

Online Appendix

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1 Construction of Survey Weights

In this section we describe the choices and procedures made to calculate post-stratification weights (PS weights henceforth). We use the Stata user-written program `ipfraking` by Kolenikov (2014) to calculate the PS (raked) weights. The program produces PS weights using as input covariates and the distribution of these covariates in the general population. We produce two PS weights `w1`, and `w2` as described below.

1.1 Steps of the Procedure

The most crucial step in producing post-stratification weights is obtaining population values for the demographic input variables.

1. Adult population size.

We extract the total population for the four countries of the study at <https://bit.ly/3p5thJZ>. For Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico the information was extracted on 1/8/2021. For the USA it was extracted on 1/10/2021. For Argentina the total population is

45,415,987; for Brazil is 213,359,206; for Mexico is 129,653,657; and for the USA is 332,039,504.

Since we only surveyed adults (who are at least 18 years old), we use the total number of individuals aged 18 years or more in the population: For Argentina the adult population is 31,913,814; for Brazil 159,220,374; for Mexico 118,902,776; and for the US 252,350,023.

2. Age and Gender Categories

Netquest, our survey firm, provided the distribution of the population by both gender and age categories for the Latin American countries. For the USA, the distribution of the adult population by age category and gender was extracted from the 2010 Census at <https://bit.ly/2Nmb3Gd>.

3. Socioeconomic status

Netquest, our survey firm, provided the distribution of the population by Socioeconomic status categories for the Latin American countries. For the USA, we calculated the share for each household income bracket using Census data available at <https://bit.ly/3qC5PUZ>.

4. State or region of residency

Netquest, our survey firm, provided the distribution of the population by Socioeconomic status categories for only Argentina and Brazil. For Mexico we extracted the distribution from the INEGI website. The data corresponds to the 2010 distribution of the population by state. For the USA, we extracted the share of the population that in 2019 lived in each of the four regions used by the Census available at <https://bit.ly/35ZZSJA>.

5. Ideology

The ideological distribution of the general population is extracted from the 2019/2020 surveys carried out by LAPOP for the Latin American countries available at <https://bit.ly/3qDvA7y>, and from the 2016 surveys carried out by ANES for the USA available at <https://bit.ly/2XUAYGP>.

In our survey (Q65), we ask respondents to self-place themselves on a 5-points ideological scale: very conservative, moderately conservative, neither conservative nor liberal, moderately liberal, and very liberal.

The LAPOP surveys ask respondents (I1) to self-place themselves in a 1-10 ideological scale where 1 is “izquierda” (left) and 10 is “derecha” (right). We connect this variable to variable Q65 as described below in Table 1.

For the ANES data we use question V161126, together with variable V160101 as a weight

Table 1: Mapping ideology between LAPOP and our survey

| l1 value in LAPOP | Q65 in our data |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| 9-10 | Very conservative |
| 7-8 | Moderately conservative |
| 5-6 | Neither conservative nor liberal |
| 3-4 | Moderately liberal |
| 1-2 | Very liberal |

variable¹. The ideology variable (V161126) is a “7 point scale Liberal conservative self-placement,” and the information was recorded before the 2016 election. The variable takes values from 1 to 7, where 1 is extremely liberal, 2 is liberal, 3 is slightly liberal, 4 is moderate or middle of the road, 5 is slightly conservative, 6 is conservative, and 7 is extremely conservative. It also has some non-response categories like “refused”, “don’t know”, or “haven’t thought much about this”. Since our variable Q65 has no missing responses, we re-scaled the proportions extracted from V161126 in order to exclude the non-response categories. We then connect the ANES variable to variable Q65 as described below in Table 2:

Table 2: Mapping ideology between ANES and our survey

| V161126 in ANES | Q65 in our data |
|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| 7 | Very conservative |
| 5-6 | Moderately conservative |
| 4 | Neither conservative nor liberal |
| 2-3 | Moderately liberal |
| 1 | Very liberal |

Finally, version 1 of the PS weights (**w1**) is produced from following steps 1-5, while version 2 (**w2**) is produced from following steps 1-5.

1.2 Error Checking

The weight variables stands for the number of people in the population. Therefore, if an observation has a weight of 2,000 it means that the observation represents 2,000 individuals in the population. To check if the procedure is consistent, we aggregate each weight across survey observations. If the procedure was carried out properly, the result be very close to the

¹The actual label of the variable in the codebook is “Pre-election weight full sample”.

population aged 18 years and above for each country. In Table 3 we report the sum of the weights, the actual population aged 18 years or older, and the absolute difference between the sum of the weights and the population for each country. Indeed, the error for all countries is low and likely due to rounding precision.

Table 3: Weights construction error checking

| Country | Pop. 18+ | Σw_1 | Σw_2 | Abs. Dif. 1 | Abs. Dif. 2 |
|-----------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| All | 562,386,974 | 559,252,831 | 557,252,276 | 3,134,143 | 5,134,699 |
| Argentina | 31,913,814 | 31,762,027 | 31,655,762 | 151,787 | 258,052 |
| Brazil | 159,220,368 | 158,991,545 | 158,677,148 | 228,823 | 543,220 |
| Mexico | 118,902,776 | 118,112,316 | 117,145,192 | 790,461 | 1,757,585 |
| USA | 252,350,016 | 250,386,944 | 249,774,175 | 1,963,072 | 2,575,841 |

All values are rounded to the nearest integer.

1.3 Imputation for Missing Covariates

There are 121 observations from Brazil, and 203 observations for the US that do not have a value for the socioeconomic covariate. We impute the median socioeconomic level in the population to the missing observations. For Brazil the median socioeconomic level is C2 and for the US is income bracket \$65,000-\$69,000.

1.4 Trimming of PS Weight Variables

Since the right tail of the distribution is very long for some of the weights and some of the countries we trim them. The trimming procedure is done by country and weight variable. We calculate the 99th percentile of the variable for each country, and then truncate the distribution such that any weight larger than the 99th percentile is exactly equal to that value.

1.5 Summary Statistics of the PS Weights

Table 4 provides summary information for the post-stratification weight variables:

Table 4: Summary Statistics of the PS Weights

| Country | Weight Version | Mean | Median | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. | N |
|-----------|----------------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|---------|--------|
| All | 1 | 31,498 | 27,779 | 26,944 | 3,223 | 183,925 | 17,755 |
| All | 2 | 31,386 | 22,692 | 33,195 | 1,831 | 225,178 | 17,755 |
| Argentina | 1 | 7,126 | 6,908 | 2,172 | 3,223 | 22,294 | 4,457 |
| Argentina | 2 | 7,102 | 5,806 | 5,078 | 2,875 | 36,678 | 4,457 |
| Brazil | 1 | 36,028 | 35,295 | 7,674 | 20,415 | 58,518 | 4,413 |
| Brazil | 2 | 35,957 | 29,779 | 18,117 | 12,176 | 100,456 | 4,413 |
| Mexico | 1 | 26,771 | 21,961 | 16,710 | 3,770 | 81,384 | 4,412 |
| Mexico | 2 | 26,551 | 17,096 | 27,604 | 1,831 | 148,065 | 4,412 |
| USA | 1 | 55,977 | 45,419 | 36,199 | 11,195 | 183,925 | 4,473 |
| USA | 2 | 55,840 | 42,660 | 45,210 | 3,800 | 225,178 | 4,473 |

All values are rounded to the nearest integer.

2 Comparison between survey and country population

In this section, we explore the representativeness of our four-country samples to their respective national population. In each of Tables 5–8, column 1 provides information on the country’s national mean value per demographic characteristic (for example, share female), column 2 provides information on the unweighted sample mean, while columns 3–4 are the survey sample values mean after applying post-stratification (raked) weights as described above. Tables 5–8 show that the post-stratification weighted sample mirrors the national population rather well.

Table 5: Argentina: survey representativeness

| Characteristic | Share in Population | Share in Survey Unweighted | Share with Raked Weights | |
|---|------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------|
| | | | w1 | w2 |
| Gender | | | | |
| Male | 49.00 | 49.11 | 48.92 | 49.00 |
| Female | 51.00 | 50.89 | 51.08 | 51.00 |
| Age | | | | |
| 18-24 | 16.04 | 19.50 | 16.12 | 16.16 |
| 25-34 | 21.49 | 22.46 | 21.59 | 21.59 |
| 35-44 | 19.35 | 18.89 | 19.44 | 19.41 |
| 45-54 | 14.94 | 15.73 | 15.01 | 14.99 |
| 55-64 | 12.52 | 12.09 | 12.58 | 12.57 |
| 65-74 | 9.11 | 9.18 | 9.15 | 9.11 |
| 75+ | 6.55 | 2.15 | 6.10 | 6.16 |
| Provinces | | | | |
| Buenos Aires | 39.00 | 37.00 | 38.81 | 39.06 |
| Catamarca | 0.91 | 0.94 | 0.91 | 0.92 |
| Chaco | 2.63 | 2.76 | 2.64 | 2.64 |
| Chubut | 1.26 | 1.32 | 1.27 | 1.27 |
| Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires | 7.20 | 7.29 | 7.23 | 7.08 |
| Corrientes | 2.47 | 2.51 | 2.48 | 2.23 |
| Córdoba | 8.24 | 8.46 | 8.26 | 8.31 |
| Entre Ríos | 3.08 | 3.10 | 3.07 | 3.10 |
| Formosa | 1.32 | 1.35 | 1.33 | 1.33 |
| Jujuy | 1.67 | 1.82 | 1.68 | 1.68 |
| La Pampa | 0.80 | 0.83 | 0.80 | 0.81 |
| La Rioja | 0.83 | 0.92 | 0.83 | 0.84 |
| Mendoza | 4.33 | 4.58 | 4.35 | 4.36 |
| Misiones | 2.74 | 2.78 | 2.75 | 2.76 |
| Neuquén | 1.37 | 1.50 | 1.38 | 1.38 |
| Río Negro | 1.60 | 1.68 | 1.61 | 1.61 |
| Salta | 3.02 | 3.07 | 3.03 | 3.04 |
| San Juan | 1.70 | 1.73 | 1.71 | 1.70 |
| San Luis | 1.07 | 1.19 | 1.08 | 1.08 |
| Santa Cruz | 0.68 | 0.70 | 0.68 | 0.69 |
| Santa Fe | 8.00 | 8.23 | 8.00 | 8.02 |
| Santiago del Estero | 2.17 | 2.24 | 2.18 | 2.18 |
| Tierra del Fuego, Antártida e Islas del Atlántico Sur | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.31 | 0.31 |
| Tucumán | 3.60 | 3.66 | 3.62 | 3.61 |
| Socioeconomic Status | | | | |
| AB/C1 | 5.10 | 5.68 | 5.13 | 5.13 |
| C2 | 18.00 | 18.20 | 17.89 | 17.52 |
| C3 | 30.20 | 28.18 | 30.06 | 30.12 |
| D1 | 32.00 | 32.48 | 32.10 | 32.38 |
| D2/E | 14.70 | 15.47 | 14.82 | 14.85 |
| Ideology | | | | |
| Very conservative | 8.96 | 5.77 | - | 9.03 |
| Moderately conservative | 16.86 | 17.75 | - | 16.99 |
| Neither conservative nor liberal | 43.17 | 56.41 | - | 43.52 |
| Moderately liberal | 18.35 | 17.52 | - | 18.50 |
| Very liberal | 12.66 | 2.56 | - | 11.95 |

Table 6: Brazil: survey representativeness

| Characteristic | Share in | Share in Survey | Share with Raked Weights | |
|----------------------------------|------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-------|
| | Population | Unweighted | w1 | w2 |
| Gender | | | | |
| Male | 49.30 | 47.04 | 49.28 | 49.30 |
| Female | 50.70 | 52.96 | 50.72 | 50.70 |
| Age | | | | |
| 18-24 | 17.00 | 22.48 | 17.02 | 17.06 |
| 25-34 | 22.04 | 22.32 | 22.07 | 22.11 |
| 35-44 | 20.45 | 19.90 | 20.48 | 20.51 |
| 45-54 | 16.31 | 14.73 | 16.33 | 16.30 |
| 55-64 | 12.46 | 8.79 | 12.34 | 12.24 |
| 65+ | 11.74 | 11.78 | 11.76 | 11.78 |
| Provinces | | | | |
| Acre | 0.40 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.40 |
| Alagoas | 1.62 | 1.74 | 1.62 | 1.61 |
| Amapá | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.38 |
| Amazonas | 1.96 | 2.06 | 1.96 | 1.97 |
| Bahia | 7.40 | 7.80 | 7.41 | 7.42 |
| Ceará | 4.34 | 4.74 | 4.35 | 4.35 |
| Distrito Federal | 1.46 | 1.61 | 1.46 | 1.46 |
| Espírito Santo | 1.94 | 2.18 | 1.94 | 1.95 |
| Goiás | 3.26 | 3.87 | 3.26 | 3.27 |
| Maranhão | 3.37 | 3.17 | 3.37 | 3.36 |
| Mato Grosso | 1.61 | 1.70 | 1.61 | 1.62 |
| Mato Grosso do Sul | 1.30 | 1.40 | 1.30 | 1.30 |
| Minas Gerais | 10.17 | 10.72 | 10.18 | 10.20 |
| Paraná | 5.45 | 5.64 | 5.46 | 5.47 |
| Paraíba | 1.94 | 2.08 | 1.94 | 1.95 |
| Pará | 4.03 | 3.74 | 4.03 | 4.04 |
| Pernambuco | 4.56 | 4.78 | 4.57 | 4.56 |
| Piauí | 1.55 | 1.31 | 1.55 | 1.55 |
| Rio Grande do Norte | 1.70 | 1.72 | 1.70 | 1.71 |
| Rio Grande do Sul | 5.45 | 5.55 | 5.46 | 5.45 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 8.07 | 8.27 | 8.08 | 8.08 |
| Rondônia | 0.87 | 1.02 | 0.87 | 0.87 |
| Roraima | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Santa Catarina | 3.37 | 3.67 | 3.37 | 3.37 |
| Sergipe | 1.10 | 1.11 | 1.10 | 1.10 |
| São Paulo | 21.71 | 18.26 | 21.61 | 21.56 |
| Tocantins | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.74 | 0.74 |
| Socioeconomic Status | | | | |
| A | 2.50 | 2.56 | 2.50 | 2.51 |
| B1 | 4.40 | 3.90 | 4.40 | 4.41 |
| B2 | 16.50 | 16.68 | 16.52 | 16.54 |
| C1 | 21.50 | 22.86 | 21.53 | 21.48 |
| C2 | 26.80 | 24.16 | 26.72 | 26.72 |
| D-E | 28.30 | 29.84 | 28.32 | 28.33 |
| Ideology | | | | |
| Very conservative | 23.02 | 27.44 | - | 23.09 |
| Moderately conservative | 18.90 | 7 8.79 | - | 18.66 |
| Neither conservative nor liberal | 28.21 | 37.75 | - | 28.31 |
| Moderately liberal | 15.51 | 9.02 | - | 15.53 |
| Very liberal | 14.36 | 17.00 | - | 14.41 |

Table 7: Mexico: survey representativeness

| Characteristic | Share in | Share in Survey | Share with Raked Weights | |
|----------------------------------|------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-------|
| | Population | Unweighted | w1 | w2 |
| Gender | | | | |
| Male | 48.60 | 47.82 | 48.52 | 48.42 |
| Female | 51.40 | 52.18 | 51.48 | 51.58 |
| Age | | | | |
| 18-24 | 21.10 | 29.03 | 21.24 | 21.41 |
| 25-34 | 24.87 | 23.37 | 25.00 | 24.80 |
| 35-44 | 22.05 | 20.01 | 22.14 | 22.12 |
| 45-54 | 15.84 | 14.57 | 15.86 | 15.84 |
| 55-64 | 10.11 | 7.09 | 9.70 | 9.73 |
| 65+ | 6.03 | 5.92 | 6.05 | 6.10 |
| Provinces | | | | |
| Aguascalientes | 1.05 | 1.34 | 1.06 | 1.07 |
| Baja California | 2.81 | 3.15 | 2.83 | 2.85 |
| Baja California Sur | 0.57 | 0.82 | 0.57 | 0.58 |
| Campeche | 0.73 | 0.86 | 0.74 | 0.74 |
| Chiapas | 4.27 | 2.56 | 4.20 | 4.30 |
| Chihuahua | 3.03 | 2.18 | 3.02 | 3.02 |
| Ciudad De Mexico | 7.88 | 3.88 | 7.84 | 7.59 |
| Coahuila | 2.45 | 2.79 | 2.46 | 2.48 |
| Colima | 0.58 | 0.63 | 0.58 | 0.59 |
| Durango | 1.45 | 1.13 | 1.46 | 1.45 |
| Guanajuato | 4.88 | 3.40 | 4.88 | 4.85 |
| Guerrero | 3.02 | 2.40 | 2.97 | 3.02 |
| Hidalgo | 2.37 | 1.54 | 2.36 | 2.32 |
| Jalisco | 6.54 | 9.36 | 6.59 | 6.64 |
| Mexico | 13.51 | 9.27 | 13.52 | 13.52 |
| Michoacan | 3.87 | 2.56 | 3.85 | 3.72 |
| Morelos | 1.58 | 3.90 | 1.59 | 1.61 |
| Nayarit | 0.97 | 1.18 | 0.97 | 0.98 |
| Nuevo Leon | 4.14 | 7.62 | 4.17 | 4.20 |
| Oaxaca | 3.38 | 1.84 | 3.32 | 3.24 |
| Puebla | 5.15 | 8.05 | 5.18 | 5.22 |
| Queretaro | 1.63 | 3.69 | 1.64 | 1.65 |
| Quintana Roo | 1.18 | 2.61 | 1.19 | 1.20 |
| San Luis Potosi | 2.30 | 1.68 | 2.32 | 2.34 |
| Sinaloa | 2.46 | 1.79 | 2.48 | 2.42 |
| Sonora | 2.37 | 2.56 | 2.39 | 2.41 |
| Tabasco | 1.99 | 2.15 | 2.01 | 2.02 |
| Tamaulipas | 2.91 | 1.81 | 2.90 | 2.92 |
| Tlaxcala | 1.04 | 1.38 | 1.05 | 1.06 |
| Veracruz | 6.80 | 7.55 | 6.85 | 6.89 |
| Yucatan | 1.74 | 3.63 | 1.75 | 1.77 |
| Zacatecas | 1.33 | 0.70 | 1.28 | 1.34 |
| Socioeconomic Status | | | | |
| ABC+ | 17.00 | 23.93 | 17.11 | 17.26 |
| C/C- | 27.00 | 29.71 | 27.14 | 27.27 |
| D+ | 15.00 | 20.74 | 15.10 | 15.19 |
| D/E | 41.00 | 25.61 | 40.64 | 40.29 |
| Ideology | | | | |
| Very conservative | 11.01 | 9.68 | - | 11.18 |
| Moderately conservative | 20.84 | 12.13 | - | 20.99 |
| Neither conservative nor liberal | 33.38 | 64.46 | - | 33.88 |
| Moderately liberal | 21.53 | 9.25 | - | 21.36 |
| Very liberal | 13.24 | 4.49 | - | 12.59 |

Table 8: USA: survey representativeness

| Characteristic | Share in | Share in Survey | Share with Raked Weights | |
|--|------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-------|
| | Population | Unweighted | w1 | w2 |
| Gender | | | | |
| Male | 49.20 | 49.83 | 49.25 | 49.32 |
| Female | 50.80 | 50.17 | 50.75 | 50.68 |
| Age | | | | |
| 18-24 | 13.03 | 14.31 | 12.94 | 12.88 |
| 25-44 | 35.13 | 37.22 | 35.20 | 35.24 |
| 45-64 | 34.74 | 32.24 | 34.72 | 34.72 |
| 65+ | 17.10 | 16.23 | 17.13 | 17.16 |
| Provinces | | | | |
| Northeast | 17.10 | 20.75 | 17.23 | 17.27 |
| Midwest | 20.80 | 19.25 | 20.94 | 20.96 |
| South | 23.90 | 37.89 | 24.09 | 24.15 |
| West | 38.20 | 22.11 | 37.73 | 37.62 |
| Socioeconomic Status (in dollars) | | | | |
| Less than 14,999 | 9.05 | 17.19 | 9.12 | 9.15 |
| 15,000 to 19,999 | 4.03 | 4.09 | 4.06 | 4.07 |
| 20,000 to 24,999 | 3.94 | 5.45 | 3.97 | 3.98 |
| 25,000 to 29,999 | 4.09 | 5.03 | 4.12 | 4.13 |
| 30,000 to 34,999 | 4.25 | 5.54 | 4.28 | 4.29 |
| 35,000 to 39,999 | 3.66 | 3.91 | 3.69 | 3.70 |
| 40,000 to 44,999 | 4.19 | 4.27 | 4.22 | 4.23 |
| 45,000 to 49,999 | 3.87 | 3.82 | 3.90 | 3.91 |
| 50,000 to 54,999 | 3.80 | 5.07 | 3.83 | 3.84 |
| 55,000 to 59,999 | 3.40 | 2.73 | 3.42 | 3.43 |
| 60,000 to 64,999 | 3.53 | 2.57 | 3.55 | 3.56 |
| 65,000 to 69,999 | 2.85 | 7.00 | 2.87 | 2.87 |
| 70,000 to 74,999 | 2.96 | 3.15 | 2.99 | 2.99 |
| 75,000 to 79,999 | 2.76 | 3.09 | 2.78 | 2.79 |
| 80,000 to 84,999 | 2.65 | 1.68 | 2.67 | 2.66 |
| 85,000 to 89,999 | 2.35 | 1.50 | 2.36 | 2.37 |
| 90,000 to 94,999 | 2.35 | 1.70 | 2.37 | 2.38 |
| 95,000 to 99,999 | 2.19 | 2.53 | 2.21 | 2.22 |
| 100,000 to 124,999 | 9.43 | 5.54 | 9.46 | 9.50 |
| 125,000 to 149,999 | 6.12 | 4.38 | 6.16 | 6.18 |
| 150,000 to 174,999 | 5.02 | 3.47 | 5.05 | 5.03 |
| 175,000 to 199,999 | 3.27 | 1.77 | 3.27 | 3.26 |
| 200,000 to 249,999 | 4.17 | 2.12 | 4.08 | 3.87 |
| 250,000 and above | 6.08 | 2.39 | 5.54 | 5.58 |
| Ideology | | | | |
| Very conservative | 4.69 | 15.98 | - | 4.74 |
| Moderately conservative | 36.64 | 25.60 | - | 36.33 |
| Neither conservative nor liberal | 27.11 | 29.44 | - | 27.34 |
| Moderately liberal | 27.29 | 19.54 | - | 27.28 |
| Very liberal | 4.27 | 9.43 | - | 4.31 |

3 General Support for Democracy




Figure 1: Figure presents the distribution of response, by country, to the following question: *I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States? The first one is having a strong leader who does not have to bother with congress and elections. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?.* Top panel are mean values for those respondents who report voting for the incumbent in the last presidential elections. The bottom panel are those respondents who report not voting for the incumbent.




Figure 2: Figure presents the distribution of response, by country, to the following question: *What about having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing.* Top panel are mean values for those respondents who report voting for the incumbent in the last presidential elections. The bottom panel are those respondents who report not voting for the incumbent.




Figure 3: Figure presents the distribution of response, by country, to the following question: *What about having a democratic political system. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?* Top panel are mean values for those respondents who report voting for the incumbent in the last presidential elections. The bottom panel are those respondents who report not voting for the incumbent.

4 Vignette Verbatim and Results in Tabular Form

For each of the three vignette, we first share its text as seen by respondents before presenting regression results in tabular form. Our survey was written in English for the USA sample, and then translated to both Spanish (Mexico and Argentina) and Portuguese (Brazil).

4.1 Note on estimation

As for regression results: While in the main text we report predictive probabilities, in Tables 9–17 below we report the marginal effect coefficients of treatments by our moderating variable: (the self-reported) support for the president in the past elections. As per our pre-analysis plan, all models are estimated using OLS while also adjusting for the following covariates: gender (binary), age (continuous), tertiary education (binary), socio-economic status (5-points categorical scale), support incumbent (binary), conservative liberal (binary). Tables 18–20, we report balance tests for the three treatments.

4.2 Vignette 1a: Purge EPA civil servant

Now we'd like you to read a brief news article about recent political events in another country. Imagine you are a citizen of that country.

The newly elected president has issued new guidelines that reverse existing environment protection rules. The president campaigned on loosening environment protection rules, which he claims will help grow the economy. The new guidelines, however, have not been implemented yet due to resistance from professional civil servants. These civil servants are arguing that the changes the president is pushing for will significantly harm the environment and violate the responsibilities of the government agency that is legally responsible for protecting the environment. The civil servants have been appointed by a meritocratic process based on their expertise, and not by political affiliation, and have served under different administrations across the political spectrum. The president has decided to remove the civil servants and replace them with loyalists who will implement his proposed policies that loosen protection of the environment.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION A:] [change law]: There is an existing law that protects civil servants from being fired on the basis of their expertise-based opinions. This law is meant to protect the ability of government agencies to carry out the work they are legally charged with. The president's party changed the law that protects civil servants in order to enable him to replace any civil servant he desires. The president declared that replacing civil servants as he desires is consistent with his electoral victory and campaign promises.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION B:] [ignore law] There is an existing law that protects civil servants from being fired on the basis of their expertise-based opinions. This law is meant to protect the ability of government agencies to carry out the work they are legally charged with. The president ignored the law, declaring that replacing civil servants as he desires is consistent with his electoral victory and campaign promises.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION C:] [ignore norm] There is a longstanding practice that civil servants are not fired on the basis of their expertise-based opinions. This practice developed to protect the ability of government agencies to carry out the work they are legally charged with. The president ignored the practice, declaring that replacing civil servants as he desires is consistent with his electoral victory and campaign promises.

[QUESTIONS (the same questions follow each of the three vignettes)]

Q27: Again, imagine you are a citizen of the country described in the news brief. Would you support the president's action to remove civil servants and replace them with loyalists?

1. No; I would not support the president's actions (0)
2. Yes; I would support the president's actions (1)

Q29: Imagine that there is a scale that measures whether actions of the president are consistent with democracy. The scale ranges from 1, which represents a major violation of democracy, to 4, which represents actions completely consistent with democracy. Where would you place the president's choice to remove civil servants and replace them with loyalists on the scale?

1. Not at all consistent with democracy (0)
2. Not too consistent with democracy (0)
3. Mostly consistent with democracy (1)
4. Very consistent with democracy (1)

Q31: Do you think the president's action merits impeachment (that Congress removes him from the office)?

1. No; removing civil servants is within the president's authority (0)
2. No; impeachment should only be used as a last resort for extreme abuse of power (0)
3. Yes; the president's actions merit impeachment (1)

Table 9: DV: Support the president's action (Q27)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|---------|
| | Argentina | Argentina | Argentina | Brazil | Brazil | Brazil | Mexico | Mexico | Mexico | USA | USA | USA |
| | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 |
| Ignore Law × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.000 | -0.001 | -0.005 | -0.016 | -0.018 | -0.028 | -0.008 | 0.028 | 0.050 | -0.017 | -0.028 | -0.018 |
| | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.019) | (0.023) | (0.028) | (0.040) | (0.023) | (0.020) | (0.021) |
| Ignore Law × Voted for Incumbent | 0.037 | 0.034 | 0.030 | -0.039 | -0.028 | -0.042 | -0.001 | 0.046 | 0.031 | -0.060 | -0.053 | -0.079 |
| | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.033) | (0.041) | (0.042) | (0.044) | (0.037) | (0.045) | (0.053) | (0.047) | (0.056) | (0.061) |
| Ignore Norm × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.000 | -0.003 | -0.007 | -0.021 | -0.026* | -0.032 | -0.000 | 0.028 | 0.033 | -0.053** | -0.025 | -0.019 |
| | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.035) | (0.022) | (0.024) | (0.023) |
| Ignore Norm × Voted for Incumbent | 0.059* | 0.067** | 0.092** | 0.018 | 0.027 | 0.013 | 0.058 | 0.065 | 0.053 | 0.013 | -0.011 | -0.025 |
| | (0.032) | (0.034) | (0.045) | (0.042) | (0.044) | (0.046) | (0.039) | (0.044) | (0.054) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.062) |
| Number of Observations | 1,897 | 1,897 | 1,897 | 1,640 | 1,640 | 1,640 | 1,739 | 1,739 | 1,739 | 1,592 | 1,592 | 1,592 |
| R^2 | 0.033 | 0.036 | 0.043 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.088 | 0.038 | 0.035 | 0.037 | 0.135 | 0.153 | 0.143 |

OLS Estimates: The dependent variable is binary. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *change law* is the omitted category.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10: DV: Action consistent with democracy (Q29)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Argentina | Argentina | Argentina | Brazil | Brazil | Brazil | Mexico | Mexico | Mexico | USA | USA | USA |
| | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 |
| Ignore Law × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.012 (0.015) | 0.011 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.016) | -0.023 (0.018) | -0.020 (0.018) | -0.015 (0.021) | -0.001 (0.023) | 0.014 (0.025) | 0.028 (0.037) | -0.027 (0.024) | -0.022 (0.024) | -0.020 (0.026) |
| Ignore Law × Voted for Incumbent | 0.036 (0.032) | 0.030 (0.031) | -0.000 (0.039) | -0.026 (0.037) | -0.035 (0.038) | -0.034 (0.040) | 0.027 (0.033) | 0.058 (0.040) | 0.081 (0.050) | -0.004 (0.046) | 0.036 (0.054) | 0.018 (0.058) |
| Ignore Norm × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.003 (0.014) | 0.001 (0.013) | -0.009 (0.015) | -0.021 (0.018) | -0.017 (0.019) | -0.021 (0.021) | -0.022 (0.021) | 0.001 (0.024) | -0.001 (0.032) | -0.004 (0.026) | 0.023 (0.027) | 0.017 (0.028) |
| Ignore Norm × Voted for Incumbent | 0.074** (0.035) | 0.080** (0.036) | 0.077 (0.050) | 0.083** (0.041) | 0.093** (0.043) | 0.080* (0.045) | 0.073** (0.035) | 0.078** (0.039) | 0.059 (0.045) | 0.060 (0.049) | 0.093* (0.056) | 0.094 (0.060) |
| Number of Observations | 1,897 | 1,897 | 1,897 | 1,641 | 1,641 | 1,641 | 1,739 | 1,739 | 1,739 | 1,593 | 1,593 | 1,593 |
| R^2 | 0.028 | 0.030 | 0.035 | 0.067 | 0.071 | 0.065 | 0.037 | 0.039 | 0.042 | 0.092 | 0.100 | 0.087 |

OLS Estimates: The dependent variable is binary. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *change law* is the omitted category.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11: DV: Oppose impeachment (Q31)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Argentina | Argentina | Argentina | Brazil | Brazil | Brazil | Mexico | Mexico | Mexico | USA | USA | USA |
| | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 |
| Ignore Law × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.064** (0.032) | 0.056* (0.034) | 0.047 (0.038) | -0.002 (0.035) | -0.015 (0.036) | 0.013 (0.039) | -0.006 (0.039) | 0.026 (0.045) | -0.002 (0.055) | -0.067* (0.038) | -0.056 (0.045) | -0.054 (0.048) |
| Ignore Law × Voted for Incumbent | 0.124*** (0.042) | 0.128*** (0.042) | 0.161*** (0.056) | -0.005 (0.044) | -0.005 (0.043) | 0.015 (0.051) | -0.021 (0.040) | 0.004 (0.045) | 0.029 (0.052) | -0.058 (0.038) | -0.072 (0.045) | -0.077 (0.050) |
| Ignore Norm × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.023 (0.031) | 0.026 (0.033) | 0.019 (0.037) | 0.007 (0.035) | 0.001 (0.036) | 0.010 (0.040) | 0.040 (0.038) | 0.019 (0.044) | 0.052 (0.053) | 0.024 (0.038) | 0.031 (0.044) | 0.018 (0.046) |
| Ignore Norm × Voted for Incumbent | 0.089** (0.044) | 0.101** (0.043) | 0.136** (0.056) | 0.021 (0.043) | 0.015 (0.042) | 0.047 (0.049) | 0.022 (0.038) | 0.024 (0.044) | 0.011 (0.055) | 0.008 (0.037) | -0.011 (0.045) | 0.001 (0.048) |
| Number of Observations | 1,896 | 1,896 | 1,896 | 1,639 | 1,639 | 1,639 | 1,736 | 1,736 | 1,736 | 1,593 | 1,593 | 1,593 |
| R^2 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.029 | 0.199 | 0.200 | 0.188 | 0.067 | 0.066 | 0.073 | 0.145 | 0.145 | 0.138 |

OLS Estimates: The dependent variable is binary. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *change law* is the omitted category.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.3 Vignette 1b: Purge Prosecutors at DoJ

Now we'd like you to read a brief news article about recent political events in another country. Imagine you are a citizen of that country.

The president has ordered the department of justice to investigate his main political opponent whom he accused of corruption. The justice department is headed by public prosecutors who have been appointed through a non-political meritocratic process based on their expertise and have served under different administrations across the political spectrum. The justice department, whose mandate is to enforce federal law, refused the president's order, alleging that there is not sufficient evidence to merit an investigation. In response, the president decides to replace the long-term public prosecutors with loyalists who will start an investigation against his main opponent.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION A:] [**change law**] There is an existing law that protects public prosecutors from being fired on the basis of their expertise-based decisions. This law is meant to protect the mandate of government agencies. The president's party changed the law in order to enable him to replace any public prosecutor he desires. The president declared that replacing public prosecutors as he desires is consistent with his electoral victory and campaign promises.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION B:] [**ignore law**] There is an existing law that protects public prosecutors from being fired on the basis of their expertise-based decisions. This law is meant to protect the mandate of government agencies. The president ignored the law, declaring that replacing public prosecutors as he desires is consistent with his electoral victory and campaign promises.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION C:] [**ignore norm**] There is a longstanding practice that public prosecutors are not fired on the basis of their expertise-based decisions. This practice is meant to ensure the independence of prosecutors and protect them from political interference. The president ignored the practice, declaring that replacing public prosecutors as he desires is consistent with his electoral victory and campaign promises.

Table 12: DV: Support purge of prosecutors (Q30)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Argentina | Argentina | Argentina | Brazil | Brazil | Brazil | Mexico | Mexico | Mexico | USA | USA | USA |
| | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 |
| Ignore Law × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | -0.012 (0.015) | -0.012 (0.014) | -0.003 (0.014) | -0.001 (0.017) | 0.005 (0.018) | 0.010 (0.019) | -0.010 (0.022) | -0.011 (0.028) | 0.065* (0.039) | -0.018 (0.024) | -0.034 (0.026) | -0.035 (0.028) |
| Ignore Law × Voted for Incumbent | -0.019 (0.034) | -0.025 (0.034) | -0.059 (0.049) | -0.084* (0.045) | -0.075 (0.046) | -0.063 (0.046) | -0.037 (0.039) | -0.057 (0.044) | -0.041 (0.056) | 0.043 (0.051) | 0.081 (0.060) | 0.089 (0.064) |
| Ignore Norm × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.003 (0.015) | 0.002 (0.014) | 0.019 (0.018) | -0.007 (0.016) | -0.007 (0.017) | -0.005 (0.016) | 0.048** (0.024) | 0.060* (0.032) | 0.091*** (0.034) | -0.013 (0.024) | 0.007 (0.030) | 0.005 (0.032) |
| Ignore Norm × Voted for Incumbent | -0.020 (0.033) | -0.024 (0.034) | -0.050 (0.049) | -0.091* (0.047) | -0.094** (0.047) | -0.064 (0.049) | 0.001 (0.041) | 0.035 (0.048) | 0.007 (0.060) | -0.029 (0.050) | -0.007 (0.059) | 0.002 (0.061) |
| Number of Observations | 1,887 | 1,887 | 1,887 | 1,673 | 1,673 | 1,673 | 1,813 | 1,813 | 1,813 | 1,432 | 1,432 | 1,432 |
| R^2 | 0.035 | 0.040 | 0.049 | 0.163 | 0.163 | 0.135 | 0.080 | 0.077 | 0.076 | 0.146 | 0.154 | 0.122 |

OLS Estimates: The dependent variable is binary. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *change law* is the omitted category.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13: DV: Action consistent with democracy (Q32)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | Argentina | Argentina | Argentina | Brazil | Brazil | Brazil | Mexico | Mexico | Mexico | USA | USA | USA |
| | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 |
| Ignore Law × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | -0.001 (0.015) | -0.001 (0.014) | 0.007 (0.014) | 0.017 (0.020) | 0.019 (0.021) | 0.021 (0.021) | 0.014 (0.022) | 0.021 (0.030) | 0.067* (0.039) | 0.020 (0.028) | 0.008 (0.029) | 0.016 (0.031) |
| Ignore Law × Voted for Incumbent | -0.009 (0.035) | -0.013 (0.035) | -0.039 (0.047) | -0.095** (0.042) | -0.097** (0.044) | -0.097** (0.045) | -0.044 (0.037) | -0.069* (0.041) | -0.059 (0.055) | -0.026 (0.050) | -0.021 (0.059) | 0.019 (0.063) |
| Ignore Norm × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.008 (0.015) | 0.008 (0.014) | 0.020 (0.017) | 0.014 (0.020) | 0.007 (0.020) | 0.007 (0.020) | 0.008 (0.022) | 0.010 (0.029) | 0.022 (0.029) | -0.006 (0.028) | 0.010 (0.030) | 0.021 (0.031) |
| Ignore Norm × Voted for Incumbent | -0.034 (0.033) | -0.037 (0.033) | -0.038 (0.047) | -0.065 (0.044) | -0.067 (0.046) | -0.056 (0.049) | 0.008 (0.039) | 0.053 (0.048) | 0.043 (0.060) | -0.047 (0.051) | -0.025 (0.060) | 0.001 (0.063) |
| Number of Observations | 1,887 | 1,887 | 1,887 | 1,672 | 1,672 | 1,672 | 1,813 | 1,813 | 1,813 | 1,431 | 1,431 | 1,431 |
| R^2 | 0.029 | 0.032 | 0.038 | 0.090 | 0.097 | 0.089 | 0.063 | 0.067 | 0.078 | 0.099 | 0.109 | 0.083 |

OLS Estimates: The dependent variable is binary. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *change law* is the omitted category.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14: DV: Oppose impeachment (Q34)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | Argentina | Argentina | Argentina | Brazil | Brazil | Brazil | Mexico | Mexico | Mexico | USA | USA | USA |
| | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 |
| Ignore Law × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.014 (0.034) | 0.002 (0.035) | 0.041 (0.039) | 0.050 (0.036) | 0.061* (0.037) | 0.059 (0.040) | -0.011 (0.038) | 0.014 (0.045) | 0.061 (0.054) | 0.034 (0.040) | 0.065 (0.046) | 0.095** (0.048) |
| Ignore Law × Voted for Incumbent | -0.009 (0.046) | -0.014 (0.047) | 0.023 (0.064) | 0.008 (0.038) | 0.005 (0.039) | 0.029 (0.042) | -0.026 (0.041) | -0.042 (0.048) | -0.027 (0.058) | 0.039 (0.032) | 0.027 (0.034) | 0.018 (0.032) |
| Ignore Norm × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.042 (0.034) | 0.014 (0.036) | 0.037 (0.039) | -0.005 (0.035) | -0.002 (0.036) | 0.007 (0.038) | 0.058 (0.037) | 0.070 (0.044) | 0.101* (0.053) | 0.007 (0.039) | 0.047 (0.045) | 0.068 (0.048) |
| Ignore Norm × Voted for Incumbent | -0.008 (0.045) | -0.013 (0.045) | 0.084 (0.058) | 0.020 (0.038) | 0.018 (0.040) | 0.027 (0.046) | 0.022 (0.040) | 0.046 (0.045) | 0.057 (0.053) | -0.005 (0.035) | -0.010 (0.036) | -0.013 (0.035) |
| Number of Observations | 1,883 | 1,883 | 1,883 | 1,671 | 1,671 | 1,671 | 1,811 | 1,811 | 1,811 | 1,433 | 1,433 | 1,433 |
| R^2 | 0.030 | 0.036 | 0.035 | 0.222 | 0.218 | 0.229 | 0.060 | 0.052 | 0.068 | 0.238 | 0.266 | 0.260 |

OLS Estimates: The dependent variable is binary. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *change law* is the omitted category.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.4 Vignette 2: Court Packing

Now we'd like you to read a brief news article about recent political events in another country. Imagine you are a citizen of that country.

The president and ruling party have been frustrated by the fact that the Supreme Court consistently strikes down their executive orders and legislation. In response, the president and the ruling party agree on the need to add sympathetic judges to the Court as a mean to advance their agenda. The constitution specifies the number of Supreme Court justices. No party has changed the number of justices in recent administrations. In collaboration with the president, the ruling party amends the constitution and installs four new sympathetic judges to ensure it has a majority over subsequent rulings.

[CONDITION A1: Justification: Polarization] [ideology: Conservative]

The right-wing ruling party argues that its [conservative] vision of justice is better for the country than the vision of the current [liberal] judges, which it claims endangers the country's core values. Critics say that by politicizing the judiciary, the actions of the president and the ruling party undermine the independence of the justice system.

[CONDITION A2: Justification: Polarization] [ideology: Liberal]

The left-wing ruling party argues that its [liberal] vision of justice is better for the country than the vision of the current [conservative] judges, which it claims endangers the country's core values. Critics say that by politicizing the judiciary, the actions of the president and the ruling party undermine the independence of the justice system.

[CONDITON B1: [Justification: Legitimacy] [Ideology: Conservative]:

The right-wing ruling party argues that the current makeup of the Supreme Court makes it illegitimate. It points to the fact that when the left-wing opposition party was in power, it changed the nomination process to make appointments easier and then appointed several sympathetic judges. Critics say that by politicizing the judiciary, the actions of the ruling party undermine the independence of the justice system.

[CONDITON B2: [Justification: Legitimacy] [Ideology: Liberal]:

The left-wing ruling party argues that the current makeup of the Supreme Court makes it illegitimate. It points to the fact that when the right-wing opposition party was in power, it changed the nomination process to make appointments easier and then appointed several sympathetic judges. Critics say that by politicizing the judiciary, the actions of the ruling party undermine the independence of the justice system.

[CONDITON C1: [Justification: Majoritarian] [Ideology: Conservative].

The right-wing ruling party argues that its electoral mandate gives it the responsibility to appoint judges that will advance the interests and priorities of the majority. Critics say that by politicizing the judiciary, the actions of the ruling party undermine the independence of the justice system.

[CONDITON C2 [Justification: Majoritarian] [Ideology: Liberal].

The left-wing ruling party argues that its electoral mandate gives it the responsibility to appoint judges that will advance the interests and priorities of the majority. Critics say that by politicizing the judiciary, the actions of the ruling party undermine the independence of the justice system.

Table 15: DV: Support court packing (Q45)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Argentina | Argentina | Argentina | Brazil | Brazil | Brazil | Mexico | Mexico | Mexico | USA | USA | USA |
| | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 |
| Legitimacy × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.004 | 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.033** | 0.006 | -0.010 | -0.009 | -0.002 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.030) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.022) |
| Legitimacy × Voted for Incumbent | -0.021 | -0.024 | 0.024 | 0.017 | 0.022 | 0.032 | 0.014 | -0.007 | -0.010 | 0.011 | 0.025 | 0.033 |
| | (0.027) | (0.029) | (0.039) | (0.032) | (0.033) | (0.036) | (0.029) | (0.033) | (0.041) | (0.034) | (0.041) | (0.044) |
| Majoritarian × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.019 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.018 | 0.015 | 0.025* | 0.014 | 0.012 | 0.010 | -0.007 | -0.005 | -0.008 |
| | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.023) | (0.030) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.022) |
| Majoritarian × Voted for Incumbent | 0.034 | 0.025 | 0.027 | 0.074** | 0.072** | 0.053 | -0.015 | -0.025 | 0.007 | -0.012 | -0.029 | -0.050 |
| | (0.029) | (0.031) | (0.036) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.037) | (0.029) | (0.034) | (0.043) | (0.034) | (0.040) | (0.042) |
| Number of Observations | 3,894 | 3,894 | 3,894 | 3,583 | 3,583 | 3,583 | 3,761 | 3,761 | 3,761 | 3,110 | 3,110 | 3,110 |
| R^2 | 0.056 | 0.061 | 0.067 | 0.195 | 0.198 | 0.180 | 0.053 | 0.050 | 0.055 | 0.097 | 0.111 | 0.096 |

OLS Estimates: The dependent variable is binary. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *polarization* is the omitted category.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 16: DV: Action consistent with democracy” (Q47)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Argentina | Argentina | Argentina | Brazil | Brazil | Brazil | Mexico | Mexico | Mexico | USA | USA | USA |
| | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 |
| Legitimacy × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | -0.011 | -0.013 | -0.024** | -0.006 | -0.005 | 0.014 | 0.005 | -0.006 | -0.005 | -0.002 | 0.008 | 0.016 |
| | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.020) | (0.025) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.021) |
| Legitimacy × Voted for Incumbent | 0.022 | 0.015 | 0.063 | 0.021 | 0.029 | 0.026 | 0.001 | -0.019 | -0.021 | 0.011 | 0.035 | 0.035 |
| | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.041) | (0.031) | (0.032) | (0.035) | (0.027) | (0.031) | (0.039) | (0.034) | (0.041) | (0.044) |
| Majoritarian × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | 0.007 | 0.005 | -0.006 | 0.008 | 0.009 | 0.015 | -0.000 | 0.002 | -0.005 | 0.012 | 0.031 | 0.026 |
| | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.020) | (0.025) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.022) |
| Majoritarian × Voted for Incumbent | 0.027 | 0.019 | 0.001 | 0.022 | 0.024 | 0.004 | -0.022 | -0.024 | -0.039 | 0.011 | -0.021 | -0.021 |
| | (0.027) | (0.029) | (0.035) | (0.032) | (0.033) | (0.035) | (0.027) | (0.032) | (0.040) | (0.034) | (0.039) | (0.043) |
| Number of Observations | 3,895 | 3,895 | 3,895 | 3,584 | 3,584 | 3,584 | 3,765 | 3,765 | 3,765 | 3,112 | 3,112 | 3,112 |
| R^2 | 0.041 | 0.046 | 0.061 | 0.102 | 0.103 | 0.096 | 0.051 | 0.048 | 0.059 | 0.071 | 0.086 | 0.076 |

OLS Estimates: The dependent variable is binary. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *polarization* is the omitted category.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 17: DV: Oppose impeachment (Q51)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|--|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | Argentina | Argentina | Argentina | Brazil | Brazil | Brazil | Mexico | Mexico | Mexico | USA | USA | USA |
| | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 | No | w1 | w2 |
| Legitimacy × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | -0.051** (0.024) | -0.045* (0.025) | -0.041 (0.027) | 0.019 (0.025) | 0.026 (0.026) | 0.041 (0.028) | 0.029 (0.026) | 0.003 (0.031) | 0.016 (0.038) | 0.020 (0.027) | 0.012 (0.032) | 0.011 (0.034) |
| Legitimacy × Voted for Incumbent | -0.019 (0.031) | -0.026 (0.032) | 0.008 (0.039) | 0.015 (0.026) | 0.013 (0.026) | 0.022 (0.030) | 0.033 (0.027) | 0.023 (0.030) | 0.016 (0.035) | 0.015 (0.028) | 0.030 (0.031) | 0.004 (0.033) |
| Majoritarian × Didn't Vote for Incumbent | -0.023 (0.023) | -0.022 (0.024) | -0.031 (0.027) | -0.008 (0.025) | -0.008 (0.025) | -0.024 (0.027) | 0.048* (0.026) | 0.048 (0.030) | 0.075** (0.037) | 0.002 (0.028) | 0.006 (0.033) | 0.002 (0.034) |
| Majoritarian × Voted for Incumbent | -0.008 (0.031) | -0.006 (0.031) | 0.020 (0.039) | -0.013 (0.027) | -0.014 (0.028) | -0.013 (0.033) | 0.007 (0.027) | 0.002 (0.032) | -0.001 (0.037) | -0.061** (0.030) | -0.081** (0.036) | -0.108*** (0.037) |
| Number of Observations | 3,894 | 3,894 | 3,894 | 3,584 | 3,584 | 3,584 | 3,761 | 3,761 | 3,761 | 3,110 | 3,110 | 3,110 |
| R^2 | 0.040 | 0.042 | 0.047 | 0.182 | 0.178 | 0.177 | 0.064 | 0.068 | 0.078 | 0.132 | 0.156 | 0.155 |

OLS Estimates: The dependent variable is binary. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *polarization* is the omitted category.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 18: Balance test: Vignette 1a: Purge EPA civil servant

| Variable | (1) change law | | (2) ignore law | | (3) ignore norm | | (4) Total | | T-test Difference | | |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------|---------|
| | N | Mean/SE | N | Mean/SE | N | Mean/SE | N | Mean/SE | (1)-(2) | (1)-(3) | (2)-(3) |
| Female | 2966 | 0.505 (0.009) | 2930 | 0.515 (0.009) | 2969 | 0.512 (0.009) | 8865 | 0.511 (0.005) | -0.010 | -0.006 | 0.003 |
| Age | 2966 | 40.541 (0.299) | 2930 | 40.581 (0.301) | 2969 | 40.614 (0.302) | 8865 | 40.579 (0.174) | -0.039 | -0.073 | -0.034 |
| Teritiary education | 2966 | 0.352 (0.009) | 2930 | 0.341 (0.009) | 2969 | 0.350 (0.009) | 8865 | 0.348 (0.005) | 0.011 | 0.002 | -0.009 |
| Income group | 2966 | 3.310 (0.023) | 2930 | 3.320 (0.024) | 2969 | 3.330 (0.024) | 8865 | 3.320 (0.014) | -0.010 | -0.020 | -0.010 |
| Support incumbent | 2966 | 0.364 (0.009) | 2930 | 0.372 (0.009) | 2969 | 0.369 (0.009) | 8865 | 0.368 (0.005) | -0.008 | -0.005 | 0.003 |
| Conservative | 2966 | 0.314 (0.009) | 2930 | 0.305 (0.009) | 2969 | 0.312 (0.009) | 8865 | 0.310 (0.005) | 0.009 | 0.002 | -0.007 |
| Liberal | 2966 | 0.230 (0.008) | 2930 | 0.226 (0.008) | 2969 | 0.223 (0.008) | 8865 | 0.226 (0.004) | 0.005 | 0.007 | 0.003 |

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. Fixed effects using variable Country are included in all estimation regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 19: Balance test: Vignette 1b: Purge Prosecutors at DoJ

| Variable | (1) change law | | (2) ignore law | | (3) ignore norm | | (4) Total | | T-test Difference | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------|---------|
| | N | Mean/SE | N | Mean/SE | N | Mean/SE | N | Mean/SE | (1)-(2) | (1)-(3) | (2)-(3) |
| Female | 2931 | 0.505 (0.009) | 2975 | 0.526 (0.009) | 2984 | 0.529 (0.009) | 8890 | 0.520 (0.005) | -0.021 | -0.024* | -0.002 |
| Age | 2931 | 40.356 (0.298) | 2975 | 39.995 (0.298) | 2984 | 40.168 (0.297) | 8890 | 40.172 (0.172) | 0.361 | 0.188 | -0.172 |
| Teritary education | 2931 | 0.342 (0.009) | 2975 | 0.339 (0.009) | 2984 | 0.345 (0.009) | 8890 | 0.342 (0.005) | 0.003 | -0.003 | -0.006 |
| Income group | 2931 | 3.335 (0.024) | 2975 | 3.347 (0.023) | 2984 | 3.306 (0.024) | 8890 | 3.329 (0.014) | -0.013 | 0.028 | 0.041 |
| Support incumbent | 2931 | 0.366 (0.009) | 2975 | 0.382 (0.009) | 2984 | 0.369 (0.009) | 8890 | 0.373 (0.005) | -0.015 | -0.003 | 0.013 |
| Conservative | 2931 | 0.317 (0.009) | 2975 | 0.304 (0.008) | 2984 | 0.297 (0.008) | 8890 | 0.306 (0.005) | 0.013 | 0.021 | 0.008 |
| Liberal | 2931 | 0.221 (0.008) | 2975 | 0.214 (0.008) | 2984 | 0.219 (0.008) | 8890 | 0.218 (0.004) | 0.008 | 0.002 | -0.005 |

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. Fixed effects using variable Country are included in all estimation regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 20: Balance test: Vignette 2: Court Packing

| Variable | (1) Polarization | | (2) Legitimacy | | (3) Majoritarian | | (4) Total | | T-test Difference | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------|---------|
| | N | Mean/SE | N | Mean/SE | N | Mean/SE | N | Mean/SE | (1)-(2) | (1)-(3) | (2)-(3) |
| Female | 5892 | 0.519 (0.007) | 5943 | 0.521 (0.006) | 5920 | 0.507 (0.006) | 17755 | 0.515 (0.004) | -0.002 | 0.012 | 0.014 |
| Age | 5892 | 40.366 (0.213) | 5943 | 40.543 (0.212) | 5920 | 40.215 (0.210) | 17755 | 40.375 (0.122) | -0.176 | 0.151 | 0.327 |
| Teritiary education | 5892 | 0.347 (0.006) | 5943 | 0.344 (0.006) | 5920 | 0.344 (0.006) | 17755 | 0.345 (0.004) | 0.003 | 0.002 | -0.001 |
| Income group | 5892 | 3.318 (0.017) | 5943 | 3.315 (0.017) | 5920 | 3.340 (0.017) | 17755 | 3.325 (0.010) | 0.002 | -0.023 | -0.025 |
| Support incumbent | 5892 | 0.368 (0.006) | 5943 | 0.380 (0.006) | 5920 | 0.363 (0.006) | 17755 | 0.370 (0.004) | -0.012 | 0.005 | 0.018** |
| Conservative | 5892 | 0.305 (0.006) | 5943 | 0.314 (0.006) | 5920 | 0.305 (0.006) | 17755 | 0.308 (0.003) | -0.008 | 0.000 | 0.009 |
| Liberal | 5892 | 0.229 (0.005) | 5943 | 0.213 (0.005) | 5920 | 0.224 (0.005) | 17755 | 0.222 (0.003) | 0.016** | 0.005 | -0.011 |

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. Fixed effects using variable Country are included in all estimation regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.