant that land came "under outright state ownership or cooperative control" (Howe, 1998: 211; Davidova, Buckwell and Kopeva, 1997: 25). Although
most small farmers had joined collectives, by 1949, only 12 percent of arable land was under state control – mainly because the collectivization program alienated many peasants. But between 1950 and 1953, the Stalinist regime of Vulko Chervenkov used threats, violence, and supply discrimination to produce the fastest pace of collectivization in Eastern Europe. The process was declared complete in 1958, when 92 percent of arable land belonged to large collective farms. This ended the first phase of Bulgarian postwar agricultural restructuring (Howe, 1998).

"In 1986 agricultural land under state control amounted to well over 80 percent of the total, individual use in small plots by collective farm workers" (Howe, 1998: 210). After 1991, however, there were reforms to restore land to the original owners: "in principle, restitution of land to its previous owners or their heirs should be most easily accomplished where evidence is available for the actual location of the property" (Howe, 1998: 212). "According to official sources, by the end of 1995, some 3.75 million hectares (69.1 percent of the total area farm land in Bulgaria) had reverted to its former owners" (Howe, 1998: 218). This was principally done in small plots, however. Privatization beginning in 1991 did not immediately reconstitute a landed elite. Rather, a new landed elite began to emerge after 1993 as the number of farming companies grew (Davidova et al 1997, 290).

Croatia

“The Croatian agricultural sector has two different production systems: private family farms and agricultural companies” (Penavic and Medic, 2005: 6). Historically, three circumstances shaped the present agricultural structure in Croatia. The first was the political and economic barriers imposed on family farms in the former socialist system, such as enforced collectivization, limited private ownership, and a maximum land holding 10 hectares introduced in 1953, insisting on the so-called “socially-owned” agricultural sector and, generally, the treatment of family farm as a historical remnant (Zutinic and Grgic, 2010: 523). Since Croatia’s independence in 1991, all formerly socially-owned agricultural land has become state-owned (Svrznjak and Franic, 2014: 53). There is therefore no elite split in Croatia since independence. “Since 2002 the process of disposing and privatizing state-owned agricultural land has been decentralized because it is implemented on the local level in accordance with Programs for the disposal of state-owned agricultural land, approved by the Ministry of Agriculture” (Svrznjak and Franic, 2014: 53). “The privatization of the state-owned agricultural land, besides sales activities, is also done through the return of taken property” (Svrznjak and Franic, 2014: 54). "In 2009, the Farm register had 190,672 entries, of which 96% were family farms and 4% agricultural companies and cooperatives […] Of the total number, 63.1% farms have up to 3 hectares of land, one third (33.4%) from 3 to 20 hectares, and only 3.6% are farms with 20 hectares and more of land” (Zutinic and Grgic, 2010: 522-523). The agricultural companies are “the remaining or reorganized structures of the ex-socially-owned agricultural cooperatives. Some of these are partly owned by the government and are soon to be privatized. The average size of agricultural companies is 159 ha (Penavic and Medic, 2005: 6).


Cyprus

The land question in Cyprus is very much affected by the tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, especially starting with the second half of the twentieth century. “The exchange in
populations between the north and the south of the island did not occur immediately after the Turkish intervention in 1974, and took place under different conditions for the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations (Loizos 1981)” (Scott, 1998: 147). “The registration of property was managed by the Ministry of Resettlement (Iksan), established in 1976. In accordance with legislation enacted the following year, it allocated points to Turkish Cypriot refugees according to the value of the land and other property they had left in the south. These points could then be exchanged with certificates of ownership for Greek Cypriot property in the north. This has been a slow and painful process, with the result that in 1993 nearly one third of applicants were still waiting for certificates of ownership to be issued” (Scott, 1998: 149). The 1960 Cypriot Constitution provided for a presidential system of government with independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as a complex system of checks and balances including a weighted power-sharing ratio designed to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots (Burton, 1988). No split between landed elites and political elites has thus arisen; the principal axis of political contention between Greeks and Turks has lent a hand to landowners in government. Burton, S. P. 1988. "Land consolidation in Cyprus: A vital policy for rural reconstruction." Land Use Policy, 5(1): 131-147

Czech Republic

Landed elites were eliminated under communism in Czechoslovakia with collectivization before the Czech Republic becomes an independent country. After 1989, “[t]he extent of restitution and privatization has no parallel in the whole known history of the country. Enormous political pressures for fast progress of the whole process have been managed to support the development of the cadaster, which has proved to be essential to its success” (Rydvil and Pesl, 1995: 347). Governing coalitions were not strictly opposed to the reconstitution of large landholdings, although in the early post-independence years "properties returned in the restitution process were usually not too large (middle and lower peasantry was the single strongest group in the pre-war Czechoslovak countryside in terms of numbers)” (Majerova, 2000: 173). By 1994, “co-operatives farmed 47.7% of agricultural land, other corporate bodies (successor companies to collective farms) farmed 25.7%, and private individual farms accounted for 23.2%. Over 80% of private individual farms were of less than 10 hectares, and around 2% of individual private farms were over 100 hectares” (Swain, 2010: 1210). (Swain, 2010: 1212) explains: “The small number of large privately owned farms in the Czech Republic are mainly the ventures of the lucky inheritors of ‘residual estates’.” The “lucky inheritors” usually inherited manor houses and estate buildings, but were not particularly apt at agriculture (the former owners had been dispossessed and forced out of agriculture). “It took two years of negotiations before the inheritors could really be persuaded to sell their patrimony to the family that actually farmed it” (Swain, 2010: 1212). “Czechoslovak procedures were rather more individualistic, backward-looking, biased in favor of former owners and financially relatively unsophisticated, leaving co-operatives with a large potential ‘cash call’ on their assets seven years after transformation” (Swain, 2010: 1216). Consequently, “the pattern of land ownership reverted, in reality as well as legal fiction, to its highly fragmented post-World War II structure… Most people, however, rejected the idea of
farming their newly acquired land themselves and rented it back to either the co-operative or one of its successor companies, creating a structure of land rental in which many owned and few rented, the inverse of the historical norm” (Swain, 2010: 1216).


Czechoslovakia

Mounting social and property-related inequality marked the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century in Czechoslovakia: 37.6% of the land was held by large-estate owners. The new Czechoslovak government split with landowners: “[I]n one of its first steps, [it] passed a law on the ‘impoundment of large estates’ (9 November 1918), intended to prevent land and property machinations before the former would be at the disposal of the State” (Majerova, 2000: 160). There were caps associated with the amount of land one could own. The landed elites resisted. “Nevertheless, the economic and social influence of large proprietors and the foreign aristocracy was weakened considerably” (Majerova, 2000: 161). Communists come to power in 1945, entirely excluding large landowners from the ruling coalition. Nationalization began in 1948. Collectivization was then forcefully imposed: “SACs slowly consolidated at the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s, and underwent four stages of unification” (Majerova, 2000: 169). Landed elites were therefore eliminated by the late 1960s. In the early 1990s, “the distinctive features of Czechoslovak co-operative transformation, together with the absence of any effective bankruptcy legislation, paradoxically favored the co-operative form’s continuance” (Swain, 2010: 1210).


Estonia

The governments that came to power after 1991 made the transition to a market economy their explicit goal (Purju 1999, 202). Moreover, though governments initially imposed some restrictions on the farm size and use, such restrictions were ultimately amended, as they resulting
in a slowing down of land reform (Meyers and Kazlaskiene 2003, 92). Finally, privatization of land resulted in the reconstitution of the landed elite by 1993—albeit to a lesser degree than in other former communist countries. As of 1993, there were 1,013 agricultural companies whose average farm measured 508 hectares (Meyers and Kazlaskiene 2003, 97). By 2000, the largest 10% of all farms owned roughly 60 percent of Estonia’s total arable land (Csaki and Lerman 2000, 15). By 2007, the average farm size of those large farms that owned 20 percent of the total agricultural land was 1,988 hectares. By contrast, small farms that owned the remaining 80 percent averaged just 39 hectares. Moreover, the threshold size of the large farms that owned 20 percent of all agricultural land was quite large: 1,178 hectares. (Martins and Tosstorff 2011). Because privatization policies largely promoted the interests of an aspiring landed elite, there was no elite split in Estonia after 1991.


**Greece**

Many Greek landowners moved abroad in the early 1900s. These are the landowners that bought land from Ottoman owners. When they left, they rented out their property for grazing and tenant farming (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010: 84). These landowners nonetheless had influence on politicians: "Furthermore, the well-connected chifflike (privately owned land) owners were in a position to convince their political protégés to maintain high tariffs on imported grain in order to protect their own low-grade production from foreign competition" (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010: 84-85). The monarchy at this time was also a large landowning interest, and was allied with other large landowners. There is a military coup in 1909, which allows Eleftherios Venizelos to come to power and become prime minister. Venizelos’ Liberal government directly opposed the monarchy and excluded large landowners. This later led to attacks on large landowners: “The drafting of laws for the expropriation of the large estates was begun in 1917 by the revolutionary government in Thessaloniki, but was actually put into effect after the 1922 influx of refugees from Turkey (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010: 85). “Initially, compulsory land redistribution had been intended to break up large agricultural estates in Thessaly and Macedonia. Yet, the campaign also contributed to the homogenization of national identity among the population of Greek Macedonia.” (Karakasidou, 1997: 168-169). The elite split ended following the coups by Pangalos and Kondylis in 1926. The Venizelists were subsequently suppressed and the monarchy and royalist power was restored until 1947.
Hungary

In the early 1900s in Hungary, "The pattern of landholding was characterized by many tiny holdings, small medium holdings (286-1430 acres) and the dominant position of huge estates" (Eddie, 1967: 304). "Dominance by very few families was typical, and because towns bulked so large as landholders, this political control served to concentrate control of land still further in the hands of the nobility" (Eddie, 1967: 299; Marrese 1983, 332). "The vast economic and political power that rested with the great landed nobility lent strong support to belief in the Hungarian saying 'Who owns the land, owns the country'" (Eddie, 1967: 309). In short, the rural sector in Hungary prior to WWI was dominated by a small number of elite landowners that commanded "large estates operated in a backward, feudal manner" alongside a large number of landless agrarian laborers and peasants with extremely small landholdings (Marrese 1983, 332). The Hungarian kings were themselves large landowners and depended on the landed aristocracy for stability and the extraction of rural surplus. They therefore had a vested interest in the status quo distribution of property. King Charles IV was pushed aside in the aftermath of WWI, but a circumscribed electoral system and the dominance of Admiral Horthy in alliance with the aristocracy forestalled an elite split (Mathijs 1997, Stowe 1947). WWII drastically altered the rural landscape. The absence of large landowners at the end of the war due to displacement and wreckage in concert with the occupying Soviet army resulted in a clear elite split. The Hungarian Communists followed by the Independent Smallholders ruled to the exclusion of large landowners. "Due to a transformation of the political institutions, the representatives of the aristocratic and gentry classes were excluded from parliament and state administration (Varga, 2009: 225). "Collectivization began in force in 1949 and was mostly completed by 1962, and collective farming came to replace peasant agriculture" (Mathijis, 1997: 52). Landed elites were destroyed under collectivization. Yet collectivization foundered. Hungary then began to adopt reforms that embraced market capitalism, such as the 1968 New Economic Mechanism and a host of liberalizing reforms in the 1980s. Nonetheless, by 1987 71.4% of agrarian land was still in collective hands (Mathijs 1997, 45).

The collapse of communism eliminated opposition to an aspiring landed elite. The privatization debate centered on redressing historical injustice stemming from the demands of pre-1945 landowners for land restitution, social equity, and efficiency (Swinnen 1999, 638). Ultimately about a third of collective farmland was restituted to former owners, a third was auctioned for compensation bonds, and another third was distributed to farm workers of the collectives (Swinnen 1999, 639). Restitution was based on 1948 ownership – after the 1945 decree but before collectivization (Swinnen 1999, 643). Hungarians who lost their land between 1939 and 1948 were partially compensated with option rights or bonds that could be used to buy land or other privatized assets or to establish a life annuity (Swinnen 1999, Varga 2009). Although landed elites have not been reconstituted, significant farm consolidation has begun.
Latvia

Before 1990, like other Baltic countries, Latvia was under the Soviet Union. There was no private property before 1990. A series of reforms took place in early 1990s: "The agrarian reform in the Baltic countries started in 1989 when all three countries, still within the legal framework of the USSR, found ways to establish family farms. Under provisions of peasant (or private) farms laws passed between May and December 1989, individual farms were established based on long-term land use rights, not ownership" (Meyers and Kazlauskiene, 1998: 88). “Land reform in Latvia has been regulated by a number of laws beginning with the June 1990 decision on agrarian reform in the Republic of Latvia of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia” (Hartvigsen, 2013: 7). Such reforms entailed the return of the original holdings. Alternatively, people could choose to “receive compensation in money for the value of the lost property. Compensation has been estimated on the basis of the area of land, type of land use and location of the property. Agricultural land was restituted up to a maximum limit of 100 ha. In Latvia the claims for restitution exceeded the land available by more than 25 percent. According to the most recent data (2012), the average size of agricultural land parcels in Latvia is relatively large, around 7.3 ha.” (Hartvigsen, 2013: 7-8). The ceiling on the amount of property that could be restituted has to date prevented the reconstitution of landed elites in Latvia. However, the collapse of communism eliminated opposition to an aspiring landed elite, and land consolidation has proceeded. The average utilized agricultural area of all farms in 2007 was 16 hectares while the average utilized agricultural area of larger farms was 844 hectares, according to Eurostat.
Lithuania was under the Soviet Union prior to 1990. There was no private property before this year. A series of reforms took place in early 1990s, which established private property (Meyers and Kazlauskiene, 1998). Equally, such reforms were meant to regulate the agricultural sector. Therefore, "the first law set up the procedures for the actual denationalization of the countryside, recognizing the legal right of the pre-World War II owners and their heirs to their once nationalized property, including land" (Meyers and Kazlauskiene, 1998: 88). There is however no reconstitution of a landed elite since a ceiling was imposed on the amount of land that could be claimed back: “the maximum area of land to be restituted increased over time. When the process began in 1991, a maximum of 50 ha of agricultural land and 10 ha of forest could be restituted. In 1995, the maximum size increased to 80 ha of agricultural land and 25 ha of forest. Finally, in 1997 the maximum area of land that could be restituted was increased to 150 ha” (Hartvigsen, 2013: 6). Because the collapse of communism eliminated opposition to an aspiring landed elite, as reflected in privatization policies that have enabled restitution to former owners while raising land restitution ceilings, there was no elite split in Lithuania after 1991.

Macedonia

There was an elite split in Macedonia in 1991 and 1992, as the Communist Party remained in power and largely viewed property as a source of political power (Slaveski 1997, 35). The Party thus resisted mass privatization after independence. However, beginning in 1993, the design of land reform was influence by a political concern that the process would lead to reduced productivity in the agricultural sector through the breakup of large-scale state farms (Hartvigsen 2013, 35). Reforms—including the 1998 Law on Denationalization—thus included provisions that protected state farms: former owners and their successors had to accept compensation in state land other than the parcel’s original boundaries if that parcel was part of a field larger than 20 hectares (Hartvigsen 2013, 35-6). As a result, large, former-state-owned farms were left intact and often leased out to large, corporate farms. Thus, there was no elite split in Macedonia after 1993. "Due to the failed collectivisation of labourers and smaller household farms, the majority
of agricultural land has remained in the possession of small family household farms. This has resulted in a bipolar ownership and operational farm structure similar to other former Yugoslav republics and Poland, with many small household farms and a few large former state (socially-owned) enterprises.” (Angelovska et al. 2012).


Moldova

There was no elite split in Moldova after 1991. The Moldovan government embarked on a decollectivization process that signaled its ambivalence toward any landed elite. Through 1997, some 1.7 million hectares of formerly collectivized land were distributed to 1.1 million individuals (Hartvigsen 2013, 40). Collectivization under Soviet rule had eliminated private ownership of land (Hartvigsen 2013, 39). Roughly 98 percent of all land marked for privatization was redistributed in the form of physical parcels (Hartvigsen 2014, 335). Though individuals received relatively small parcels – roughly 1.56 hectares on average – these small farms have coexisted with large corporate farms. The National Land Programme of 1997 to 2001 reconstituted to the landed elite by distributing land to large, corporate farms (Hartvigsen 2013). Indeed, smallholders that operate roughly 99.5 percent of all farms cultivate just 39 percent of total arable land (Hartvigsen 2013, 41). By contrast, large corporate farms average nearly 250 hectares in size (Hartvigsen 2013, 410). Thus, there was no elite split in Moldova.

Poland

An elite split in Poland arose in 1919 in the immediate aftermath of WWI and persisted through the interwar period. This was manifested mainly through narrow ruling coalitions under the military man Józef Piłsudski as well as a series of administrations that excluded large landowning interests under the populist Polish People’s/Peasant Party “Piast.” A major land reform then occurred in Poland in 1919 expropriating large landlords. “A year later, on July 15, 1920, a decree on implementing the reform was passed. Under this decree the maximum size of a farm allowed to remain in private hands was 150 ha of arable land” (Vasekla, 1996).

Poland was occupied and divided during WWII. The foreign occupying powers ruled by force and did not ally with large landowners. "The Ribbentrop-Molotov line drawn in the secret Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939, divided Poland into two more or less equal spheres of influence, each with its own subsequently imposed land ‘reform’ policies” (Pronin, 1949: 141). On the one hand, German occupied Poland was incorporated into the Reich. The agrarian policy was announced in 1941. In implementing this policy, Polish estate owners were killed off, the peasant farmers were sent to labor camps in central Germany or driven into the General government with a maximum of 50 pounds of luggage, having been required to leave their houses and furnishings intact with the key on the outside of the door. On the other hand, Soviets occupied Eastern Poland and almost immediately implemented new land legislation: "Within a few days the Soviets accomplished their "land reform" even before the opening of the Peoples Assembly in Lwow. The western term "land reform" hardly fits the measures taken by the Red Army; Soviet terminology is more specific: "liquidation of land holders as a class and proletarization of the people working on land” (Pronin, 1949: 141-142). All big farms were divided into little parcels (as small as 6 acres). As early as September 1944, a post-WWII land reform began in Poland as a clear elite split under the communists and the Red Army persisted. Agricultural and forest properties larger than 50 ha (and in some cases 100 ha) were expropriated without compensation. The collectivization efforts in Poland during the socialist era had largely failed due to the post-WWII land reform that established a strong structure of small-scale family farms and thus resistance towards collectivization.

Largely due to failed collectivization, post-communist Poland “made a political decision not to restitute the ownership rights to the former owners who lost their land rights after WWII through a land restitution programme as in the case of the other Central European countries… Instead, claims for restitution of lost property rights are treated under the existing civil law on a case-by-case basis… Poland is going through a process of privatizing the 20 percent of the agricultural land of the state farms. The Agricultural Property Agency (APA) was established in 1992 to manage this process… By the end of 2011, 2.2 million ha had been privatized through auctions and direct sale, and 1.46 million ha of the remaining 1.95 million ha had been leased out to private farmers” (Hartvigsen, 2013: 16). Although a fragmented farm structure persisted after 1990 (Hartvigsen 2013, 15; Gorz and Kurek 1998, 171), and land inequality remained low when
compared to other countries of Western and Eastern Europe (Martins and Tosstorff 2011), the collapse of communism eliminated opposition to an aspiring landed elite. It is now easier to agglomerate land through the market. There is consequently no elite split coded in Poland after 1990.


**Romania**

Before 1865, Romania featured a feudal system, where peasants provided labor and/or rents in produce or money in exchange for the use of a piece of land from the local landlord. Indeed, large landowners were at the heart of the Romanian government under the monarchy. In 1884, the Romanian parliament granted Carol I a large royal estate, making him and his successor Ferdinand I the biggest landowners in the country (Middleton 2005, 796). WWI and the treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon substantially enlarged Romanian territory, and ironically enlarged the electoral opposition while incorporating landowners into the national territory that were not aligned with the monarchy. The interwar period also brought to power a series of prime ministers that represented populist, peasant, middle-class, and liberal parties rather than landowning interests such as the PP, the PNL, the PNR, and the PNT. Ion Antonescu seized power in 1940 and ruled during WWII in a narrow military dictatorship.

In 1945, a new coalition came to power led by the communists. The communists excluded large landowners from government and attempted to undermine the now very weak monarch. "In 1948, the government expropriated land belonging to the royal family (Crown Estate) and, soon after, the land owned by German citizens and collaborators. The means of production were nationalized and a planned economy was officially instituted. In 1949 properties of more than 50 hectares were dismantled. The confiscated land was given to the state or to the emerging collective sector. Collectivization was launched in 1948, but initially it progressed slowly with only 10% of land by 1956. The process was accelerated in the second half of the 1950s by
forcing individual farmers to join collectives. In 1962, the collectivization process was completed with 77% of agricultural land transferred to collective and state farms. The remaining land, mostly remote and mountain areas, was left in private hands” (OECD, 2000: 76). There was no reconstitution of landed elites following the fall of communism. To the contrary, successive Romanian governments actively sought to squelch any aspiring large landowners. The demand for land restitution from individuals who still formally owned the land was overruled. A 10-hectare limit meant that Romania combined the strong demand for full property rights restitution from those who still formally owned the land with equity and efficiency considerations (Swinnen, 1999: 649).


Russia

There was no elite split in Russia prior to the Bolshevik revolution under Tsar Nicholas II. Indeed, Nicholas II was himself a very large landowner and referred to himself as “the landlord of the Russian soil” (Anan’ich 1983, 136). Management of the tsar’s lands and those of his family was under the authority of the cabinet and the Ministry of the Court. The tsar maintained antiquated forms of feudal exploitation and collected feudal rents (Anan’ich 1983, 137). The Bolshevik revolution, by contrast, and the workers’ councils and militias brought a clear split with landowners and of course with the tsar himself. This split persisted through the course of the Soviet Union. "Land was nationalised in Russia and other parts of the Russian empire within days of the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917" (Lerman, 1997: 311; Swinnen, 1999: 641). “Traditional socialist agriculture was characterised by a dual farming structure. One component comprised commercial production in large-scale collective and state farms. These large farm enterprises cultivated thousands of hectares and employed hundreds of workers. The other component consisted of subsistence-oriented individual farming in small household plots. A typical household plot was less than half a hectare, and it was cultivated by part-time family labour” (Lerman, 1997: 308). "Between 1917 and 1990 the state was the sole legal owner of land in the former Soviet Union, and access was allocated to producers through use rights. Collective and state farms held state land in permanent use. Even the land in individually cultivated household plots was state-owned, and the families held in so-called inheritable lifetime possession" (Lerman, 1997: 312). “Over 85 per cent of arable land in the countries behind the
Iron Curtain was owned by the state. All agricultural land had been fully nationalised in the fifteen republics of the former Soviet Union and in Albania” (Lerman, 1997: 309).

The collapse of communism eliminated opposition to the rise of newfound large landowners. In fact, privatization paved the way for greater inequality in the distribution of landholdings. In 1990, Russia came up with reforms to reverse the results of collectivization: these reforms were “similar to the reform of a hacienda-type system with a mix of central landlord driven production (the joint production of the collective farm) and individual tenant-based farming (the household plots)” (Lerman, 1997: 310). Land reform in the FSU context thus became inseparably intertwined with plans and options for the restructuring of the existing large-scale farms. In 1991, president Boris Yel’tsin initiated a decree giving all twenty-five thousand collective and state farms in Russia three months to be dismantled for the purpose of giving rise to private farming as the main form of agricultural production. Nevertheless, after five years of reform, there was neither collapse nor a rapid recovery. In Russia, land was mostly distributed to people rather than restituted to former owners. According to Lerman (1997: 317), 40% of all the land in Russia was still the state’s hand in 1997. Nonetheless, major portions of land have been “privatized wholesale, in chunks of thousand of hectares, by transferring its ownership to local collectives” (Lerman, 1997: 317). A distinctive feature of private farms in Russia is their substantially larger size: while household plots typically have less than 1 ha of land, private farmers cultivate from several hectares to tens of hectares. “Survey data for Russia reveal a definite shift in the distribution of farm enterprises towards smaller sizes between 1990 and 1993 (Brooks et al., 1996; Lerman, 1997), although the smallest farm enterprises are still very large compared to typical farms in market economies. At the same time, the emergence of a new category of private farms, between the two extremes of farm-size distribution, with sizes of 10-40 ha, is beginning to have a smoothing effect” (Lerman, 1997: 319). A new landed elite does not fully reemerge in this period.


Serbia

There was no elite split in Serbia through 2006. First, until 2000, the state was itself among the largest landowners (Hartvigsen 2013, 32; Giovaellia and Bledsoe 2001, 27). Indeed, the Serbian state held some 411 farms averaging 1,600 hectares each (Hartvigsen 2013, 32). Second, privatization from 1991 to 2006 restituted some 150,000 hectares of land expropriated after 1953 to their former owners—without regard for any ceiling (Hartvigsen 2013, 33). Third, the privatization of state-owned enterprises actually reconstituted the landed elite. Indeed, 9 large state-owned enterprises were privatized after 2002, and in most cases, land was sold to private investors as large parcels or as complete farms (Hartvigsen 2013, 33). In other words, the
Serbian state undertook a privatization process after 2002 that cultivated the emergence of a new landed elite. Indeed, as of 2009, large corporate farms own roughly 15 percent of all agricultural land (Hartvigsen 2013, 33).


Slovakia

Landed elites were eliminated under communism in Czechoslovakia with collectivization before Slovakia becomes an independent country. Land that had been confiscated from owners under communist rule was then subject to restitution (Blass, 62). Governing coalitions were not strictly opposed to the reconstitution of large landholdings, and therefore there is no elite split coded. The upper limit of restituted land was decided at 150 hectares of agricultural land, and 250 hectares of all other land; however, these limits do not apply to land acquired by other means, e.g., by purchase or through inheritance (Blass 2001, 64). The co-operative is still maintained in a more or less “traditional form” (Swain, 2010: 1208). “The immediate consequence of the restitution and co-operative transformation process was a reversion to the highly fragmented pre-socialist pattern of land ownership” (Swain, 2010: 1205). “During transformation, 98% of co-operatives opted to retain the co-operative form, and in 1994 co-operatives continued to farm 69.9% of agricultural land. Other corporate bodies farmed 4.6% of agricultural land, and private individual farms only 5.2%. Of the latter, some 76% of private farms were under 10 hectares, and around 2% were over 100 hectares – figures very similar to those for the Czech Republic (Swain, 2010: 1205).

The following two examples are illustrative of what the “lucky inheritors” do with the land. “In Slovakia too a lucky few have been able to obtain through restitution ‘residual estates’ which are sufficiently large to permit viable farming in the 1990s. In Klanec, for example, the grandson of a villager who had run a 320-hectare farm in the village and who had been refused higher education because of his class background and worked all his life in the construction industry, began restitution of 280 hectares in 1991. Taking maximum advantage of the generous subsidies available at the time, he acquired most of the machinery that he needed in the first year and, by mid-decade, had built himself a modern, ranch-style farm house in the middle of his land. In Banec, on the other hand, the fate of a former residual estate was less positive because the heirs (an engineer, a physician, a broadcaster and a company director) would not commit themselves to farming. They chose a succession of unscrupulous individuals to rent it to who charged excessive rents to the tenants and then disappeared with the crop” (Swain, 2010: 1213). After the 1990s, “the pattern of land ownership reverted, in reality as well as legal fiction, to its highly fragmented post-World War II structure” (Swain, 2010: 1216).


**Slovenia**

There was no elite split in Slovenia after 1991. First, the state remained a major owner of land: in 1991, the state owned 17 percent of all agricultural land (Hartvigsen 2013, 30). State ownership of agricultural land persisted: as of 2011, the state owned 9 percent of agricultural land, or roughly 60,000 hectares (Hatvigsen 2013, 30). Moreover, privatization of land proceeded in a way that has favored the reconstitution of a landed elite. For instance, in 1990, the maximum size of farms was increased and then abolished altogether in 1991 (Bojnec and Swinnen 1997, 289). Land could be traded freely among Slovenian citizens thereafter, and private economic rights and property rights were largely protected (Bojnec and Swinnen 1997, 289). Nonetheless, there was no full reconstitution of a landed elite after Slovenian independence until the end of the period: just 930 estates had more than 20 ha of agricultural land (Bojnec and Swinnen 1997, 285); Hartvigsen (2013, 30) and (Vriser 1998, 277) both claim that Slovenia was dominated by small family farms, with an average farms size of 6.3 ha.


**Ukraine**

There was no elite split in Ukraine. Even though various restrictions have been placed on owners of land shares—including a six-year moratorium on the sale of land shares after 1997 (Ash 1998, 70)—restrictions did not reflect governments’ ideological opposition to a landed elite. Rather, restrictions reflected ambivalence on the part of successive governments. For instance, “the fact that the large-scale farm structure was generally retained was in no small part due to the fact that the government of Kravchuk had no real design as to what land tenure system should be put in its place” (Ash 1998, 68). Moreover, Kuchma (1994-2004) and his deputy prime minister for the agricultural sector recognized the importance of developing a mixed agricultural system of “large collective/cooperative and private farms” (Ash 1998, 69), yet there was no clear policy at the national level concerning how land shares were to be used during farm reorganization (Ash 1998, 69). Thus, despite the fact that there is “no functioning land market in Ukraine” (Ash 1998,
70), this is not due to governments’ opposition to large landowners but to ambivalence about how to best put state land into private hands.


Yugoslavia

The Serbian elite that held virtually every position of power within the new unified state viewed land reform as means of breaking “the political and economic power of large estate owners, most of whom were foreign, either by birth, political affiliation, religion or political attitude” (Tomasevich 1955, 349). Moreover, the People’s Radical Party—which based it support on the peasantry (Tomasevich 1955, 251)—dominated cabinet politics from 1921 to 1929 (Tomasevich 1955, 241). Thus, there was an elite split from 1921 to 1929. Prince Aleksandar seized dictatorial power in a 1929 coup d’état. Aleksandr explicitly aimed to cultivate unitary Yugoslav consciousness (Djilis 1991, 80), and the government–sponsored political party—the only party permitted from 1931 to 1934—included ambitious politicians “of all shades and of such people who could be herded into these parties, e.g., government employees” (Tomasevich 1955, 244). This terminated the elite split. Cabinets under Prince Pavle similarly included members from various former political parties (Tomasevich 1955, 243). An elite split occurred once more with the Communists’ seizure of power in 1945 as the party ideologically opposed wealthy landowners and excluded them from direct power. As Dovring notes (1970, 21), the reforms of 1945-1953 “really wanted to do away with any residuals of a wealthy class in the countryside” while laying the foundation for socialized agriculture. The split continued despite a withdrawal from collectivization in 1953, as de-collectivization was “a matter of development strategy rather than a change in long-run objectives” (Dovring 1970, 21). In other words, despite a shift in policy, the communist party continued to exclude large landowners from the ruling coalition and oppose their reconstitution after they were destroyed once collectivization was completed in 1953 (Brashich 1954, 99; Hartvigsen 2013, 28-29, 37). From 1953 the maximum size of privately-owned farms was limited to 10 ha of agricultural land in fertile areas and to 20 ha in hilly areas (Hartvigsen 2013, 29). The elite split continued through the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991.


**SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

**Angola**

Angola has been ruled since independence by the political party People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The MPLA was founded as an opposition movement to Portuguese rule. Its core base is among the Umbundu ethnic group, urban black intellectuals, the mixed-race population, and labor unions (Dobronravin 2010, 185-86). Large landowners of European descent, many of which cultivated coffee (Paige 1975), and extractive foreign enterprises were excluded from MPLA rule (Dobronravin 2010, Ohlson 1998).


**Burkina Faso**

Customary land tenure rules long governed land transactions and land allocations in Burkina Faso, and the share of privately held land was very small upon independence. Burkina Faso was dominated by a single party in the aftermath of independence in 1960. An elite split arose with the military coup of Sangoulé Lamizana in 1966. Lamizana’s support coalition stemmed principally from the military. Lazimana was ousted by Colonel Saye Zerbo in 1980. As Bienen (1985, 365) writes, the military itself was a critical interest group in these regimes. A 1983 coup by Captain Sankara marked a clear turn away from even the military establishment. Sankara made “diffuse appeals to such activist groups as urban workers, students, the military, and ideologues.” Most support groups were marginal to existing powerholders, including rural chiefs and landowners; instead Sankara’s regime sought to create coalitional links to excluded social groups (Bienen 1985, 366). In 1984, Sankara nationalized all land and vested it in the state. Sankara’s successor, Blaise Compaoré, began his career in the military and conspired with Sankara’s coup. He ultimately overthrew Sankara in 1987, yet he had strong military ties and connections to the Ligue Patriotique Pour le Development and with left-wing ideologues and competing Communist trade unions (Bienen 1985).


**Central African Republic**

The first two decades of post-independence Central African Republic were dominated by two figures: David Dacko and Jean-Bédel Bokassa. Dacko ruled under the Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (MESAN), a leading political party in the independence movement. Upon winning the first national election, Dacko exiled and suppressed rivals and banned opposition parties. French colonialism in the Central African Republic divided the territory...
among a small number of concession companies (Takeuchi 2014, 98). These concessions and their partners grew cash crops such as cotton, and developed a forced labor regime in the countryside. MESAN turned from reliance on the French to indigenous blacks, and especially selected ethnic groups, as its base of support. Jean-Bédel Bokassa, who displaced Dacko in a coup, concentrated political power within the military until he was overthrown by the French and Dacko was restored to power. Both of these rulers, however, built ruling coalitions to the effective exclusion of French agriculturalists.


Kenya

Land resettlement of the European Highlands was initiated by the outgoing colonial government (Harbeson 1971, 243). There was no elite split under Jomo Kenyatta, as “many large landowners were members of Parliament, Cabinet Ministers, senior civil servants, and urban businessmen” after independence (El-Ghonemy 1990, 162). Moreover, Kenyatta sided with the outgoing colonial government – which represented the interests of the European landed elite – on two key issues: 1) that Africans must pay for the land they received under resettlement; and 2) that resettlement was to be realized – as best as possible – prior to independence (Harbeson 1971, 244). Under Moi, the Kalenjin ruling elite were “notorious land grabbers” (Boone 2012, 82); through privatization of public lands and – in some instances – the expropriation of private lands (see Klopp 2000, 17), well connected individuals and land-buying companies “like the white settlers before them, use these sites for private accumulation at the expense of local communities” (Klopp 2000, 18).


Mozambique

The Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) has governed Mozambique since independence in 1975. Frelimo began as a guerrilla movement that fought for independence from Portugal. Commercial exploitation of land by Portuguese settlers and plantation owners was more limited than in South Africa or Zimbabwe but still important, and resulted in the relegation of indigenous Mozambicans to residual land rights (O’Laughlin 1995, 100). Frelimo set up early zones of
control in northern Mozambique and partnered with the peasantry against Portuguese landlords and Portuguese-appointed chiefs (O’Laughlin 1995). Frelimo expanded its rural base of support as the independence movement gained strength, and continued to draw support from the countryside as well as from urban workers (O’Laughlin 1995, 102). There was therefore an elite split immediately upon independence under Frelimo rule, which has persisted to the present.


Namibia

Namibia was colonized by Germany and later conquered by South Africa. Vast swathes of indigenous lands under these occupying forces were appropriated by white settlers and commercial interests. Some 4,300 primarily white commercial farmers held 43% of all agricultural land upon independence in 1990 (De Villiers 2003, 33). The political party and former national liberation movement South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) swept into power following independence. SWAPO has dominated the government ever since. SWAPO is governed by a politburo, which is chosen by SWAPO’s central committee. The party has its main base in Ovamboland and gets its support mainly from indigenous blacks (De Villiers 2003, Dobell 2000); it does not incorporate white landowners in its ruling coalition or ally with them. There is therefore an elite split coded under SWAPO rule since independence.


Nigeria

Nigeria gained independence from the British in 1960. The first government formed was inclusive, joining the National Council of Nigerian Citizens, a party representing Igbos and Christians in Eastern Nigeria, and the Nigerian People’s Congress, representing conservative Muslims (mainly Hausas and Fulanis) in Northern Nigeria. The Action Group, rooted in western Yorubas, entered the opposition. Political contestation was therefore principally along ethnic lines, and the clan interests represented in government included powerful leaders who controlled large areas of land via clan authority (Magid 1976). There is consequently no elite split between 1960 and 1963.

There is, however, an elite split between 1967 and 1979. This period was marked by a series of military rulers. The July 1966 coup, for instance, was led by northern and middle-belt soldiers, who brought with them a contingent of noncommissioned officers at the start and sought to curtail Igbo influence (Bienen 1985, 359). The military rulers during this period led narrow regimes in which ruling coalitions were built around a small coterie of military officers and civil servants. Gowon, for instance, relied on a small group of peer officers (principally via the Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council) since the officer elite were
principally of Igbo origin (Gould 2013). Gowon also appointed civilian commissioners over which he exercised considerable personalist control (Joseph 1987, 79), and a series of military governors who served as his allies in the provinces.


South Africa

At the time of independence in South Africa, 60,000 white farmers held 86% of all farmland with the remaining poor-quality land divvied up between 13 million blacks (Lahiff 2009, 170). Early political competition was principally between Dutch-descended Afrikaners and English-speaking whites. These groups at times joined in coalition government and at times competed, yet white landowning elites played a key role in all of the early government coalitions (Higginson 2015). The National Party (NP) ruled from 1948-1994, and in 1951 absorbed the Afrikaner Party. There was consequently no elite split during this period (Higginson 2015, Wood 2000). The 1993 Constitution defined a transitional power-sharing agreement from 1994 to 1999, called the Government of National Unity, in which the opposition ANC agreed that the NP would be part of the government during this period (Wood 2000, 187). Cabinets were to make consensus decisions. There was therefore no elite split immediately following the end of Apartheid and the 1994 transition. An elite split then arose in 1999 as the National Unity government ended and the ANC came to dominate executive power.


Swaziland

A substantial portion of Swaziland’s territory was signed away in concessions in the early 20th century such that more than half of its land was in the possession of European landholders in the 1920s (Olson and Shadle 1996, 1076). This included the best riverine land and known mineral deposits (Hanlon 1986, 92). Nonetheless, substantial portions of foreign land were repurchased prior to independence with British aid. King Sobhuza II ruled from independence until his death in 1982 as an absolute monarch and himself derived power from alliances with large landowners. As Kenworthy (2012, 156) writes: “The king appoints and dismisses the government and prime
minister at will, and in effect runs the country as a landlord would his farm in medieval Europe, deciding over everything from land allocation to the budget through a traditional system of chiefs and headmen.” There was no elite split under Sobhuza II. In additional to allying with powerful chiefs that could allocate land access, he also allied with foreign landowners, taking shares in most developments and becoming a key partner to foreign capital (Hanlon 1986, 92). Key insiders such as the prominent politicians Sishayi Nxumalo, R.V. Dlamini, and ombudsman Robert Mabila became large landowners (Hanlon 1986, 92). The alliance with large landowners, and their influence within the upper echelon of the monarchy, has continued to the present under Sobhuza II’s son and now king, Mswati III. There is therefore no elite split since independence.


**Tanzania**

The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), formed by Julius Nyerere as the main party and movement in the struggle for independence, dominated the political scene following independence. Independent Tanzania inherited a legacy of British colonialism that had mobilized rural laborers on a large scale to work on foreign-owned plantations and development projects (Scott 1998, 225). TANU and Nyerere’s government marked a clear turn from pre-independence reliance on the British and instead sought to root its base of support among rural laborers in the countryside (Scott 1998). This ultimately led to the regime’s ujamaa forced villagization and cooperative schemes. TANU merged with the Zanzibar ruling party to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which has ruled until the present.


**Zambia**

The United National Independence Party (UNIP), with Kenneth Kuanda at its head, strengthened substantially in the movement for independence just prior to the end of British colonialism in 1964. Economically, British colonialism in Zambia was oriented toward the production and export of copper and other minerals (Ihonvbere 1996, 48). White settlers were given preferential concessions to land, especially near railroad lines where crops such as maize could be grown and shipped as cheap nutrition to the growing Zambian workforce employed in the mines (Jayne et al. 2007). The British government subsizided these producers, who came to dominate commercial farming despite being a small settler class relative to Zimbabwe’s or Kenya’s (Nuetzenadel and Trentmann 2008, 222-23). Foreign ownership of mines, banks, and agriculture persisted for a significant period after independence. Yet Kuanda and UNIP, which ruled Zambia from independence until 1991, drew their political support from Zambian laborers and...
smallholders in the countryside, the latter of which were neglected under British colonial rule (Jayne and Jones 1997). White landowners were not incorporated in the ruling coalition. UNIP and Kuanda ruled until 1991, when they were displaced by the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy.


**Zimbabwe**

Independence negotiations took place between the black independence leaders, the white Rhodesian regime, and the British government at Lancaster House in 1979. The Lancaster House Agreement preserved 20 seats out of the 100 total in parliament to be chosen from the "white roll" of voters, those enfranchised under pre-independence rule. There was nonetheless an elite split under Robert Mugabe. Starting as a Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe reformed the electoral system and won the presidency, repressing his rivals and forging the party ZANU-PF with majority support of the Shona and other smaller ethnic and political groups. The roughly 6,000 white commercial farmers that owned 42% of the country's agricultural land were excluded from key positions in Mugabe’s ruling coalition (De Villiers 2003). Mugabe did face constraints: the independence constitution developed at Lancaster House imposed a ten-year moratorium on the expropriation of white land, resulting in what Gonese et al. (2002, 11) characterized as a decade of “entrenched protection of white farmer interests.” The Lancaster House constitution expired in 1990. The elite split nonetheless continued, even with a serious internal political challenge to Mugabe’s rule in 1997 (De Villiers 2003). Mugabe was still in power as of 2015.


**MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

**Algeria**

Algeria became independent from France in 1962. At that time, the agricultural sector was divided into a European (principally French) sector of roughly 22,000 holdings covering 2.2 million hectares of land and an indigenous Algerian sector of 631,000 units covering 4.7 million hectares (Smith 1975, 260). The European sector included a million hectares of the most
valuable and productive land in the country. Major European landowning families, however, were not incorporated into the ruling coalition of Algeria’s first two presidents: Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumédiène. Ben Bella had a socialist and Pan-Arab orientation, and rose to power through the pro-independence National Liberation Front (FLN) and Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action, which gathered leading Algerian civilian and military resistance figures and rooted itself in rural and urban popular sectors (Chau 2008, 114-15). Boumédiène, who toppled Ben Bella in a coup in 1965, drew his support from FLN mujahedeen veterans of the war of independence, officers of the independence movement’s National Liberation Army, and a nascent class of young technocrats (Entelis 1986). Similarly narrow coalitions of FLN and military insiders, such as Boumédiène’s protégé Chadli Bendjedid and Lamine Zéroural, ruled until 1999.

Abdelaziz Bouteflika won a fraudulent election in 1999 and has been in power ever since. Though he had joined the National Liberation Army as a teenager, the FLN had transformed itself by the time he took power. European landowners had been expropriated long prior to his rise to power, in the aftermath of independence. Bouteflika has been well-connected to Algeria’s upper social strata since taking power. Not only does he have deep connections with the military and urban elite, but he also reliably depends on rural elites (tribal qaids and rural dignitaries) to turn out electoral support for him at election times (Bustos and Mane, 56). He similarly allied himself with these rural elites early in his rule in an attempt to end a bloody Islamic insurgency rooted in the countryside. There is therefore no elite split under Bouteflika.


**Bahrain**

The Al Khalifa family has ruled Bahrain since independence; indeed, it has monopolized the country’s politics since the late 1700s. Furthermore, the Al Khalifa family along with Sunni allies are the largest landowners in the small country. This began under Isa bin Ali, who consolidated Al Khalifa rule, and transformed the relatively small portion of cultivable land on the islands into a “feudal estate system” under direct administration of the Al Khalifa family (Khuri 1980). These estates were converted to private ownership under British-sponsored administrative reforms in the 1920s. Land titles were also lopsidedly granted to allied Sunni tribal leaders, positioning them as rentiers and positioning them “to prosper handsomely from the construction boom of the postwar years” (Lawson 1989, 68). Among the roughly 10,000 plots of cultivated land circa 1993, the Al Khalifa family owned the greatest number, as well as the largest and most productive plots (Hooglund 1994, 123). Consequently, there is no elite split in Bahrain since independence.
Egypt

Kings Fuad I (1922-36) and Farouk (1937-52) were among the largest landowners in Egypt (Barnett 2012, 53), and landowners held a majority of positions with in the state during their periods of rule (Barnett 2012, 53). The Free Officers that overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, however, had middle-class backgrounds and thus “felt no internal restraints in acting against the landed gentry” (Tai 1974, 62). The Nasser government (1954-1969) was comprised primarily of the Free Officers. Sadat’s early post-succession government was similarly comprised of military officials from the Free Officers (Hinnebusch 1981, 446). However, a striking “transformation of in the top elite – the inner core of power” coincided with Sadat’s implementation of economic reforms beginning in 1974 (i.e., al-infitah, or the economic “opening”). Specifically, many of the Free Officers were retired or pushed into peripheral positions, and individuals from wealthy landholding families – such as Sayid Marei and Majmoud Abu Wafia – were incorporated into the cabinet (Hinnebusch 1981, 446). Mubarak (1982-2009) appointed individuals – such as Minister of Agriculture Wali – who were meant to attract the support of the landed gentry to the regime (Arafat 2009, 24-5). Moreover, the implementation of the Economic Restructuring and Adjustment Program (ERSAP) after 1991 created a new economic elite that allied with the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). As Joya notes (2011, 371), “the political outcome of economic liberalisation was a strengthening of ties between the NDP and the landlords and businessmen who had acquired monopoly control of important sectors in the economy.”

Iraq

Upon independence, most land in Iraq was registered as state-owned (mirî) due to the Ottoman legacy. A small amount (17% by 1943) was registered as private property (tapu), though
predominantly in the name of politically influential tribal chiefs and city merchants (El Ghonemy 1990, 210). The British mandate did not try to upset the Ottoman arrangement: “[T]he British did not attempt to alter the system for fear of antagonizing the landlords and tribal chiefs, on whose support they were dependent” (quoted in El Ghonemy 1990, 210). Land accumulation by the sheiks was reinforced after independence, and the Hashemite monarchy under King Faisal I, King Ghazi I, and King Faisal II allied with powerful landowning sheiks to maintain political stability. Furthermore, the royal family itself became major landowners.

A split with landowners began with a series of military regimes in 1958 and continued under the Ba’athists beginning in 1968. The military coups in 1958 and the 1960s brought to power a series of narrow regimes ruled by military officers that did not have strong ties to traditional landowners. The 1958 coup was spearheaded by a group that identified as the Free Officers, and comprised mainly middle-class Sunni Arabs who were influenced by Pan-Arab ideas. Indeed, the leader of the 1958 coup, Brigadier Qasim, came from a farming family on his mother’s side. The Ba’athists continued the split from traditional landlords and tribal sheik landowners. Starting under al-Bakr, the Ba’athists espoused Arab socialism and pan-Arab nationalism, and ruled with narrow military and personalist coalitions. Though coalitions and ideological platforms shifted in subsequent decades, power was retained among a series of narrow inner circles that largely excluded the landowning sheiks that had been powerful under the monarchy.


Iran

Through the accession of Shah Pahlavi in 1941, wealthy landlords comprised a large share of the One Thousand Families that ruled Iran (Tai 1974, 97). In fact, in 1906, Muzzafar ad-Din had codified the political influence of Iran’s landlords when he guaranteed their representation within the Majlis (Tai 1974, 97). For decades afterward, “landlords retained their political preeminence, and, together with the army and Muslim mullahs, they constituted the vital pillars on which the Peacock Throne of Iran rested” (Tai 1974, 97). However, in 1962, Shah Pahlavi “cut off his ties to the big landlords” in an effort to cultivate peasant for the threatened monarchy (Tai 1974, 98). The Shah suspended the Majlis and enacted major land reform. An elite split continued under the revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini: In 1979, the Revolutionary Council (RC), a group wholly comprised of the Tawhidi Ulema that sought the establishment of an Islamic republic, effectively ousted Mehdi Bazargan, who had headed a liberal provisional government that sought a “Western-style democracy…within the existing capitalist relationships” (Moaddel 1993, 206). The Rafsanjani government was marked by a “de-ideologization’ of executive power, and Cabinets were comprised primarily of technocrats – rather than individuals noted for the Islamic virtue or revolutionary zeal (Ehteshami 1995, 55). Moreover, the government demonstrated a “renewed preference for large-scale production schemes” and initiated plans to consolidate one million hectares of fragmented peasant holdings (Haghayeghi 1990, 22). This preference for large-scale farming continued under Khatami. As Nomani and Behdad note (2008, 378), after 1996, the Iranian economy was marked by a “revitalization of capitalist relations of
production, reconstitution of market institutions, proletarianization of the work force, and de-peasantization of the rural economy.”


Israel

There was no elite split during the rule of the Mapai party and its successor, the Israel Labor Party (1948-77) for three reasons: First, a majority of Arab landowners had left their landholdings by 1948 (Forman and Kedar 2004, 812), so much of Arab landed elite was no longer physically present. Second, to the degree that some wealthy Arab landowners remained, at least some of those landowners were included in the Mapai ruling coalition. As Peretz notes (1960, 19-20), four of five politicians elected in 1959 from Mapai-supported Arab parties were wealthy landowner-merchants of the sons of village mukhtar (headmen). Moreover, for Peretz (1960, 19), the communal influence of such politicians explains why a majority of Arabs voted for Mapai-supported parties through 1959. Third, the Mapai government included prominent members of the Jewish agricultural cooperatives (kibbutzim) (Etzioni 1957, 364; Medding 1972). For instance, seven members of Ben Guirons’ sixteen-member 1956 cabinet were members of kibbutzim (Etzioni 1957, 364). Feitelson goes so far as to characterize the Israel Labor Party as an “integrated policy community that controlled Israel since its establishment, of which the cooperative agricultural establishment was an integral part” (1999, 439). There was no elite split after 1977 despite the right-wing Likud Party’s control of government for much of the 1980s. Despite the fact that the Likud Party was “dominated by urban interests” (Feitelson 1999, 439), agriculture remained “among the most ' politicized' sectors in the country" and "prone to elitist relationships with the authorities, that is, to integration with decision makers" (Ishai 1991, 231). Agricultural interests exerted influence primarily through the agricultural councils that had been formed in the pre-state era and expanded under Moshe Dayan in 1959 and 1964 (Ishai 1991,
The councils "are empowered to oversee production, to assure regular supply of products, to facilitate marketing, and to deal with surplus...In fact, they are responsible for the implementation of agricultural policy forged by the authorities" (Ishai 1991, 231).


Jordan

Jordan is coded from the time King Hussein acceded to the throne. King Hussein ruled from 1952 until early 1999, and was then succeeded by his son, now King Abdullah II. The pattern of land tenure in Jordan during this period stems from a combination of shari‘ah and the Ottoman Land code of 1858. One important feature was the customary tribal practice of holding land under semi-collective ownership (musha‘a), though such holdings were registered to individuals under the 1933 Land Settlement Law under the British Mandate (Hazleton 1979, 258-59). Nonetheless, land ownership itself was highly concentrated and share-cropping was common. Concentration was facilitated by the registration of many lands under tribal leaders rather than tribal members under the Ottoman system, and by the accumulation of land through purchase by merchants following the Land Settlement Law (Hazleton 1979, 259).

The most productive farming region of Jordan is the Jordan Valley, which up until WWII was used mainly by local farmers and nomads; tenant farming was rare. However, more intensive and sophisticated commercial farming in the area began after WWII with the influx of Palestinian refugees (Hazleton 1979, 260). This new farming initiative reached something of a limit by the mid-1950s, however, due to limits to existing irrigation. Importantly, many large landowners in the Jordan Valley, and especially newcomer Palestinians, did not have close ties to the monarchy. King Hussein’s support base was rooted among Bedouin and Hashemite populations – minority native Jordanians (Price 1999, 57). Fearful of the burgeoning Palestinian population
and a Palestinian takeover, King Hussein built a narrow regime and staffed the military, security forces, and state apparatus with members of loyal Bedouin and Hashemite tribes and clans (Price 1999, 57). Nonetheless, this elite split eroded with the succession of King Abdullah II. The strength of the monarchy – and its ownership of land – along with urbanization and modernization enabled it to empower East Bank Jordanians and regime elements while maintaining key tribal alliances. Privatization, for instance, has led to doling out portions of public sector enterprises at reduced prices to members of the security forces and others with strong palace ties (Choucair-Vizoso 2008, 62-63). The monarchy prior to Abdullah II had also succeeded in diminishing the power of certain 1950s-era Jordan Valley landowners by setting landholding ceilings in the valley.


Kuwait

Kuwait has been ruled by the Al-Sabah family since independence from the British. Dating since well before independence, the royal family has been the major landowner in Kuwait, and no splits with landed elites have arisen. The Al-Sabahs also developed a tight alliance with wealthy merchant families that had established themselves as prominent traders in Kuwait among the tribal clans that had migrated from Saudi Arabia to found Kuwait in the early 18th century. In exchange for revenue from customs duties collected by merchants, the Al-Sabahs provided the merchant class with stability conducive to trade as well as preferential policies to stem competition (e.g., Crystal 1995, 8). Both the Al-Sabahs and wealthy merchant families had a strong corporate character: social mechanisms such as out-marriage taboos and the diwaniyya reinforced social class and status.

The ruling family enriched itself and the allied merchant class in the lead-up to independence through a land acquisition program. Whereas urban private property predated the discovery of oil, formal title was only extended to rural regions beginning in the 1950s as the state zoned regions and divided them up. Ruling family members were the first to grab this land (Crystal 1995, 76). Connected merchant families also became major beneficiaries, both of rural and urban land acquisition. Though it declined in scope by the 1990s, the state would buy land owned by connected merchants at inflated prices and then resell the land at much lower prices – largely back to these wealthy merchants (Crystal 1995, 76-77). Furthermore, the royal family nationalized the oil industry under the state-controlled Kuwait Petroleum Company in 1975, becoming the owner of the most lucrative land in the country.


Lebanon

From 1943 to 1975 (i.e., prior to the Lebanese civil war), there was no elite split, since Lebanese governments operated according to consociationalism. That is, in an effort to regulate conflict within a divided society, cabinets from 1943 to 1975 have implemented executive power-sharing based on proportional representation of Lebanon’s different religious and regional sects (i.e., Sunnis, Maronite Christians, Druze, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic) (Muhlbacher 2009, 78; Hudson 1969, 251, 252; Hess and Bodman 1954, 22-3; Goenaga and Mateos 2012, 220; Landau 1961, 122). Thus, virtually every sector of society was continually represented within the government – including landowners.

The period of civil war (1975-1989) is not coded for elite splits. With the end of the civil war (1989), the Ta’if Accord once more implemented consociational government in Lebanon. The Accord prescribed a “distribution of power among all communities based on parity between Christians and Muslims” (Haddad 2009, 404-5), and groups were granted veto power in order to reinforce consociational practice and to enable minority groups to challenge decisions that were harmful to their interests (Haddad 2009, 404-5).


Libya

Libya gained independence in 1951 after several years of British and French oversight following Italian colonization. King Idris I of the Senusi dynasty ruled Libya from the time of independence until his overthrow in a coup by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 1969. Although there was no local bourgeoisie or agricultural class tied whose fortunes were tied to colonial administrators, the king and royal household (diwan) incorporated mostly Cyrenaican tribal elites whose loyalty predated independence (Vandewalle 1998, 47). The Council of Ministers was also staffed with these tribal elites. Consequently, “[t]ribal alliances were thus maintained, and locally powerful families were consistently recruited by the king and his advisers” (Vandewalle 1998, 47). These powerful families and tribal leaders marshalled considerable land, from which their power was in part derived. The monarchy also used oil company concessions and contracts to strengthen these alliances, as occurred with Occidental’s financing of a fertilizer plant and water
drilling around the Kufra oasis in the 1960s (Vandewalle 2012, 58). There is consequently no elite split coded under Idris I.

Colonel Gaddafi and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) overthrew the monarchy in 1969. Hailing from the military, the coup leaders and the administration that they would subsequently form was a major break from the past. As Vandewalle (2012, 78) writes, “Their [RCC members’] socio-economic and political backgrounds stood in sharp contrast to those who had provided leadership during the monarchy. Virtually all of them came from the country’s middle class, and from less prestigious tribes and families than those who had been affiliated with the Sanusi government. Most came from rural backgrounds and they were all young.” All of them had attended the Military Academy. Their ideological program differentiated themselves still further from the monarchy; guided by Gaddafi, who was an admirer of Egypt’s Nasser, the new leaders espoused Arab nationalism and a homegrown version of socialism. There is thus an elite split beginning in 1969. Although Gaddafi would later drop Arab nationalism, abolish the RCC after a failed coup attempt, and become increasingly corrupt and nepotistic, his regime only narrowed; he came to incorporate individual members of his tribe – and later his family – into the inner circle of his regime (Vandewalle 2012, 100).


**Morocco**

Morocco gained independence in 1956. At the time of independence, nearly two-thirds of the population lived in rural areas, and over half of the population was employed in agriculture (Griffin 1975, 319). Some 3,500 families owned 65% of the cultivated land, and half of those families were of foreign (principally French) nationality (Ashford 1969, 194-95). These foreign families were not incorporated into the ruling coalitions of King Mohammed V (1955-1961) and his successor, King Hassan II (1961-1999). These kings built bases of support with urban elites and in rural areas to ensure tribal support (Ashford 1969). Though this did include Moroccan landowners (Swearingin 1987, 154-55), it did not include incorporating – or explicitly allying with – large foreign landowners. Furthermore, decision-making was concentrated within the ruling family and loyal insiders.

King Hassan II was replaced with his son, King Mohammed VI, upon the former’s death in 1999. By the time Mohammed VI took the throne, most foreign landowners with colonial ties had been bought out or expropriated by his predecessors – sometimes in favor of large Moroccan landowners and the royal family itself. What remained of landed elites were Moroccan landowners, some of whom were tribal leaders. Like his predecessors, Mohammed VI has allied with powerful tribal leaders to enhance his legitimacy. At the same time, the monarchy’s fortunes had expanded substantially; Mohammed VI himself is a major landowner, and the royal family has a majority of shares in the National Investment Company, which has assets across a range of sectors including in agriculture (Layachi 2015). There is therefore no elite split under King Mohammed VI.
Oman

The Al Said family has monopolized political authority in Oman through a series of sultans since the mid-1700s, and has ruled Oman since independence. At the time of independence, nearly the entire population was organized along tribal lines and adhered to tribal customs. In part due to geography and in part due to the social customs associated with tribes in Oman, tribal politics was concerned with authority over people rather than territory. As Rabi (2006, 3) writes, “Thus whereas the territory of a state was defined in terms of established tribal allegiances and tribal territory, the political institutions were based on personal and tribal loyalties.” In order to establish stable political rule, the Al Said dynasty therefore had to form alliances with powerful established tribes. These tribes (as well as the Al Saids themselves), in turn, had power rooted in people but also commanded territorial access and agricultural land, which helped tribal leaders maintain the loyalty of their members. Several examples of tribes loyal to the Sultan included Bani Kalban, Bani Sa’id, Bani Manathira, Bani Ya’aqib, Bani Ghafir, Bani ‘Amr, and Bani Hawasina (Rabi 2006, 41). Loyal sedentary tribes, unlike nomadic tribes, paid taxes to the Sultan. In cases of enduring loyalty, as in the tribes listed above, the Sultan granted subsidies; these tribes in return provided support for the Sultan and even furnished men as soldiers in times of need (Rabi 2006, 41-42). Consequently, there is no elite split in Oman since independence.


Qatar

The political influence of landowners in Qatar was so sufficient after 1971 to cause the Qatari government to “backpeddle on its earlier plans for agricultural self-sufficiency” (Crystal 1995, 149). Moreover, the Al Thani royal family has traditionally used land as means of garnering support. For instance, Shaykh Hamad Al Thani (1995-2009) “spread the wealth around to ensure that all Qataris, especially those closer to the ruling inner circle, benefit[ed] from the country’s rapid development” (Kamrava 2009, 417). Indeed, “some of these benefits [were] rumored to [have been] channeled to key Al Thani figures…through land distributions” (Kamrava 2009, 417). Given this use of land by the royal family to enrich its supporters and cultivate their continued loyalty, there was no elite split in Qatar from 1971 to 2009.
Tunisia

Tunisia won independence from France in the late 1950s. Agriculture was the foundation of the economy and was mainly oriented toward export to France. However, some 6,600 colonial families of French and Italian nationality controlled the most productive land and accounted for 40% of value added in the agricultural sector (Simmons 1970, 456-57). These families, as well as many absentee Tunisian large landowners, were not incorporated into the ruling coalition of Habib Bourguiba, who presided over one-party rule from the time of independence until 1987. Bourguiba’s Neo Destour Party (later the Socialist Destourian Party) drew its early support from rural areas and rural families, especially in the Sahel and Djerba (Coupe and Redissi 2014, 795). It came to mobilize laborers, artisans, farmers, women, and merchants in support (Coupe and Redissi 2014, 795-96). At the same time, decision-making was concentrated narrowly among Bourguiba and top party insiders.

Bourguiba was toppled in a coup by his prime minister, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in November 1987. Ben Ali ruled until the Arab Spring, at which point he fled to Saudi Arabia. By the time Ben Ali seized power, French and Italian colonial landowners had been bought out or expropriated. The government under Bourguiba had forced the agricultural sector into cooperative organizations. Ben Ali reformed and renamed the party he inherited from Bourguiba, and began to reduce its influence on the state (Murphy 2001, 145). He simultaneously packed the upper echelon of the party and his cabinet with loyalists, including allies from the security forces and interior ministry personnel (Murphy 2001, 144-45). Ben Ali then turned to economic liberalization, allying himself with the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie (Murphy 2001, 153). Crucially, Ben Ali ended the populist era and recommitted the state to an alliance between urban and rural elites (King 2003). There is therefore no elite split under Ben Ali. As King (2003, 58) writes, “The long struggle over property rights between rural notables in the beylical regime and cultivators of the soil would ultimately be decided by the state when it turned over cooperative land to the descendants of the state’s powerful allies in the countryside. These landed elites would provide the regime with its most potent source of support.”


**Turkey**

There was no elite split with landowners under the Ottoman Empire. Not only were the sultans and their families large landowners, but they also allied with large landowners by doling out land grants to loyal allies in conquered territories and sharing the surplus of peasant production with landowners (Inalcik and Quataert 1994, 128). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s rise to power brought a clear elite split. Atatürk ruled with a narrow coalition, excluding traditional power-holders such as religious elites and landowners and dividing powerful factions against one another (Huntington 1968). İnönü, his successor, initially maintained Atatürk’s government arrangement after succeeding him and leading Turkey during WWII.

With the initiation of multiparty democracy in 1945, İnönü reincorporated landed elites into his cabinet. For instance, İnönü appointed Cavit Oral, a wealthy landowner from the Adana region, to head the Ministry of Agriculture (Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 121). Ironically, İnönü even came to criticize his own land reform bill (enacted in 1945) as being too extreme (Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 121). Adnan Menderes, who headed the government from 1950 to 1960, was himself a wealthy landowner (Karaömerlioğlu 2000, 121; Parvin and Hic 1984, 214). In 1961, the Turkish military ousted Menderes and formed the National Union Committee. During 15 months of military rule, the NUC exiled a number of landowners to other parts of Turkey (Landau 1974, 11). The government headed by İnönü from 1961 to 1964 was a coalition government that included members of the Justice Party (Brown 1989, 389), a party that was largely comprised of landowners (Cohn 1970, 12). Governments from 1965 to 1979 all incorporated the interests of Turkish landowners, either because they were Justice-Party-led governments (e.g., Demirel, from 1965 to 1971) or coalition governments that incorporated Justice-Party members (1972-79) (Cohn 1970, 12; Hale 2013, 202; Karabelias 1999, 133). After a coup in 1980, Evren’s government was comprised of military officers: indeed, from 1980 to 1982, “the military institution became the sole political ruler of Turkey” (Karabelias 1999, 133). It is worth noting here that in Turkey, the military, state bureaucracy and intelligentsia have historically opposed industrialists and landowners (Parvin and Hic 1984, 213). Governments after 1983 are characterized by an absence of elite splits. Özal (1983-89) was a neoliberal reformer who espoused strong anticommunist and conservative Islamist views (Dodd 1992, 23; Acar 2002, 172); Ciller (1993-96) headed a government comprised primarily of members of the True Path Party, the party that succeeded the pro-landowner and anti-land-reform Democrat Party of Demirel (Cizre 2002, 210); and Yılmaz (1997-99) headed a coalition government that incorporated parties representing landed elite interests (Cinar and Ozbudun 2002, 189).


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Inalcik, Jalil, and Donald Quataert, eds. 1994. An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has been ruled by the Saud family since its independence from the British. From this time, the royal family has been one of the chief – if not the chief – landowners in the kingdom. This began with Ibn Saud’s campaign of conquest in the Arabian peninsula (Bray and Darlow 2010). Major milestones include the conquest of the Najd in 1922 and the Hejaz in 1925. Territorial control was further extended in the 1930s. From independence, the bulk of land in the kingdom (roughly 80%) was considered miri – lands owned by the state, as personified in the king (Vassiliev 2000). These lands were primarily used by tribes or were in the form of feudal estates, and comprised mainly pastures and deserts. Remaining lands belonged to individuals, clans, religious groups, or tribes, though King Saud restricted tribes’ traditional rights (e.g., when they conflicted with access to mineral resources). Larger non-state properties were established when the government transferred miri lands to feudal possessions (iqtas), which were principally granted to loyal military commanders and merchants (though they remained formally owned by the state) (Vassiliev 2000). Owners of iqtas often rented out land to sharecroppers. A relatively small amount of land was also held in forms of communal ownership (mushaa) among clan members. Though small-scale agriculture dominated in terms of cultivators for decades, these cultivators were mainly renters. Large landowners mostly lived in towns and rented out lands; they gained in power over time vis-à-vis peasant renters (Vassiliev 2000). Against this backdrop, the monarchy has held tight control of political power from the kingdom’s founding until the present. There is therefore no elite split coded at any time since independence.
Syria

At the time of independence, land in Syria was owned and worked in part under Ottoman Land Code and in part under French Civil Code. The state claimed formal ownership of all land with the exception of urban freehold land (mulk) and land held in trust by Muslim religious groups (waqf). In practice, state-owned land consisted principally of public-domain land, land managed and de facto owned by tribal sheiks, and land titled to individuals by the French. Sheiks, which often controlled extensive land areas, mainly rented out lands to peasant cultivators, sharecroppers, and a growing merchant farming class with capitalized enterprises that Warriner (1962) dubs “merchant-tractorists.” The French, however, surveyed and registered several million hectares of land in the early 1940s. Though this land technically remained state land, in practice title registration conferred fairly secure ownership rights on individuals. This titling mainly benefitted large landowners over peasant cultivators (Warriner 1962, 98).

Syrian independence was guided in large part by the National Bloc, which was led by many of the wealthiest and most powerful Syrian families, including large landowners (Savelsberg 2014, 88-89). This party and its successors (e.g., the National Party) sought to unite disparate ethnic and religious groups against French and other foreign influence. Early political competition in Syria up until joining the United Arab Republic in 1958 largely sought to avoid alienating powerful landowning tribal sheiks. Rulers up until 1958 instead were either drawn from large landowners or sought to partner with sheiks in order to maintain political stability. A split with landowners arose in 1958. First, Syria joined the United Arab Republic with Egypt under Nasser, one of the middle class military men of the Free Officers who had no ties with large landowners. The split continued after Syria left the United Arab Republic in 1958 largely sought to avoid alienating powerful landowning tribal sheiks. 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United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates is a federation of seven separate emirates; these emirates jointly select a President through the Federal Supreme Council. The Al Nahyan family of Abu Dhabi has occupied the presidency since independence from the British in 1971. Within each individual emirate there has been a longstanding ruling family with power substantially predating independence. The British divided tribes, rooted in an insistence on territorial claims and rewards to individual sheiks. As Kupchan (2010, 324) writes, “Although the tribes in question had been primarily nomadic, exercising authority over people rather than land, Britain’s efforts to establish an effective division of labor prompted colonial officials to affiliate the most powerful family lines with specific territories.” Some of these tribes professed loyalty to a ruling family that resided in a non-contiguous location. Nonetheless, informal political institutions of communication and mediation persisted in spite of periodic tribal competition (Young 2014, 25-26). Importantly, the political culture of the ruling families is also tribal in origin, with social norms of loyalty and consensus binding tribes to ruling families, and ruling families together within the UAE (Young 2014, 106). So although there are different tribal and ruling family notions of land ownership across the emirates (Young 2014), that the bulk of land is owned by ruling families and allied tribal leaders indicates that there has been no elite split in the UAE since independence.


Yemen

Yemen is coded from the time of independence from the Ottomans until 1961, the year prior to Imam Ahmad bin Yahya’s death and the start of the North Yemen Civil War. This covers the period of rule under Imam Yahya Muhammad of the al-Qasimi dynasty and his son Ahmad. In the aftermath of independence, Imam Yahya engaged in a campaign to consolidate his rule over the tribes in North Yemen. Aid from the Turks to Yahya as well as the withdrawal of British aid to rival tribal leaders enabled Yahya to regain territories that his Qasimi ancestors had formerly ruled (Weir 2007, 265-66). Yahya’s campaign was successful as he conquered rival tribes and forged tribal pacts that recognized his divine authority and pledged loyalty to his rule (Weir 2007).

Imam Yahya and his son Ahmad both allied themselves with large tribal landowners. These rulers conquered valuable lands for allocation to their own tribal connections, and also forged alliances with powerful tribal sheiks (especially plateau-based sheiks) that owned large estates worked by socially inferior laborers. These plateau-based sheiks had been granted estates over
the decades – some in the plateaus, others in mountainous regions where there was little or no tribal organization – by imams seeking to secure their loyalty (Weir 2007, 18-19). Indeed, large landholdings underpin and symbolize sheikly power, from which sheiks govern their tribes (e.g., by allowing tribal members to develop the land) (Weir 2007, 96). Consequently, there is no elite split coded in Yemen during this period.


CENTRAL ASIA

Armenia

“Under the Soviet regime, all agricultural land was state property and most of it was given in use rights to 860 large, mechanized collective and state farms, which were subject to the usual central command procedures. These farms controlled more than 96% of arable land and all of the pastures and hay meadows” (Lerman and Mirzakhanian, 2001: 7). The vast majority of all agricultural land was privatized from 1991-1992: “Approximately 70% of all arable land in the country was transferred in ownership to family farms while most of the remainder was leased to farmers, making state and collective farms almost entirely obsolete” (Giovarelli and Bledsoe, 2001: 18). “The village council is the principal source for leased land: 90% of those with leased land get it from the village council… Land lease market in Armenia is thus strictly one-way: the private farmer leases land from the state (strictly through village council)” (Lerman and Mirzakhanian, 2001: 16). For the first three years there was a moratorium placed on land sales, but after February 1994 it became legal to buy and sell land” (Giovarelli and Bledsoe, 2001: 18). Governments following the collapse of communism did not consistently or substantially seek to forestall land accumulation; there is consequently no elite split coded in Armenia after 1990. "Primarily arable land (with in addition most of the orchards and vineyards) was privatized, while an important part of the hayfields and all pasture land remained in the hands of the state" (Spoor, 2005: 5).


Azerbaijan

There is no elite split coded in Armenia. Collective farms reminiscent from Soviet times were still present in the 1990s, and the state had substantial ownership in the agricultural sector. "The 1995 and 1996 decrees of President Aliyev on farm and land reform aimed to privatize
Azerbaijani agriculture and to dissolve collective farms. Those decrees defined the procedures for dividing and distributing both land and material assets of collective and state farms. The State Land Committee was charged with carrying out the necessary land survey work for division of land into parcels, as well as for issuing land titles.” (Dudwick, Fock and Sedik, 2007: 31). "By 2002, some 96 percent of cultivated land and 98 percent of livestock inventories were in individual farms… About 80 percent of households chose to farm the land themselves, while 9 percent leased land to other persons, and 16 percent left some land unused" (Dudwick, 2007: 34). The effort to privatize by the Aliyevs brought an emphasis on market principles for economic development, including titling and the allowance of market-based transfers.


**Georgia**

There was no elite split in Georgia after 1991. During the Soviet Union, all land was in the hands of the state. After the 1990s, land was distributed for private ownership. Though the privatization process resulted in the establishment of a large number of small, private farms averaging just 0.9 hectares each (Hartvigsen 2013, 46), some commercial farms were larger. As Thomas notes (2006, 235), “A third group of roughly 6,300 commercial farms with an average size of about 90 hectares (often legal entities as cooperatives) have leased large units of adjoining plots of former sovkhozes or kolkhoz land from the state...This group has a strong interest in preventing further purchase of state land and in avoiding further fragmentation.” Furthermore, “although private ownership has increased steadily since the initiation of privatization in 1992, state land ownership dominates in rural areas" (USAID, 2010: 6). "In 2005, the Government of Georgia (GOG) began privatizing the agricultural land remaining in state ownership… The aims of this large-scale privatization strategy were to complete the land privatization process, create incentives for the establishment of large-scale farms and increase productivity" (USAID, 2010: 1). At the same time, "Despite efforts to privatize state land, the state still owned 45% of Georgia's agricultural land in 2007. The State leases out approximately half of its land to private individuals" (USAID, 2010: 7).


**Kazakhstan**
Land in Kazakhstan was owned by the state and operated mainly in state farms and collective farms up until independence. This is a legacy of Soviet land policy. Since independence, it has restructured the agricultural sector. As of 1997, private plots of part-time producers (mainly households) comprised 96% of agricultural producers and occupied 0.06% of agricultural land; individual full-time producers with long-term land leases from the state comprised 3.5% of producers and occupied 12.1% of agricultural land; collective enterprises comprised 0.4% of producers and held 81.8% of agricultural land; and state enterprises comprised 0.1% of producers and occupied 6.04% of agricultural land (Rumer 2000, 115). Employees of nongovernmental agricultural enterprises have the legal capacity to privatize the rights to shares of their land. In practice, however, it is difficult to exercise these rights. The overwhelming majority of land is used by collective enterprises, and these collectives have not typically granted concrete plots to peasant workers, making it impossible for them to leave the collectives and form independent, private farms (Rumer 2000, 115-16). Kazakhstan’s sole president since independence, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has closely monitored state-owned and collective farms. There is consequently no elite split in Kazakhstan since independence.


Kyrgyzstan

“As was the case with other Soviet republics before independence, almost all agricultural land in Kyrgyzstan was held by state and collective farms” (Bloch and Rasmussen, 2005: 87). “Since 1991, the government of Kyrgyzstan has introduced reform measures aimed at transforming its farm sector into a mix of collectively and individually operated farm enterprises. To date, the constitution of Kyrgyzstan does not permit private ownership of agricultural land, reserving ownership to the state (Article 3)” (Bloch and Rasmussen, 2005: 88-89). Due to the various land reforms in early 1990s, there was an increase in the number of peasant farms: “At the end of 1990, before the law, just 8 peasant farms existed in the country, comprising only 1,200 hectares. By the end of 1991 almost 2,000 peasant farms had been established, they accounted for 5 percent of land in use by agricultural enterprises. By mid-1994, the number of peasant farms had reached 16,400 farms with 419,200 hectares.” (Bloch and Rasmussen, 2005: 89-91) "The primary unresolved issues facing the government of Kyrgyzstan are managing the economic failure in spite of land privatization and the ethnic polarization increased by land privatization” (Jones, 2004: 267-268) There is no elite split occurring during the period of interest.


Tajikistan
Prior to independence, all land in Tajikistan was owned by the state under Soviet land policy. Upon independence in 1991, there were 206 collective farms, 362 state farms, and 19 inter-enterprise farms (World Bank 1994, 96). Together, these farms controlled 9.6 million hectares of land. Private plots, by contrast, totaled a mere 75,000 hectares (World Bank 1994, 96-97). Collective and state farms continued to dominate the agricultural sector in the first years following independence. Although Law 544 sought to divide state and collective farms into dekhan farms, lease share enterprises, and agricultural cooperatives by granting state and collective farm members property shares, the law was not implemented for years as a brutal civil war ensued. However, this subsequently shifted with privatization and the reorganization of collective farms. By 2009, the state and collectives controlled only 27.5% of land (Akramov 2013, 129). Most agricultural land shifted to private dekhan farms (39.2% of land) and household plots (24.2% of land). Nonetheless, cropping and production decisions were restricted in many cases, and the privatization of collectives was dictated by connected elites within the collectives and their allies in district, provincial, and even central state offices (Boboyorov 2011, 122). Consequently, there has been no elite split under Tajikistan’s presidents – the short-lived Nabiye (1991-1992) and his successor Rahmon (1992-present).


Turkmenistan

Until 1992, all land in Turkmenistan was owned by the state as a legacy of Soviet land policy. Collective and individual producers were granted usufruct rights. However, over 95% of agricultural land was permanently in use by some 500 large-scale state and collective farms (Lerman and Brooks 1998, 167). Individual plots were overwhelmingly very small household plots. This distribution shifted through the 1990s and 2000s, mainly because of the growth of the land cultivated under household plots; collective cultivated land grew at a much slower pace (Lerman and Brooks 1998, 168-69). Private farms, however, did not cover more than 100,000 hectares even by 1995. Large-scale farms utilizing state-owned land continued to dominate agricultural production. Turkmenistan’s autocratic rulers since independence – Niyazov and Berdimuhamedow – have carefully managed these state-owned farms. Consequently, there is no elite split in Turkmenistan since its founding.


Uzbekistan

All land in Uzbekistan was the property of the state during the period of analysis. This is a legacy of Soviet land policy. Collectives are granted land in permanent use whereas individuals
receive land in inheritable lifetime possession (Lerman 1998, 143). Users do not have rights to transfer, privatize, sell, or mortgage their land. State and collective farms comprised the bulk of agricultural land upon Uzbekistan’s founding, though household plots and peasant farms have become increasingly common (Lerman 1998). Nonetheless, state and collective farms remain the cornerstone of the agricultural economy, and household plots and peasant farms are small-scale. Furthermore, control of state and collective farms is centralized and monitored tightly: district governors, loyal to the central government and President Karimov (who has been in power since independence), have the power to hire and fire farm managers, whereas the general assembly of the collective is a mere rubber stamp on official decisions (Lerman 1998, 151). There is thus no elite split in Uzbekistan since independence.


SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan

Afghanistan was ruled by the Barakzai dynasty from the beginning of the period until 1978. The dynasty since 1900 comprised two different but related families: those descendants of Abdur al-Rahman, who ruled from 1880-1929 with the tribal support largely from non-Pashtuns, and the Musahiban family, which won the throne in 1929 with the support of Wazir frontier tribesmen and ruled until 1978 (Tapper 1983, 62-63). Both of these families built ruling coalitions with powerful tribesmen wealthy enough to employ others to work their land or flocks, who in turn brought the support of their tribes and dependent non-tribespeople (Tapper 1983, 62). There is consequently no elite split during this time period.

A military coup overthrew the Daoud government in 1978, and the Marxist Nur Mohammad Taraki took power. Taraki hailed from a rural Pashtun family. The Soviet Union then invaded the country in 1979 after Taraki lost a power struggle with his prime minister, Hafizullah Amin. The invasion brought a clear elite split. The Soviets occupied Kabul, installing a puppet government that followed the dictates of the Soviet army rather than large tribal landowners (Amstutz 1986). The Soviet occupation lasted until 1989, at which point the last president appointed by the Soviets – Mohammad Najibullah – continued to rule until being displaced in 1992. Najibullah had been severely weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the loss of foreign aid. The coding of elite splits for Afghanistan ends here.


Bangladesh
Sheikh Mujib Rahman, who ruled from 1972-1975, was a key figure in the independence movement and Bangladesh Liberation War. The Mujib regime was secularist and Bengali, and sought to turn the tide on Hindu rule. Most landowners and moneylenders under British colonial Bangladesh were Hindus, and these Hindus kept peasant tenants in a state of near-serfdom and dependent upon their landowners via indebtedness (Novak 1993, 142). Mujib’s rule therefore gave rise to a coalitional split with Hindu landowners (Alamgir 1981). Mujib was assassinated in 1975. The subsequent military regime of Ziaur Rahman, by contrast, incorporated landowners into the cabinet (Islam 1985, 560). Ziaur actively sought to co-opt the rural elite by holding local elections that would confer authority on groups dominated by the landed elite (Bertocci 1982, 991, 997). Ershad’s cabinets also included landed elites. As Alam notes (1993), cabinet ministers not connected to industry and business were “linked with land and had connections to the civil and military bureaucracy.” For instance, Minister Mizan Chawdhury “came from a large landholding family with a business background” (Alam, 1993, Appendix). Finally, the governments of Khaleda Zia (1992-96; 2001-04) and Hasina Wazed (1997-2000) were both dominated by landed elites and were characterized as little more than a form of crony capitalism that “depends on and reinforces a class politics built on collusion among politicians, a bureaucratic administration, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary” (Feldman and Geisler 2012, 976). Moreover, both of their cabinets incorporated individuals linked to land (Maniruzzaman 1992, 217).


Bhutan

Bhutan is coded from 1907 to 1951. From 1907 to 1951, there was no elite split in Bhutan. Until recently, the political and social life of Bhutan was closely bound up with the ownership of land,
most of which belonged either to the Government or to the monasteries or to the aristocracy. Ownership of land implied the responsibilities of administration as well as social duties and political functions. The most important of the social duties was the duty of the landlord to look after the needs of all those who worked for him. Only a small portion of the land belonged to the peasantry. Thus, “the landlords, especially the aristocracy and the monasteries, dominated the political life and politics of the country” (Rahul 1971, 67-8).

http://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/226994.

Cambodia

There was no elite split under Sihanouke, who governed from 1953 to 1970. Indeed, power “remained solidly in the hands of the old Right” given that the Popular Socialist Community Party headed by Sihanouke was effectively “the political representative of the large landowners” (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 97, 100). The perpetrators of the 1970 coup that ousted Sihanouke were among the “big guns of the Cambodia Right” and actually helped to sustain Sihanouk’s absolute rule after 1955 (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 108). Thus, there was no elite split from 1970 to 1974. Upon seizing power in 1975, the Khmer regime declared that the old elite should give up some of its wealth and power (Kiernan and Boua 1982, 112) and subsequently implemented communist-style collectivization of the agricultural sector (Gottesman 2003, 271). Thus, there was an elite split from 1975 through the end of collectivization in 1988. With the privatization of agriculture after 1988, land grabbing by politicians close to the PRK regime resulted in the cultivation of a new landed elite (Gottesman 2003, 280, 299). As Gottesman notes (2003, 286), decollectivization marked a return to the “old society” in Cambodia. After 1990, private construction and development companies effectively dominated the land policy-making process (Hughes and Un 2011, 119, 158-9), so there was no elite split after 1990.


India
During the early years of independence, non-landed professionals retained nearly exclusive control of the Congress Party and government (Tai 1974, 93; Kohli 1987, 69-70). It was during this period that the Nehru government abolished the zamindari system. By the late 1950s, however, landed interests gained greater influence within the national political elite (Tai 1974,97), and the Nehru government increasingly relied on a network of local landlords to deliver votes (Heller 2000, 504). Consequently, national political elites were increasingly “content to lay down broad with regard to reform programs affecting these lesser interests, leaving the local elite to work out the details” (Tai 1974, 97). In other words, an early split by the Congress party from colonial zamindars subsided as Congress became embedded in rural patronage networks. This was the case under successive administrations: For instance, Kohli observes that under Indira Gandhi (1988, 10), “neither the local party nor the bureaucratic elite were in a position to confront the landed elite; on the contrary, at times the party and the landed elite were the same people, and nearly always the local bureaucrats were deeply entrenched in local power structures.” The short-lived, Janata-Party administration of Morarji Desai (1978-79) was supported primarily by affluent and conservative members of India society (Frankel 2005, 577). In the 1980s, the Indira and Rajeev Gandhi governments took an ideological U-turn, shifting the state away from its former socialist ambitions and instead pursuing a growth-oriented state allied with the capitalist sector (Kohli 1988, 11). Importantly, this liberalizing shift marked by a state-business alliance – has “pretty well continued to characterize India’s model of development since about 1980, with another important liberalizing shift in 1991, when integration with the global economy picked up speed” (Kohli 1988, 11).


Korea, North

The post-WWII Russian Occupation Authorities had no ties to the Korean landed elite (Lee 1963, 66-67). The Russian-endorsed government of Kim Il-Sung similarly excluded the landed elite. Indeed, the communist oligarchy under Kim was wholly comprised of Communists, former Manchurian guerrillas, Korean soldier-guerillas, and Soviet-Koreans who had been in exile during Japanese occupation (Buzo 1999, 5, 12). Subsequent purges (~1951, 1958 and 1961) transformed the ruling Politburo into an instrument of personal authoritarian rule, one comprised primarily of former middle and poor peasants who were committed to an ideology driven by the Manchurian guerrilla campaign and wartime Stalinism (Buzo 1999, 32, 58, 78). Collectivization
was implemented, and by the time of its completion by 1960, 95.6 percent of the agricultural population was organized into 3,843 collectives (Lee 1963, 76). Landlords either fled south or were allowed to work small plots of land in other counties (Lee 1963, 76). The composition of the Politburo remained stable, such that former members of the guerrilla groups began the 1980s with an almost total monopoly of power (Buzo 1999, 115). The transition to Kim Jong-Il’s rule in 1994 was marked by political and ideological continuity; “socialist farming constitutes the basic institutional structure of the agricultural sector in North Korea, and it continues to the present day” (Kim et al 1998, 521).


Korea, South

The post-WWII Occupation Authorities had no ties to the Korean landed elite (Mitchell 1949, 147-152; Morrow and Sherper 1970, 36). An elite split continued under the administration of Syngman Rhee. Though Rhee had come to power with the financial assistance of landowners within the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) (Kim 1976, 124), he appointed just one KDP member to the cabinet, an action that precipitated the formation of an opposition bloc that included Rhee’s former party (Kim 1976, 124). Following a failure by the opposition to undermine Rhee’s support by purging the police and bureaucracy, Rhee used land reform to undermine the financial support of the opposition (Kim 1976, 125). The government of Park Chung Hee was comprised of military officers during its early years (1961-1963) and thus continued to exclude the landed elite (Kang 2002, 85; Kim, Hyung-A 2011, 87-88). After the 1963 election, however, Park increasingly incorporated state bureaucrats into his cabinets (Kim, Byung-Kook 2011, 204). Park’s split with the landed elite ended when, in 1968, he sought to forge a “Bismarckian alliance of ‘rye and steel’” (Lee 2011, 363) through large investments in heavy industry and generous price supports for grain and fertilizer. By this time, however, smaller producers had supplanted landed elites. As of 1968, just 1.6 percent of all farms exceeded the 3-hectare ceiling established during the earlier land reform, and the threshold itself remained in place through at least 1970 (Lee 1979, 496). "As a consequence of land reform during the late 1940s and early 1950s, land was parceled out into relatively small holdings. The landlord class collapsed as a result and was replaced by a myriad of smallholders" (Im 1987, 247).

Agricultural interests reasserted their influence on policy by the 1980s, but remained weakened and did not reconstitute a landed elite. For instance, in March 1987, large-scale debt relief for farmers was enacted despite the opposition of the President-backed Economic Planning Board (Boestal et al 2013, 149). Indeed, “by this stage, the central technocracy of the EPB, with the President behind it, could no longer over-rule politicians and interest groups, especially where, as
in the case of agriculture, the Ministry had close links with its ‘client groups’ such as the NLCF [i.e., National Livestock Co-operatives Federation]” (Boestal et al 2013, 149).

Boestel, Joanna, Penelope Francks, and Choo Hyop Kim. 2013. Agriculture and Economic Development in East Asia: From Growth to Protectionism in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Routledge.


Laos

From 1956 to 1962, Lao governments were right-wing governments and diverged only in the degree to which they accommodated the communist-led Pathet Lao (Goldstein 1973, 102-3). For instance, under Phoui Sananikone (1958), Nosovan (1959) and Kong Le (1960), “events moved political power in Laos about as far to the right as it could go” (Goldstein 1973, 158), with right-wing politicians – connected to landed interests – and the Lao army in control of government. From 1962 to 1975, Souvanna Phouma headed a coalition government that incorporated the interests of every political party: As Hill notes (1969, 358-9), “The Laotian government was to consist of seven neutralists selected by Souvanna Phouma, four Pathet Lao representatives, four right-wing representatives, and four ‘Vietiane moderates.’ Not only were the right-wing and communist factions numerically balanced within the cabinet, they were also given complimentary portfolios.” An elite split occurred in December 1975, when, under Phomivhane, the Pathet Lao assumed power to the exclusion of landowners, dissolved the Provisional Government of National Unity, abrogated the six-century-old Lao monarchy and created the new Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Brown and Zasloff 1976, 193). For the next decade (1976-86), collectivization of agriculture became a national goal, with nearly 4,000 collectives created (Ducourtiex et al 2005, 502-3). This eventually laid low landed elites. In the late 1980s, “there was a radical rethinking of economic policy and a modification of the role of agriculture” (Evans
1988, 2). However, the elite split did not subside, and “the change…did not involve a retreat from the government’s socialist objective” (Evans 1988, 2). Indeed, “the New Economic Mechanism has not been accompanied by political reforms” (Bourdet 1996, 92), and “newcomers [to the regime in the early 1990s] are the children of the historical leaders of the party” (Bourdet 1996, 92).


Evans, Grant. 1988. Agrarian Change in Communist Laos. Institute of Southeast Asian.


Pakistan

Until 1958, Pakistani landlords “were in full control of Pakistani politics,” and changes in government were merely “a rearrangement of alliances among the family members of the landlord class” (Rashid 1978, 176; see also Tai 1974, 99; Maniruzzaman 1966, 86). In 1958, Ayub Khan and the Pakistani military seized power and immediately sought to reduce the political power of the big landlords (Tai 1974, 99-100; Ziring 1971, 19). Ali Bhutto (1972-76) remained opposed to Pakistani landlords upon taking office in 1972. Indeed, Bhutto came to power on a socialist platform (Monshipourit and Samuel 1995, 978), and the manifesto of his People’s Progressive Party declared that the “owners of large estates…constitute a formidable obstacle to progress” (Esposito 1974, 430; see also Monshipouri and Samuel 1995, 977). However, during his re-election in 1977, Bhutto “began to lean toward the right and move away from his populist and socialist ideology. In the 1977 election, unlike 1970, he relied on elite groups to win…Out of the top 50 leaders in his party, there were 27 landlords…This was a significant change; his previous government had included four radical socialist cabinet ministers” (Monshipourit and Samuel 1995, 978). There is consequently no elite split under Bhutto beginning in 1977. The authoritarian regime of Zia al-Huq (1978-87) was tightly allied with the landowners (El-Ghonemy 1990, 68, 284; Monshipourit and Samuel 1995, 980). The government of Benazir Bhutto similarly relied on the landowning elite to mobilize the masses
through patronage and influence peddling (Monshipouri and Samuel 1995, 981; Banuazizi 1994, 182). Governments under Sharif and Musharraf, lacking popular support, were similarly forced to rely on the goodwill of the landed and bureaucratic interests by striking close alliances with them (Constable 2001, 19, 22-3).


**Sri Lanka**

The first four Sri Lankan Prime Ministers – Don Senanayake, Kotelawala, Bandaranaike and Dudley Senanayake – were all wealthy landowners (Kumarasingham 2014, 176, 177), so there was no elite split in Sri Lanka through 1970. For instance, Bandaranaike’s cabinet (1957-64), “although ideologically more to the left, also had a large representation of landowners” (Gold 1977, 30). The United Front (UF), which governed from 1971 to 1977, emerged from the merger of two Marxist parties with the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), a party that was “oriented toward the poor and those of low status, more statist in economic policy, and less pro-Western in foreign affairs” (Moore 1990, 347). Land reform was an attempt by the UF “to recover its socialist credential and retrieve its political initiative” in the wake of an insurgency by the ultra-left Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) (Samaraweera 1982, 105-6). Under the reform, Prime Minister Bandaranaike herself lost 1,300 acres of land (Moore 1989, 75). This elite split ended with the assumption of power by the United National Party (UNP) in 1977, a party that “closely resembled a moderately conservative Western Europe party, having its main base among the more wealthy and generally favouring private enterprise” (Moore 1990, 347). Despite attempts to
popularize the UNP under Premadasa (1990-93), the party remained the party of big business and large landowners (Venupogal 2009, 7). An elite split occurred once more from 1994 through 2009 under successive SFLP governments (Ramaswamy 2014).


**Thailand**

Under Kings Rama V (1900-09), Rama VI (1910-24) and Rama VII (1925-32), wealthy landowners “had a strong voice in the Bangkok government” (Feeny 1979, 121). Moreover, members of the royal family were themselves wealthy landowners (Feeny 1979, 121), and – particularly under Rama VII – the state further enriched the landed elite through land grants (Batson 1984, 103). Though the 1932 coup was explicitly directed against the royal princes and nobles, the post-coup government incorporated many members of the old elite (Wyatt 1984, 246-7), so there was no elite split. Moreover, Phahon (1934-38) sold land to high-ranking government officials at below-market-value prices in order to cultivate support for the regime (Wyatt 1984, 251). Successive military governments under Plaek Phibunsongkhram (1939-56), Sarit (1958-63) and Thanom Kittakachorn (1964-73) explicitly appealed to the conservative Thai elite (Wyatt 1984, 266-7). For instance, Sarit himself owned more than 8,000 acres of land (Wyatt 1984, 285), and Thanom appointed wealthy landowners to many middle- and high-ranking government positions (Ramsay 1982, 176). A brief elite split occurred from late 1973 to early 1975 when the collapse of the military regime and subsequent appointment of a civilian cabinet under Sanya (October 1973) strengthened the voice of reformist government officials who emphasized the need for land reform. However, the Kukrit administration (1975-76) was a right-wing coalition that reincorporated the landed elite into government (Morrell 1976, 157): not only did Minister of Agriculture Thawit Klinpratum own sufficient land to be able to donate some toward land reform (Morrell 1976, 168), but several members of the ruling Social Justice Party owned land in excess of 450,000 acres (Morrell 1976, 168). The ensuing military regime (1977-1988) was allied with both the landed elite and civil bureaucracy (Hewison 1997, 96, 97). A second elite
split occurred with the reinstitution of civilian rule from 1989 to 2004. As Hewison notes (1997, 96), Choonhavan’s election in 1989 marked a handing over of the reins of power from a military-landowner-bureaucracy alliance to the “people’s representatives.” The split ended when Thaksin’s populist mode of governance precipitated the 2006 coup and, subsequently, the reinsertion of the military into Thai politics (Hewison 2010, 123).


**Vietnam**

North Vietnam is coded under Vietnam in the period in which Vietnam was split between the north and south. Under Ho Chi Minh, a clear elite split ensued after independence in 1954. The independence campaign against the French was rooted in rural areas and recruited peasants, and Ho Chi Minh institutionalized this group through the Vietnam Workers’ Party to the exclusion of landowners. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) then underwent a ‘rectification program’ that was meant to purge the DRV of wealthy landlords (Moise 1983, 167-77). As intended, land reform and subsequent collectivization effectively dispossessed most landlords (Ravallion and Van de Walle 2008, 23). “Large” landholdings after 1980 were just 50 ha in size (Kojin 2013, 4, 11). The elite split continued through 1982, as the DRV enforced collectivization of the agricultural sector (Ravallion and Van de Walle 2008, 23; Szelaenyi 1998, 162). In 1983, economic crisis sparked debate over land privatization between reformers and conservatives within the ruling Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). The Central Committee ultimately opted in favor of conservatism and the perpetuation of collective farming (Porter 1993, 140-42). Thus, the elite split that had begun in 1954 continued. In 1987, the Political Bureau finally accepted arguments posed by reformers and issued a series of decrees recognizing the importance of private industry and providing “something approaching ownership rights” to peasants working in collectives (Porter 1993, 148). This shifted opposition to pseudo-private landowning and led to cooperation with producers that were key to providing food to cities. In other words, the VCP reversed its former opposition to private ownership of land, thus ending the elite split. In 1993, the VCP embraced wholesale privatization of land (Szelenyi 1998, 10). Though privatization
emphasized small family farms and there was no apparent re-concentration of landholdings under privatization (Szelenyi 1998, 10), privatization signaled that the VCP’s earlier ideological reversal vis-à-vis private landownership persisted after 1993. Thus, there was no elite split after 1993.


FAR EAST ASIA

China

The Manchu Dynasty, which ruled through 1911, based its power on the landlord class (Chih-yi 1949, 343). As Skocpol notes, in the agrarian-commercial economy that functioned through 1949 (1976, 298), the Chinese gentry were “the indispensable support” for national rulers (1976, 295). Chiang Kai-shek similarly relied on the support for large landowners: As Lippit notes (1974, 6), “the Chinese gentry, including principally landowners, dominated rural China, and the Kuomintang could rule through it or not at all. It simply could not act in a way that disregarded the interests of this group.” An elite split occurred when the Chinese Communist Party assumed power beginning in 1949. The CCP was rooted in peasant rather than landowner support. It was therefore “inevitable” that the CCP would undertake land reform upon assuming power (Moise 1983, 10), since “the existence of even a limited number of rather small landlords…posed a threat to the revolution in their capacity as the traditional village elite” (Moise 1983, 31). Under collectivization, the Chinese Communist Party “succeeded in creating a system of small-scale family farming” and eliminated traditional landowners (Bramall 2004, 107). As of 1992, individual holdings comprised just 8.4 percent of all cultivated lands, and were primarily household courtyards (Rozelle, Brandt, Guo and Huang 2005, 110). The elite split continued through 2009. Indeed, though Deng Xiaping (1980-1997) enacted reforms that sought to modernize Chinese agriculture—including some decollectivization of agriculture beginning in 1980 (Brammall 2004, 108), the predominantly military politburo rejected “bourgeois liberalization” and “made it a principle to check liberalization trends” (Marti 2002, 17). The same was true under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao: the CCP, Secretariat and Politburo remained comprised primarily of technocrats and military officers (Dittmer 2000, 36-41).
Mongolia

From 1925-28, right-wing elements of the nobility infiltrated the leadership of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and “perverted the decisions of the Third Congress of the MPRP and the First People’s Khural” (Ballis 1956, 306). The nobility at this time along with the Buddhist Church and clergy were among the largest owners of land and herds in Mongolia (Bawden 1968). An elite split occurred in October 1928 when the MPRP left wing demanded at the seventh session of the MPRP that the government be purged of “casual” and “foreign” elements (Bawden 1968, 307). One month later, the left-wing formally denounced the policies of the “rightists” and dismissed the nobility and Buddhist church from the “organs of power” (Bawden 1968, 307). Under Soviet supervision, the left-wing government collectivized agriculture, and this collective structuring continued through 1989 (Ballis 1956, 307; Bawden 1968, 347). Collectivization virtually eliminated the landed elite—particularly the lamaist church (Bawden 1968, 347). After 1990, several factors indicate that there was no elite split. First, in 1990, the MPRP invited members of the new opposition parties into a coalition government. For instance, the first deputy for economics who oversaw the enactment of land reform – Ganbold – was from the National Progressive Party, which had formed around a group of young, liberalizing economists (Korsun and Murrell 1995, 472-3). Second, the state-owned farms – the negdels – were free from state control after 1990, and the Agricultural Cooperatives Union that represented farmers’ interests in parliament was able to “dictate the policies most vital to it” (Korsun and Murrell 1995, 481), including the negdel privatization process. Consequently, the privatization of the negdels generated 320 new companies in a process that was rife with corruption and resulted in the creation of a new oligarchy (Korsun and Murrell 1995, 481;
Bagdai, van der Molen and Tuladhar 2012, 801). In other words, there was no elite split after 1990 because 1) virtually every sector of Mongolian society was represented in a coalition government, and because 2) landed interests rapidly came to exert tremendous political influence over government.


Taiwan

In Taiwan, the Nationalist Government exiled from mainland China was alienated from indigenous landowners (Adams 1995, 3; see also Roy 2003, 100; Tai 1974, 267). There were no significant ethnic, historical, ideological, or political ties between the KMT and the indigenous Taiwanese landowners whose land was redistributed. As Taiwanese land expert Shih-Jung Hsu notes, “the key to Taiwan's successful land reform was that the people who implemented the policy had no relation whatsoever with landowners” (Yueh 2009). Cabinets under Chiang Kai-shek were comprised primarily of mainlanders. Chiang Kai-Shek, while dedicated to reforming the party on its new territory to attract members, did not reach out to landed elites. Chiang Kai-Shek established a Central Reform Committee (CRC) in 1950 and hand-picked each of its 16 members. The committee members were young and well-educated and nine of them had studied abroad. The CRC quickly established reform goals, including eliminating landed elites and broadening their support base to include the peasantry (Myers 2009, 189).

The composition of KMT cabinets began to shift in 1972, when the KMT began to recruit more native Taiwanese into the party and government (Jacobs 1973, 105; Roy 2003, 154; Cheng and White 1990, 7). This transformation of the KMT ruling elite coincided with a shift “from ‘oppressing’ agricultural enterprises to ‘balancing’ them with industry” (Huang 1993, 55). Specifically, under the Accelerated Rural Development Program, “policy was reoriented from taxing to subsidizing farmers” (Huang 1993, 55), and protection of the agricultural sector increased (Huan 1993, 57-8). The shift is largely attributed to Chiang Ching-quo, who “began to appoint many young intellectuals, especially those who were from Taiwanese families, to important government positions” upon becoming premier in 1972 (Cheng and White 1990, 7). Thus, the elite split that had begun with the KMT’s invasion of the island ended with the reincorporation of native Taiwanese into government beginning in 1972. The concomitant shift
in agricultural policy continues through the present-day: As Boestal, Francks, and Kim (2013) note, “By 1960 in Japan and 1970 in Taiwan and Korea, the growth that had enabled the agricultural sector to become involved in and contributed to the economic miracle had slowed down…The almost immediate response in all three countries was a switch back towards protection and supports for farmers.”


Huang, Chun-Chieh. 1998. “Historical Reflections on the Postwar Taiwan Experience from an Agrarian Perspective.” Postwar Taiwan in Historical Perspective 1: 17-35.


OCEANIA

Australia

The Hughes administration, which governed from 1915 to 1923, emerged from an alliance with the Country Party (Hughes 1998, 121), a party that “relied heavily on the initiative of farm organizations” (Hefford 1985, 64-5). In 1922, the National and Country Parties forged a durable coalition government under Bruce (1922-28) (Henderson 1985, 254). An elite split occurred from 1929 to 1932 when the Australian Labor Party (ALP) formed the government and successfully excluded the Nationalist Party (Hughes 1998, 121). Governments from 1933 to 1940 were Liberal-Nationalist coalition governments and thus incorporated the interests of the landed elite (Henderson 1985, 254). A second split occurred when the ALP once more gained access to governmental power from 1941 to 1949 (Hughes 1998, 110, 121). In 1949, the Country Party defeated the Labor Party in the general elections and formed a Liberal-Country coalition
government that ruled through 1971 (Hefford 1985, 64-5). A four-year split occurred when the ALP once more formed the government, from 1972 to 1975. This was followed by “another long period” of Liberal-Country coalition government (1975-83) (Henderson 1985, 224). Yet another split occurred when the ALP governed from 1984 to 1997 (Hughes 1998, 110), and once more from 2006 to 2009 (Hughes 1998, 110, 121).


**Fiji**

Native Fijians have historically been the country’s largest landowners. As Ward notes (1995, 248), land “is what Fijians have and other ethnic groups have not.” There was no elite split under Ratu Mara (1970-91), since Mara’s influence derived from his linkage to a network of native Fijian chiefs known as the Tovata Confederacy (Alley 2001, 219). Under the Rabuka government (1992-98), “the agenda of land reform was thoroughly captured by Fijian supremacists” (Kurer 2001, 307), and “to deny Fijian landowners access to their land was plainly unacceptable” (Kurer 2001, 304). An elite split occurred during the two years of Mahendra Chaudhry’s rule (1999-2000). As the first Indo-Fijian prime minister, Chaudhry headed a Labour Party government with an absolute majority (Alley 2000, 517). Moreover, the threat Chaudhry posed to Fijian-owned land ultimately became a major contributor to the coup that deposed him in 2000 (Fry 2000, 302). As Kurer notes (2001, 310), “the threats to Fijian interests and existence…contributed much to the groundswell of sympathy that carried the coup to its success…Indeed, the ‘main reasons given by the perpetrators of the 19 May attempted coup include fear of indigenous Fijians losing control of their own land’.” The split ended in the wake of the coup and the restoration of native Fijian rule under Laisenia.


Indonesia

In the early period of Sukarno’s rule, there was no elite split. Sukarno’s first cabinet aimed to appeal to the old guard leadership (Legge 1972, 209), and his second and third cabinets were coalition cabinets that incorporated members from 7 and 8 different political parties, respectively (Feith 1958, 5, 6). Thus, virtually every sector of society – included the landed elite – were incorporated into the government. In 1957, Sukarno publicly called for the burial of the established political parties, and a split ensued in 1959, when Sukarno built a new coalition comprised of the army and Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) (Legge 1972, 280-309). Suharto’s cabinet was comprised primarily of military officers and Western-educated technocrats, and an elite split continued through 1968 (Elson 2001, 167-8; Fane and Warr 2008, 146). However, through nepotism, the Suharto family itself gradually came to comprise a new landed elite, so the split ended after 1969. Indeed, the Suharto family held major companies with interests in real estate, agribusiness and food retail (Eklof 1999, 9), and Suharto cronies ultimately “wielded as much power as his ministers” (Vatikiotis 1998, 42).


Japan

Landowners were the most important political group in Meiji Japan; their political and fiscal importance meant that the ruling oligarchy actively vied for their support (Sheingate 2001, 46). Moreover, landlord interests were well-represented within the political parties. For instance, Hara’s cabinet (1918-21) was comprised of members of the majority Seyukai Party, “in which landlord interests were strongly represented” (Dore 1959, 81). After 1945, Japan was ruled by American Occupation Authorities who not only had no ties to the Japanese landed elite but actually blamed landowners for Japan’s role in the war (Scalapino 1968, 26; Dore 1959, 131). Land reform was enacted under the Occupation Authorities in order to “retire many of the old conservative elite” (Scalapino 1968, 26). During the 1945-52 period, however, agricultural cooperatives “established themselves as an adept political force at the grass roots” (Sheingate 2001, 154-5). For instance, “as the largest organization in the countryside, Nokyo possessed the ability to mobilize votes and exhibited its influence in national as well as local elections,” so
politicians actively cultivate Nokyo’s support by channeling state resources to the organization (Sheingate 2001, 154-5). By 1956, Nokyo had “solidified its ties to with the LDP machinery” (Sheingate 2001, 156). Moreover, given the reliance of the ruling LDP on organizations like Nokyo, Japan effectively became an agricultural welfare state after 1953, one in which Nokyo continued to play a central role in the rural economy and steadily expanded its business activities in insurance, banking and other services. Hence, after 1953, there is no elite split in Japan.


Malaysia

There was no elite split in Malaysia from 1957 to 2009, as virtually every regime either represented the landed elite or depended upon the landed elite for political support. For instance, as a member of the royal family, Rahman (1957-70) was himself a wealthy landowner (Wariya 1988, 160; Gullick 1981, 126). Similarly, Razak (1971-76) and Hussein Bin Onn (1977-81) were members of the landed aristocracy in Pahang and Johor, respectively (Wariya 1988, 160). Under Mahatir (1982-2002), the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) depended on the “rural patron class” to deliver the votes of the rural poor (Drury 1988, 295), so there was no elite split.


New Zealand

An elite split occurred from 1900 to 1912 under the Liberal Party government. The Liberal Party appealed to small farmers and from 1891 and 1893 had “cut up the big estates and put the farmers on the land” (Milne 1966, 35). Liberal prime ministers in the 1900s (e.g., Richard Seddon, 1893-1906) thus took great pains to underscore “the fact that whatever remained of the Old Conservatives and large landowners still existed was to be found in the ranks of the opposition” (Milne 1966, 30). The elite split ended in 1913 when the Reform Party began a long tenure in power (1913-28). The Reform Party was essentially a ’sectional’ farmers’ party, and it received explicit support for the Farmers’ Union (Milne 1966, 36), which was in turn described as “an alliance of large and small rural property holders” (Richardson 1981, 206). The New United Party that ruled from 1929 to 1930 incorporated wealthy landowners into the cabinet. In
fact, Prime Minister George Forbes was himself a South Island farmer (Milne 1966, 44). In 1931, The New United and Reform parties formed a coalition government in which “farming interests...had considerable support” (Richardson 1981, 221). A split occurred under the Labour Party government that ruled from 1935 to 1948. Importantly, the Labour Party began as a socialist party and was thus inimical to the interests of the landed elite (McLeay 1995, 34). The elite split ended in 1949 when the National Party, formed in 1936 out of the conservative Reform and United parties, came to power and ruled through 1957. A brief, two-year split occurred under a second Labour Party government (1958-59), and was followed by a twelve-year-long National Party government (1960-72). Another two-year split occurred under the Labour party government of 1973 to 1974. There was no split under Muldoon’s National Party government (1975-84) (McLeay 1995, 35). This was followed by yet another split under the Labour Party (1985-90) (McLeay 1995, 35). From 1991 to 1999, there was no split under successive National Party governments (Baker and McLeay 2000, 142). A final split occurred during the single-party majority government of the Labour Party after 2000 (Lodge and Gill 2011).


Papua New Guinea

From 1970 to 2009, there was no elite split in Papua New Guinea. Beginning in the 1970s, governments worked in lock-step with landed elite interests: as Stewart and Strathern (1998, 134) note, legislation to promote business and land groups effectively transformed the coffee entrepreneurs of the 1960s into oil and gas barons with the discovery of natural resource deposits in the Southern Highlands. Moreover, through lend-leaseback programs, private companies were able to acquire some 5,000,000 hectares of arable land between 2003 and 2011 (Filer 2011, 3). And importantly, a majority of such acquisitions were large-scale acquisitions of more than 1,000 hectares each (Filer 2011, 3). In other words, far from splitting with the traditional landed elite, the Papua New Guinea government has continued to promote the interests of the landed elite, even as it has worked to attract foreign investment in the country’s natural resources.
elite, political elites in Papua New Guinea have actively enriched the landed elite through policies that further concentrated private landholdings.


Philippines

The Quezon administration incorporated wealthy landowners into the cabinet. For instance, in 1941, Quezon appointed Sotero Baluyut, a prominent spokesperson for the landlords, as Labour Secretary (Kerkvliet 1977, 55). Osmeña (1944-45) was himself a member of the landed elite, owning more than 2,000 hectares (Wurfel 1979, 240). Roxas (1946-47) and Quirrino (1948-52) each appointed prominent landowners to their cabinets (Wurfel 1979, 236). A split occurred when President Magsaysay split with old guard of the Nacionalista Party (NP), particularly Senators Laurel and Recto (Abueva 1971, 298). Moreover, Magsaysay famously governed in a populist fashion, so the influence of landed elites within his cabinet was minimal (Abueva 1971, 298). Wealthy landowners once more exerted their influence during the Garcia and Macapagal governments (1957-61 and 1962-64, respectively). The government of Ferdinand Marcos initially included members of the landed elite. However, upon declaring martial law, Marcos specifically sought to undermine the traditional Philippine elite (Riedinger 1995, 26, 61); prominent elites from the opposition were arrested and stripped of their assets (Riedinger 1995, 26, 61). This elite split persisted until 1986, when the Aquino government began. In addition to being a member of the landed elite herself (Riedinger 1995, 108), Aquino appointed elites with landed-class backgrounds to her cabinet (Riedinger 1995, 108, 272 fn. 7).


**Solomon Islands**

In the Solomon Islands, privately owned land was concentrated in the West, from the Shortland Islands and Choiseul through Vella Lavella and Kolombangara to New Georgia (Fraenkel 2004, 36). Moreover, these areas were rich sources of timber, copra and cattle (Fraenkel 2004, 35). There was no elite split from 1978 to 1989, since Kenilorea drew members of his cabinet from the West in an effort to create regional balance in the distribution of cabinet portfolios (Fraenkel 2004, 37). In the 1990s, ties between the political elite and timber companies increasingly strengthened: “What started out as an opportunistic relationship in the early 1980s grew gradually into a firm alliance in the early 1990s” (Frazer 1997, 41). In 2000, constitutional reform “gave many concessions to the powerful landowner-entrepreneur factions that had been at the forefront of western demands” (Dinnen and Firth 2008, 235). In other words, the history of the Solomon Islands after 1978 was marked by the political influence of the wealthy landowners of the west. Thus, there was no elite split in the Solomon Islands.

   http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/13131.
SECTION SIX: ADDITIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSES

A. Adjusting for Land Quality

Chapter 4 discusses the issue of land quality in detail. It also discusses several of the advantages and complications of constructing a measure of land quality. The empirical analyses of land redistribution in Chapter 5 do not account for the variance in the quality of land redistributed. In other words, in analyzing hectares redistributed as a percentage of cultivable land as the dependent variable, it treats all redistributed land equally. This is not necessarily problematic for the main findings if the type of land redistributed does not systematically vary with the two key predictors of elite splits and veto points, though it may influence the coefficients of these variables. However, if the two key predictors are correlated with the type or quality of land redistributed, the findings presented may be problematic. Another factor that mitigates some of the concern over land quality is that lower quality land is less likely to be occupied to begin with, and therefore more likely to be used for land colonization rather than redistribution. The way in which land was redistributed supports this point: redistribution was often implemented via landholding ceilings whereby land above a certain threshold that was held by large landowners (and therefore likely more desirable than smallholder land) was subject to redistribution.

While it is not possible to standardize land transfers by land quality across space and time given data constraints, it is possible to attempt to bound the potential biases that are introduced using the data on land quality that are available.

There are several cases of major land reform that incorporated marginal land into the reform sector. Perhaps the most notorious is Mexico. As time elapsed since the Mexican Revolution, it became increasingly common to distribute marginal, low quality land (e.g., Walsh Sanderson 1984). This was particularly true in the more arid north of the country. Díaz Ordaz in particular, and Echeverría to a lesser degree, became well known for this (Walsh Sanderson 1984).

Related problems are present, albeit to a smaller degree, in the cases of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru. All of these countries redistributed non-negligible amounts of marginal land as a part of their land reform programs. This is mainly because these countries intersect at the altiplano, a relatively arid, high plane atop the Andes. The altiplano has land of marginal quality (see, e.g., Caballero and Alvarez 1980). These countries also have substantial mountainous territory, less of which is agriculturally productive than their northern Andean neighbors that reside closer to the equator. It is important to emphasize, however, that while this land is less productive on a per hectare basis than heavily rain-fed zones, it is far from completely undesirable: it is occupied by a reasonably dense population of agricultural laborers, particularly in Bolivia.

In an effort to bound the possible biases introduced in the analysis by failing to directly account for land quality, I make use of data on the type and quality of land distributed in these countries. In particular, I exclude completely redistributed land that is classified as mountainous or desert in Mexico (Walsh Sanderson 1984, 164-65; INEGI 1985, Table 7.1), and land of marginal quality in Chile (Garrido 1988, 174), Bolivia (Urioste 1987, Annex 10), and Peru (Caballero and Alvarez 1980, 16-17). As mentioned above, in many cases this land was actually occupied and used by land reform beneficiaries. Nonetheless, its productivity was relatively low. Excluding
this land from the analysis implies that the modified results more closely measure high-quality land that was distributed. The modified coding is, if anything, likely to be a lower bound on the amount of redistributed land that was useful for land reform beneficiaries given that it excludes marginal land that was actually farmed. As a result, the "true" coefficients on the key predictors of Elite Split and Veto Points are likely somewhere between the results presented in Table A1 and the results presented in Chapter 5.

Table A1 displays the results, using high-quality land redistribution as a percentage of cultivable land as the dependent variable. Models 1 and 2 use a tobit specification and mirror the specifications in Models 4 and 7 in Table 5.3. Models 3 and 4 employ OLS and follow the same specifications as in Models 8 and 9 of Table 5.3. All of the models use year dummies to pick up secular trends in land redistribution. Models 2 and 3 include region dummies; Model 4 employs country fixed effects. The results consistently confirm the main findings. The interaction term between Elite Split and Veto Points is negative and highly statistically significant across the Table A1 models. The results for the other variables are largely similar to those in Table 5.3. The magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term in Model 1 of Table A1 is roughly 10% lower than that in Model 4 of Table 5.3. The coefficient in Model 2 of Table A1 is somewhat lower than Model 7 of Table 5.3, and the OLS coefficients on the interaction terms in Models 3-4 of Table A1 are very similar to those in Models 8-9 of Table 5.3. This suggests that using a measure of land redistribution that is adjusted for land quality is unlikely to impact the results in Chapter 5.
Table A1: Redistribution of “High-quality” Land, 1930-2008  
Dependent Variable: Percent High-quality Land Redistribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tobit Model 1</th>
<th>Tobit Model 2</th>
<th>Tobit Model 3</th>
<th>Tobit Model 4</th>
<th>OLS Model 1</th>
<th>OLS Model 2</th>
<th>OLS Model 3</th>
<th>OLS Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Veto Points</td>
<td>6.892**</td>
<td>6.335**</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>1.089*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.169)</td>
<td>(3.073)</td>
<td>(0.413)</td>
<td>(0.619)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Split</td>
<td>7.253***</td>
<td>6.784***</td>
<td>1.689***</td>
<td>2.591***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.143)</td>
<td>(2.123)</td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
<td>(0.590)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.559)</td>
<td>(4.352)</td>
<td>(0.861)</td>
<td>(1.211)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>log(GDP)</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.661**</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.827</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.490)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Pressure</td>
<td>2.282*</td>
<td>2.528*</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.256)</td>
<td>(1.289)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.418)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Urban</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.016*</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>0.502*</td>
<td>0.489*</td>
<td>0.312*</td>
<td>0.375**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
<td>(0.290)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>2.182</td>
<td>2.347*</td>
<td>0.982**</td>
<td>1.028**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.374)</td>
<td>(1.378)</td>
<td>(0.384)</td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Prior Land Redist</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Effects</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region Fixed Effects</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Fixed Effects</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1201</td>
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<td>1201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)  
Dependent variable is in percent. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses in Models 1-2. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses in Models 3-4. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation in OLS models. Constants and time dummies are not shown.
B. Robustness to Revised Measures of Institutional Constraints

Chapter 5 primarily captures the key independent variable institutional constraints using a measure of Veto Points (POLCONIII) from Henisz (2002), but it also discusses two other alternative measures. The first is a modified measure of Veto Points that takes into consideration the role of the military as a potential de facto veto player (see Section 2 of the Appendix for details on how this measure is constructed). Model 1 of Table 5.4 presents regression results substituting this modified measure for POLCONIII.

The second alternative measure of institutional constraints discussed in the text is an additional measure of Veto Points (POLCONV) that takes into account the judiciary as another independent branch of government (alongside the executive, lower, and upper legislative chambers) that has veto power over policy change. POLCONV also accounts for independent sub-federal entities as a veto player when they impose substantive constraints on national fiscal policy, though Brazil is the only country coded as such in Latin America during this period and the results are similar regardless of how sub-federal entities are treated. Like POLCONIII, POLCONV takes into account the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit various veto points. The measure varies between 0 and 0.89. The 25th percentile is 0 and the 75th percentile is 0.56. This measure, however, has a serious drawback: data on the judiciary are only coded back to 1960. It therefore provides much less coverage than the POLCONIII measure. The manuscript consequently focuses on the results using POLCONIII given the much more comprehensive temporal coverage for this variable.

Table A2 presents a series of robustness tests using the POLCONV measure to capture institutional constraints. Models 1 and 2 use a tobit specification and mirror the specifications in Models 4 and 7 in Table 5.3. Models 3 and 4 employ OLS and follow the same specifications as in Models 8 and 9 of Table 5.3. All of the models use year dummies to pick up secular trends in land redistribution. Models 2 and 3 include region dummies; Model 4 employs country fixed effects. The results are similar to those presented in Table 5.3. Elite splits are strongly and statistically significantly associated with greater land redistribution in the absence of institutional constraints. The interaction term between elite splits and POLCONV is negative and statistically significant in Models 1-2. It is barely shy of statistical significance in Model 3 (p=0.13), but it again returns to statistical significance in Model 4 with the inclusion of country fixed effects. That the results of these robustness tests support the main results in Table 5.3 adds even more confidence to the main findings, especially given the relatively lower power of these regressions in light of the significantly restricted time period and number of observations.
Table A2: Land Redistribution Using Alternative Institutional Constraints  
Measure, 1930-2008  
Dependent Variable: Percent Land Redistribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tobit</th>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto Points</td>
<td>8.102**</td>
<td>7.889**</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>1.458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.249)</td>
<td>(3.306)</td>
<td>(0.830)</td>
<td>(1.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Split</td>
<td>6.470**</td>
<td>5.824**</td>
<td>2.013***</td>
<td>2.830***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.542)</td>
<td>(2.561)</td>
<td>(0.622)</td>
<td>(0.868)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Split*Veto Points</td>
<td>-7.678*</td>
<td>-6.489*</td>
<td>-1.695</td>
<td>-2.930**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.972)</td>
<td>(3.921)</td>
<td>(1.069)</td>
<td>(1.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(GDP)</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>0.811**</td>
<td>-0.169*</td>
<td>2.188*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.385)</td>
<td>(0.408)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(1.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Pressure</td>
<td>3.179*</td>
<td>3.443**</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>1.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.645)</td>
<td>(1.740)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.873)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Urban</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.023*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.479</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
<td>(0.421)</td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>3.019</td>
<td>3.278*</td>
<td>1.398**</td>
<td>1.400**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.885)</td>
<td>(1.975)</td>
<td>(0.574)</td>
<td>(0.546)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Prior Land Redist</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Effects</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region Fixed Effects</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Fixed Effects</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
Dependent variable is in percent. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses in Models 1-2. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses in Models 3-4. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation in OLS models. Constants and time dummies are not shown.
C. “Upward” Land Redistribution and Indirect or Market-Based Redistribution

The empirical analyses in the book directly examine three policies of land reform: land redistribution, land negotiation, and land colonization. They do not explicitly consider policies or laws that may have the effect of increasing land concentration. Mexico’s Ley Lerdo is a classic example of a law that was used as legal cover for the enclosure of lands held by smallholders and indigenous communities (often through customary law) by large landowners. If this type of law is disproportionately implemented under the same political conditions that yield land redistribution – an elite split alongside low institutional constraints – then the estimated effects of these conditions on redistribution in the regression models may be upward biased.

The empirical analyses also do not take into account policies and laws that may lead to redistribution or concentration by influencing land transfers in the private market. Land titling, for instance, while not directly transferring property, may nonetheless reduce transaction costs in the rural sector and make it easier for large landowners to acquire the property of smallholders that are economically distressed due to environmental, weather, or other shocks. Land titling may also fortify small landholders by increasing their access to loans via the collateralization of their property. The possible effects are not limited to land titling. The World Bank has funded several projects such as those in Brazil and Colombia (see, e.g., Deininger 1999) that are intended to reduce transaction costs associated with land transfers and provide incentives for groups of smallholders to purchase larger properties that are on the market. If such policies tend to be implemented under similar – or the opposite – political conditions that yield land redistribution, then the estimated effects of these conditions on “net” redistribution will again be incorrect. If for instance democratic governments are more likely to favor market mechanisms for land redistribution, then the regressions may be overestimating the impact of low institutional constraints for redistributive reform.

In order to capture the effects of these other policies, I use Vanhanen’s (2009) measure of family farms. This measure is calculated as the “area of family farms as a percentage of the total area of holdings.” A family farm implies that the family owns and cultivates the land, and employs a maximum of four people. This measure is used to tap land inequality in Ansell and Samuels (2010) and Boix (2003). I use a first-difference of the family farms measure as a dependent variable in order to pick up changes in the distribution of landholdings.

The Vanhanen family farms measure, and changes in this measure, tend to pick up the sum of all the other policy tools mentioned above that can influence land redistribution. They do not, however, effectively proxy for land redistribution itself. This is in part because many redistributive land reforms redistributed land to collectives, cooperatives, and communities rather than in family farm sized plots. Take for instance Peru. By far the largest episode of land redistribution in the country occurred from 1968-1980 under military rule. During this period, the amount of total land held in family farms changed from 8% to 14% according to the Vanhanen data, despite the fact that 45% of all agricultural land in the country was redistributed from the largest landowners primarily to collectives and cooperatives. After the push toward decollectivization and privatization began in the 1980s and sped up in the 2000s, the family farms indicator spikes. Family farms climbed from 18% to 24% of land in the period 1988-1998, and 24%-40% from 1998-2004. There was no program of land redistribution during these latter
changes, merely policies for privatization (see, e.g., Alvarado 1995, Ballantyne et al. 2000, Carter and Alvarez 1989, CEPES 2010). Nicaragua is another illustrative case. Despite the fact that the Sandinistas redistributed most of the cultivable land in the country in the decade beginning in 1979, the family farms indicator declines from 17% in 1978 to 13% in 1988. Again, the explanation lies in collective and cooperative farming. The family farms indicator increases sharply to 25% in 1998 and to 44% in 2007 even though there was no substantial land redistribution whatsoever over these two decades.

The results of four different regression models are found in Table A3. All of these models use an OLS specification with year dummies to pick up secular trends in land distribution. The models address heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and contemporaneous correlation using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with a Newey West adjustment with a one-order lag length. Models 1 and 2 include the Veto Points and Elite Split variables. Models 3 and 4 include these terms as well as their interaction. Models 1 and 3 include region dummies; Models 2 and 4 employ country fixed effects. Importantly, none of these models suggest that indirect forms of land redistribution occur under conditions opposite of those hypothesized in the manuscript. Model 2 suggests that, if anything, veto points are negatively linked with increases in the percentage of land held in family farm-sized units. Once the interaction term is included in Models 3 and 4, neither the interaction term or its constituent terms are statistically significant. The interaction term, however, is negative as in the Chapter 5 empirical analyses. This suggests that policies other than land redistribution that have a progressive impact on the distribution of landholdings are, if anything at all, weakly linked to the same political conditions under which redistributive land reforms occur: amidst low veto points and elite splits. The negative coefficients in Models 3-4 bolster the impact of the negative coefficients found on the interaction terms in Chapter 5. In other words, once we account for the other indirect policies that impact the distribution of landholdings, the conditions I lay out in the manuscript as linked to land redistribution are ever stronger. That is because this indicator is primarily tapping policies other than direct land redistribution.
Table A3: Changes in Family Farm-Sized Landholdings, 1930-2008
Dependent Variable: Percent Land Redistribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Veto Points</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.023</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elite Split</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.057</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Split*Veto Points</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(GDP)</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.530***</td>
<td>-0.028*</td>
<td>-0.510***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Pressure</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.188**</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.194**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Urban</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
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<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.027</td>
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<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
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<td>Percent Prior Land Redist</td>
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<td>0.002**</td>
<td>0.002**</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Year Effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region Fixed Effects</td>
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<td>Country Fixed Effects</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)

Dependent variable is in percent. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation in OLS models. Constants and time dummies are not shown.
D. Land Redistribution Outside Latin America

Table 8.2 in Chapter 8 presents an analysis of land redistribution around the world. Table A4 replicates the specifications in Table 8.2 but drops the observations that correspond to Latin America. The results are largely similar. Indeed, the magnitudes of the main coefficients of interest actually increase. This indicates that the Table 8.2 findings are not simply driven by Latin America. The theory linking elite splits and low institutional constraints to land redistribution holds in other regions of the world as well.
Table A4: Land Redistribution, Political Institutions, and Elite Splits Outside Latin America, 1900-2008

<table>
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<th>Includes Majority Agricultural Pop.</th>
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<td>Percent Urban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)

Standard errors clustered by country. A cubic polynomial approximation to the hazard is included in Models 1-6 to address temporal dependence (polynomial terms jointly statistically insignificant in Models 7-8). Constants and time dummies are not shown.